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MICROECONOMETRIC EVIDENCE OF FINANCING FRICTIONS AND INNOVATIVE
ACTIVITY1
Amaresh K Tiwari2, Pierre Mohnen3, Franz C Palm4
and Sybrand Schim van der Loeff5
Using Dutch data we empirically investigate how financing and innovation
vary across firm characteristics. We find that when firms face financial con-
straints, debt financing and innovation choices are not independent of firm char-
acteristics, and R&D slows down. In the absence of financial constraints, how-
ever, as they raise debt, firms become less inclined to innovate and the change
in the propensity to innovate no longer varies with firm characteristics. We find
that financing constraints faced, propensity to innovate, and R&D intensity are
not uniform across firm characteristics. A new “Control Function” estimator to
account for heterogeneity and endogeneity has been developed.
Keywords: Innovation, R&D, Capital Structure, Financial Constraints, Firm
Characteristics, Correlated Random Effects, Control Function, Expected a Pos-
teriori.
JEL Classification: G30, O30, C30
1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we empirically investigate how incentives to innovate interact with financing
frictions that are related to innovative activity. We show that financing and innovation
choices vary with firm characteristics such as size, age, and leverage for financially con-
1The authors gratefully acknowledge the financial support from The Netherlands Organization for Sci-
entific Research (NWO) under grant 400-03-109. The authors wish to thank Statistic Netherlands (CBS)
for providing the data; in particular, they would like to thank Gerard Meinen for helping with the different
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2strained and unconstrained firms. This implies that the incentives to innovate and the
extent and the nature of frictions are not uniform across firm characteristics. Our results,
thus, inform theory that in modeling firm dynamics, investment in R&D along with invest-
ment in physical capital and the financing decisions of the firm must be taken into account,
especially since, given the nature of R&D activity, the associated financing frictions can
be acute.
For our empirical analysis we use a unique data set where firms report if they have
faced financial constraint due to which some of their R&D projects were hampered. To
study how financing and innovation policy vary with firm characteristics and to establish
the extent of impact due to existence of financing frictions on innovative activity, for our
empirical analysis we write a fully specified econometric model of R&D investment with
endogenous financial constraint, endogenous decision to innovate, and endogenous financial
choices. This entails estimating a system of structural equations pertaining to (a) a model
for decision to innovate, where we study the financing choices of innovative firms, (b) a
model for financial constraint, where we try to explain why certain firms report they are
financially constrained, (c) model for R&D investment, where we try to assess the impact
of financial constraint, as reported by the firms, on R&D investment, and (d) a system of
reduced form equations of financing choice and other endogenous variables.
Firstly, in our study of innovation and financing choice we find results that are in con-
gruence with the papers that provide empirical evidence that R&D intensive firms are
less leveraged than those that are not. Brown et al. (2009) (henceforth BFP) studying a
panel of R&D performing US firms draw out a financing hierarchy for R&D intensive firms,
where equity – when more easily available, as during the boom in the supply of internal
and external equity finance in the mid and late 1990’s in US – might be preferred to debt
as a means of financing R&D. Corroborating Brown et al. (2012), we find that, ceteris
paribus, innovative firms are likely to maintain higher levels of internal liquidity reserve.
We also find that firms that pay out dividends are less likely to take up innovative activity,
suggesting that external financing could be more costly for innovative firms.
Secondly, given that firms themselves report if they are financially constrained with
respect to innovative activity, in our empirical model of endogenous financing and inno-
vation choices and endogenous financial constraint we are able to assess if certain financ-
3ing choices, as reflected in the balance sheets of the firms, determine whether a firm is
financially constrained. This allows us to assess the relevance of the classification crite-
ria (see Hennessy and Whited, 2007, henceforth HW) that distinguish firms as financially
constrained or unconstrained, and which have been motivated by the theories of finan-
cial contracting. We find that small and young firms, firms that are highly levered, and
firms that pay less dividends are more likely to face financial constraint. The finding is
in line with prediction made by Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004) (henceforth AH) and
Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006) (henceforth CH) in models of firm growth and survival
with endogenous borrowing constraint. We also find that firms that maintain high level of
liquidity reserve and those whose asset base includes more tangible assets are less likely to
face financial constraint.
Our third and important set of findings are from the investigation of innovation and
financing choices under financial constraint and under no constraint. We find that (i) under
financial constraint, extent of which varies with firm characteristics such as age, size, and
existing leverage, the change in propensity to innovate by employing more long-term debt
also varies with the firm characteristics. However, (ii) when financial constraint do not bind
the change in propensity to innovate by increasing leverage does not, or vary little with
firm characteristics, and is uniformly lower as compared to the situation when financial
constraint bind. Some other important findings that underscore the fact that innovation
and financing decision are not uniform across firm characteristics are (iii) that large and
young firms are more likely to engage in innovative activity, (iv) that large and mature
firms are less R&D intensive, and (v) that small and younger firms are more financially
constrained. These third set of findings suggest that decisions to innovate, financing choices,
and firm dynamics are not independent.
Now, while there are models of efficient firm and industry dynamics where R&D activity
and uncertainty in innovation explain some of the stylized facts related to R&D investment,
productivity, firm dynamics, and firm size distribution (see for eg. Klette and Kortum
(2004) (henceforth KK), Klepper and Thompson (2006)), none to our knowledge has ex-
plored the interaction of financing frictions with innovative activity in shaping up firm
and industry dynamics. Some of our results, for example, that not all firms are innovative,
that under financial constraint financing and innovation policy are not independent of firm
4characteristics, and that R&D intensity is not independent of firm size are contrary to
what KK purport to explain. Our findings suggest that in modeling firm dynamics with
R&D and innovation, financial consideration too must also be taken into account.
On the other hand there are models, such as by Cooley and Quadrini (2001) (henceforth
CQ), of financial market inefficiency, where financial frictions introduced in a standard
model of firm and industry dynamics generate results that match the empirical regularities
of the financial and company level investment characteristics of firms that are related to
their size and age. AH and CH in their respective papers develop models of endogenous
borrowing constraint and study its implication for firm dynamics such as growth and
survival. However, R&D and innovation do not feature in these models. In AH and CH
borrowing constraint is hinged on the capital structure of the firm, where state contingent
equity value determines borrowing constraint, exit probability, and expansion. Our results
suggest that capital structure also matters for the exercise of growth options that are related
to R&D. While a successful completion and implementation of a R&D project enhances
firm productivity and chances of survival, given the nature of R&D and the fact that it
is affected by various kinds of uncertainties (see Berk et al., 2004), engaging in R&D will
also affect the evolution of equity, thereby affecting borrowing constraint and firm growth
and survival. Our results suggests that modeling firm dynamics with R&D and innovation
that incorporates borrowing constraint in a dynamic financial contract framework could
be an important area of research.
Fourthly, our paper contributes to the empirical literature that seeks to test for financ-
ing frictions and quantifying the extent of market failure due to existence of financing
frictions. The small number of empirical studies on testing for financing frictions for R&D
investment are documented in Hall and Lerner (2010). More recent papers such as, Whited
(2006), Bayer (2006), and Bayer (2008), studying company level investment, show how fi-
nancing frictions interact with adjustment costs to alter the timing of company level lumpy
investment. HW find that existence of costly external funds depresses the path of invest-
ment. Hajivassiliou and Savignac (2011), using a similar data set for France, find that
financial constraint do adversely affect innovation output. Our objective here is to assess
by how much R&D investment is hampered given that a firm faces financial constraint.
Empirical analysis in corporate finance, as discussed in Roberts and Whited (2010), is
5marred with issues of endogeneity. Our estimation strategy combines the method of “cor-
related random effect” and “control function” (see Blundell and Powell, 2003) to account
for unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity of regressors in the structural equations.
We estimate the fully specified model, stated earlier, in three steps. In the first step we
estimate the system of reduced form equations, the estimates of which are then used to
construct the control functions that correct for the bias that can arise due the presence of
endogenous regressors in the structural equations. With the control functions in place, in
the second stage we jointly estimate the structural model of financial constraint faced by
the firms and the decision to innovate, and finally in the third stage, conditional on the
decision to innovate, we estimate the switching regression model of R&D investment to
assess the impact of financial constraint on R&D investment.
Typically, in a control function approach the structural parameters are estimated con-
ditional on unobserved heterogeneity and unobserved idiosyncratic errors that appear in
reduced form equations of a simultaneous triangular system of equations. In such an ap-
proach residuals obtained from the first stage reduced form estimates that proxy for the
idiosyncratic errors are used as control variables in the structural equations to account for
the endogeneity of the regressors in the structural equations. However, in panel data mod-
els, the residuals of the reduced form regression, which are defined as the observed value of
the response variable minus the expected value of the response conditional on exogenous
regressors and the individual effects, are functions of unobserved individual effects. Since
the individual effects are unobserved, the residuals remain unidentified. The novelty of our
approach lies in integrating out the unobserved individual effects. The integration is per-
formed with respect to the conditional distribution of the individual effects approximated
by the posterior distribution of the individual effects obtained from the first stage reduced
form estimation. This leaves us with the expected a posteriori (EAP) values of the indi-
vidual effects, which can then be used to get the residuals. The paper also provides the
theoretical foundations for such a procedure.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the economic
framework, in Section 3 we discuss the empirical strategy employed, in Section 4 the data
used and the definition of the variables are discussed, in Section 5 we present the results,
and finally in Section 6 we conclude. In Appendix A we discuss the identification of the
6structural parameters. The details of the econometric methodology are provided in appen-
dices B, C, D, and E. All the appendices, for reasons of space, have not included in the
core of the paper, but can be made available upon request.
2. FINANCING FRICTIONS AND INNOVATIVE ACTIVITY
A. Financing and Innovation Decision
Holmstrom (1989) points out that from the perspective of investment theory R&D has a
number of characteristics that make it different from ordinary investment: it is long-term
in nature, high risk in terms of the probability of failure, unpredictable in outcome, labor
intensive, and idiosyncratic. The high risk involved and unpredictability of outcomes are
potential sources of asymmetric information that give rise to agency issues in which the
inventor frequently has better information about the likelihood of success and the nature of
the contemplated innovation project than the investors. Leland and Pyle (1977) point out
that investors have more difficulty distinguishing good or low risk projects from bad ones
when they are long-term in nature. Besides, due to the ease of imitation of inventive ideas,
as pointed out by Hall and Lerner (2010), firms are reluctant to reveal their innovative
ideas to the marketplace, and there could be a substantial cost to revealing information
to their competitors. Thus the implication of asymmetric information coupled with the
costliness of mitigating the problem is that firms and inventors will face a higher cost of
external capital for R&D.
Because the knowledge asset created by R&D investment is intangible, partly embedded
in human capital, and ordinarily very specialized to the particular firm in which it resides,
the capital structure of R&D intensive firms customarily exhibits considerably less leverage
than that of other firms, see Titman and Wessels (1988). The logic is that the lack of a
secondary market for R&D and the non-collaterability of R&D activity mitigates against
debt-financed R&D activity. Aboody and Lev (2000) argue that because of the relative
uniqueness of R&D, which makes it difficult for outsiders to learn about the productivity
and value of a given firm’s R&D from the performance and products of other firms in the
industry, the extent of information asymmetry associated with R&D is larger than that
associated with investment in tangible (e.g., property, plant, and equipment) and financial
7assets. Bond holders, ceteris paribus, may be unwilling to hold the risks associated with
greater R&D activity. BFP studying a panel of R&D intensive firms, find that equity, when
more easily available, might be preferred to debt as a means of financing R&D.
Brown et al. (2012), Hall and Lerner (2010) and BFP point out that most of the R&D
spending is in the form of payments to highly skilled workers, who often require a great
deal of firm-specific knowledge and training. The effort of the skilled workers create the
knowledge base of the firm, and is therefore embedded in the human capital of the firms.
This knowledge base is lost once workers get laid off. The implication of this is that R&D
intensive firms behave as if they faced large adjustment costs and therefore chose to smooth
their R&D spending. Thus R&D intensive firms that face financing frictions, to smooth
R&D relative to transitory finance shocks, build and manage internal buffer stocks of
liquidity (e.g., cash reserves). Gamba and Triantis (2008) point out that cash balances,
which give financial flexibility to firms, are held when external finance is costly and/or
income uncertainty is high. With higher liquidity reserve firms can counter bad shocks by
draining it.
Now, given the nature of R&D activity that makes borrowing costly, internal funds may
be more preferable. Therefore, innovative firms, ceteris paribus, are less likely to distribute
cash as dividends. Both Carpenter and Petersen (2002) and Chan et al. (2001) studying
R&D intensive firms from COMPUSTAT files find that R&D intensive firms pay little or no
dividend, indicating that most firms retain essentially all of their internal funds. In our data
set we too find that, on average, innovating firms pay less dividends than non-innovating
firms.
In this paper we study a firm’s decision to innovate and the financing choices of a panel of
Dutch firms observed over three waves. While there are many studies that have explored a
firm’s choice to innovate in the Schumpeterian tradition, few have considered how financing
and innovation choices are related. We formally model the decision to innovate as
It = 1{I
∗
t (Long-term Debt,Liquidity Reserve, Dividend, Controls, α˜, υt) > 0},
(2.1)
where I = 1{.} is an indicator function that takes value 1 if the latent variable I∗t (.) > 0. α˜ is
the unobserved heterogeneity, υt the idiosyncratic term, and Controls being the traditional
8control variables. We term equation (2.1) as the Innovation equation. Given the above
discussion, we should expect that, ceteris paribus, firms with higher long-term debt in
their capital structure, firms that maintain low liquidity reserve, and firms that pay out
dividends to be less likely to engage in innovative activity. We do not contend that other
consideration such as taxes or issuance cost do not affect financial decisions. We also know
that financing and investment decisions are history dependent and are forward looking.
However, ceteris paribus, across time and firms one should expect the above hypothesized
relationships to hold on an average.
B. Financial Constraints and Innovation
Papers, such as CQ, AH, and CH, studying firm dynamics look at how financial con-
straint and capital structure affect firm growth and survival. These papers have shown
that financing constraint and financing and investment decisions are not uniform across
firm characteristics such as size and age. Now, it is well known that innovation too affects
growth and survival of firms (see KK), and that R&D effort is marred by various kinds
uncertainties (see Berk et al., 2004) unique to the innovation process. Hence, a firm engag-
ing in R&D will have its equity value affected, with implications for borrowing constraint,
state contingent growth trajectory and future financing and innovation decision.
Therefore, while the unconditional relation between financing and innovation, discussed
in the last subsection, could be expected to be true, under financial constraint, firms could,
depending on the extent of constraint, opt for a innovation and financing policy different
from when they are unconstrained. This could be ascertained by looking at how the decision
of a firm to engage in innovative activity changes by changing the financial policy of the
firm under varying degrees of financial constraint. To achieve this end, we start by studying
how financial constraint arise for firms that report that they are financially constrained.
To formalize, we denote by Fit, which takes value 1 if the firm i reports that it is
financially constrained in time period t. Now, see HW, a firm may be constrained both
because of high cost of external funds and/or because of high need for external funds.
Thus, when a firm reports that it is financially constrained, Fit = 1, it could be because
it is required to pay a high premium, which could be higher for firms engaging in R&D
9activity, on scarce external finance or because it is unable to access external funds. The
premium, for example, could reflect bankruptcy cost (see Gale and Hellwig, 1985) or the
cost of floating equity as in HW and CQ. In AH and CH this premium is formalized as
higher repayment schedule to lenders as a fraction of its profits during such time as when
the firm faces borrowing constraint and short-term capital advancement are low. Also, for
a given financial state of a firm, higher expectation of profits from R&D activity will drive
up the demand for R&D investment, creating a gap between desired and available funds,
which in turn will cause the firm to report itself as being financially constrained. Hence, in
our explanation of how financial constraint arise, we will need to control for future expected
profitability.
Barring a few that have been documented in Hall and Lerner (2010), most papers in
empirical corporate finance study corporate financing and firm level investment. Now,
financing frictions with respect to R&D activity, which for reasons discussed earlier, can be
acute when compared to financing investment in physical capital. Consequently, innovative
firms might find themselves more constrained than those that are not. To test this, like
Almeida and Campello (2007), we test if asset intangibility, which is higher for innovating
firms and which limits the debt capacity of firms, have a bearing on the firms reporting
financial constraint.
Formally, we model financial constraint as
Ft = 1{F
∗
t (Financial State Variables,Expected Profitability,Controls, α˜, ζt) > 0},
(2.2)
where α˜ is unobserved heterogeneity and ζt is the idiosyncratic component of the Financial
Constraint equation. As in Whited and Wu (2005) and Gomes et al. (2006), where the
shadow price of scarce external finance in the firm’s intertemporal optimization problem is
assumed to be a function of observable variables, we hypothesize that the latent variable
F ∗t , which captures the premium on external finance and the gap in financing, to be a
function of observable and endogenously determined financial state variables. HW give a
detailed discussion on constraint proxies that reflect high cost or high need for external
finance. Our specification, discussed later, to explain financial constraint is rich enough to
capture both aspects, high cost as well as high need for external finance.
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Now, to return to the question of innovation and financing policy under financial con-
straint across firm characteristics, we look at how the propensity to innovate under financial
constraint, both of which are determined endogenously, changes with endogenous financing
policy, say an increase in long-term debt, of the firm. To put it formally, we look at how
Pr(I = 1|F = 1) and Pr(I = 1|F = 0) changes with debt policy at different level of firm
characteristics, such as size of the firm. These firm characteristics also indicate the extent
of constraint the firm faces, so in effect by studying how Pr(I = 1|F = 1) changes with
the financing policy of the firm at different level of firm characteristics, we are looking at
how Pr(I = 1|F = 1) changes with the financing policy at different level of constraint.
C. Financial Constraints and R&D Investment
Beginning with Fazzari et al. (1988) there has been a huge amount of literature that
has sought to test for financing frictions and quantifying the extent of market failure
in company level investment due to the presence of financing frictions. A survey of this
literature is beyond the scope of this paper. However, as Brown et al. (2012) point out
there aren’t many papers that have looked at financing frictions and R&D investment.
Few papers that have studied the implication of financial constraint for R&D investment
have been surveyed in Hall and Lerner (2010).
Empirical study of the effect of financing frictions on investment has broadly followed
two approaches. One approach is to ad hoc classify firms into those that are financially
constrained and those that are not, and specify a reduced form accelerator type model for
the constrained and unconstrained firms. The extent of financing frictions, controlling for
the investment opportunity, is judged by the sensitivity of investment to cash flow. Another
approach, which is more structural, is to estimate Euler equations derived from standard
intertemporal investment model augmented with financial state variables to account for
financial frictions, where external financing constraint affect the intertemporal substitution
of investment today for investment tomorrow, via the shadow value of scarce external
funds, (see Whited and Wu, 2005). The few empirical studies on financing frictions and
R&D investment, broadly speaking, follow these two approaches.
In this paper, besides studying financing and innovation decisions of firms under financial
11
constraint across firm characteristic, we also study how financial constraint affect R&D
investment, which is observed conditional on firms choosing to innovate, It = 1. We posit
that the observed R&D intensity, measured as a ratio of R&D investment to total capital
asset, for a firm i, can be explained by estimating the following R&D equation:
Rt = Rt(Financial Constraint,Expected Profitability, Controls, α˜, ηt) if It = 1,
(2.3)
where α˜ is the unobserved heterogeneity, ηt the idiosyncratic component. The specification
is motivated by the fact that financing frictions, which could be either due to high cost
of external funds or due to lack of access to it, is summarized by the reported financial
constraint, Ft. Thus, given future expected profitability and other controls, we can gauge
the extent of market failure for R&D investment due the presence of financing frictions by
estimating the metric,
E[Rt(Ft = 0)|It = 1]− E[Rt(Ft = 1)|It = 1].
This metric could be construed as the difference between first best R&D investment and
optimal R&D investment under financing constraint.
Using firm’s assessment of being financially constrained avoids the need to ad hoc classify
the firms into constrained and unconstrained firms. Moreover, papers that a priori classify
firms as constrained and unconstrained assume financial constraint faced by firms to be
exogenous to investment decisions. In assessing the impact of reported financial constraint,
Fit = 1, on R&D expenditure, ours is a departure from the reduced form accelerator
type models, about which questions have been raised as to whether such a procedure can
indeed identify the extent of financing frictions, (see Kaplan and Zingales 1997; Gomes
2001; and HW). We address the issue of endogeneity of financial constraint by estimating
simultaneously the Innovation equation (2.1), the Financial Constraint equation (2.2) and
the R&D equation along with the equations for the financing choice made by the firms.
Thus, in contrast to reduced form models, ours is a more structural approach.
Our frame work for studying the effect of financing constraint on R&D in essence is a
static one. Though one could derive a dynamic empirical model for R&D investment from
a firm’s dynamic optimization problem with adjustment cost where the firm is subject to
12
external financing constraints, or employ indirect inference approach as in Whited (2006)
and HW to test for financing frictions and its implication for R&D investment, we avoid
this route for two reasons. The first being, as we explain when discussing our data, that in
our data set we observe R&D investment every alternative year, which precludes us from
estimating a dynamic empirical model of R&D investment, at least in the classical regres-
sion framework. The second reason is that, since firms tend to smooth R&D investment
over time, adjustment costs, for firms that have decided to engage in R&D in the past, is
unlikely to be a substantial factor in explaining R&D investment1. We believe that, given
our comprehensive treatment of heterogeneity and endogeneity, a misspecification due to
omission of adjustment cost should be taken care of.
Also, using the binary indicator on financial constraint as reported by firms allows us
to generalize the R&D equation (2.3) to a switching regression model, where the endoge-
nous financial constraint equation sorts the firms over the two different regimes, financially
constrained and unconstrained. This allows us to investigate how firms with different char-
acteristics, such as maturity and size, invest in R&D under financial constraint and under
no constraint. In doing so we are able to underscore that financing frictions condition firm
dynamics, which are brought about through R&D investment.
3. EMPIRICAL MODEL
The usual problem faced in any empirical exercise is that of accounting for heterogene-
ity and endogeneity. For the problem at hand, we know that the decision to innovate, the
financial choices made, the financial constraint faced, and the amount to invest in R&D
are all endogenously determined. In this paper we develop a control function approach to
address the issue of heterogeneity and endogeneity. In this section we introduce our empir-
ical model, the model assumptions, and some results. Technical details on identification of
1 It is also possible that new innovators bear sunk cost of investment and that starting to innovate
involves costly learning, giving rise to non-convex adjustment cost, which can interact with financing
friction to alter the timing of R&D investment. However, estimating parameters of interest of a model that
allows for sunk cost of investment that interacts with financing frictions to affect R&D investment would
most likely involve a different econometric approach, such as in Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) or HW,
and this is beyond the scope of our paper.
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structural parameters of interest has been discussed in the Appendix.
To study the effect of endogenous financial constraint on R&D expenditure, the endoge-
nous decision to innovate, and to account for the fact that R&D expenditure is observed
only for firms that opt to innovate, the three structural equations – Innovation, Financial
Constraint, and R&D – introduced in section 2 are
Iit = 1{I
∗
it = X
I′
it γ + θα˜i + υit > 0}, (3.1)
Fit = 1{F
∗
it = X
F ′
it ϕ + λα˜i + ζit > 0}, (3.2)
Rit = Fit(βfFit + X
R′
it β1 + µ1α˜i + η1it) + (1− Fit)(X
R′
it β0 + µ0α˜i + η0it) if Iit = 1
= FitR1it + (1− Fit)R0it if Iit = 1, (3.3)
where It is an indicator variable that takes value 1 if the firm i decides to innovate, Ft
takes value 1 if firm i experiences financial constraint, and Rt is the observed R&D in-
tensity, defined as the ratio of total R&D expenditure to total capital assets (tangible +
intangible), if the firm decides to innovate2. To allow for the effect of XRt to be different
in the two regimes, financially constrained and unconstrained, we model equation (3.3) as
an endogenous switching regression model, where the Financial Constraint equation sorts
the firms over the two different regimes. That is,
Rt = R1t = βfFt + X
R′
t β1 + µ1α˜ + η1t if Ft = 1 and It = 1
and
Rt = R0t = X
r′
t β0 + µ0α˜ + η0t if Ft = 0 and It = 1.
In the above set of equations X It = {z
I′
t ,x
I′
t }
′, X Ft = {z
F ′
t ,x
F ′
t }
′, and XRt = {z
R′
t ,x
R′
t }
′,
where conditional on unobserved heterogeneity α˜i, each of the zt is a vector of exogenous
variables. That is, υt|α˜i, z
I
t ∼ υt|α˜i; the same being true for the Financial Constraint and
R&D equation. Each of the xt, is a vector of endogenous variables, that is, E(υt|α˜,x
I
t ) 6= 0,
the same holds for the Financial Constraint and R&D equation.
Simultaneity in the decision to innovate, the financial constrained faced, and the amount
to expend in R&D investment is captured by the fact that unobserved heterogeneity that
affects the decision to innovate also affects the constraint faced and R&D investment, that
2In the rest of the paper unless otherwise needed we drop the firm script i.
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the unobserved idiosyncratic components in each of the equations are correlated with each
other, and certain observable variables are common to the structural and reduced form
equations. However, because xts are endogenous, estimating the system of equations will
give inconsistent results.
To obtain the consistent estimates for the structural equations we adopt a control func-
tion approach, which involves a multi-step procedure. In the first step we estimate
xit = Z
′
itδ + α˜iκ + ǫit, (3.4)
which is the system of ‘m’ equations written in a reduced form for the endogenous variables
xt = (x1t, . . . , xmt)
′, where every component of xIt , x
F
t , and x
R
t is also a component of xt.
Zt = diag(z1t, . . . , zmt) is the matrix of exogenous variables or instruments appearing in
each of the m reduced form equations in (3.4) and δ = (δ ′1, . . . , δ
′
m)
′. Let zt be the union
of all exogenous variables appearing in each of zIt , z
F
t , and z
R
t . For every l ∈ (1, . . . , m),
zlt = Zt = (z
′
t, z˜
′
t)
′, where the dimension of vector of instruments, z˜, is greater than or
equal to the dimension x. This is the crucial identifying condition, see Blundell and Powell
(2003) for details. Also define Xi = {x
′
i1, . . . ,x
′
iTi
}′ and Zi = (Z
′
i1 . . .Z
′
iTi
)′.
ǫt = (ǫ1t, . . . , ǫmt)
′ is the vector of idiosyncratic component and α˜, the unobserved in-
dividual effect for firm i, which we model as a random effect, is correlated with Zi. But,
conditional on α˜, Zi is assumed to be independent of η1t, η0t, ζt, υt, and ǫt. Since the
unobserved individual specific effect affects the endogenous regressors as well as the firm’s
innovation decision and it being financially constrained, to account for simultaneity that
arises due to unobserved heterogeneity, we therefore have different factor loadings, such as,
{κ1 . . . , κm}, that appear in the reduced form equations, and θ, λ, µ0, and µ1, that appear
in the structural equations.
The above structural equations – (3.1), (3.2), and (3.3) – can be succinctly written as
y∗t = X
′
tB+ α˜k+Υt, (3.5)
where y∗t = {I
∗
t , F
∗
t , ItFtR1t, It(1 − Ft)R0t, }
′. Xt = diag(X
I
t , X
F
t , X
R
1t , X
R
0t ), where X
R
1t =
{Ft, ItFtX
R′
t }
′ and XR0t = It(1 − Ft)X
R
t . B in (3.5) is given by B = {γ
′,ϕ′, βf ,β
′
1,β
′
0}
′.
Finally, k = {θ, λ, µ1, µ0}
′ and Υt = {υt, ζt, η1t, η0t}
′.
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Some of the distributional assumptions that will eventually allow us to construct the
control functions, which correct for the bias due to the endogeneity of xt and help us
identify the structural parameters of interest are:
A1. Υit|α˜i,Zi ∼ Υit|α˜i and ǫit|α˜i,Zi ∼ ǫit,
A2. Υit|α˜i, ǫi ∼ Υit|ǫi, where ǫi = {ǫ
′
i1 . . . ǫ
′
iTi
}′, and
A3. The error terms Υit and ǫit are i.i.d.
3 and

Υit
ǫit

 ∼ N



0
0



ΣΥΥ ΣΥǫ
ΣǫΥ Σǫǫ



 .
According to assumption A1, conditional on α˜, Z is independent of Υt, which is a
standard assumption made in the literature. In A2 by assuming Υt to be independent of α˜
conditional on reduced form errors ǫ, we weaken the standard assumption of independence
of Υt and α˜.
As stated earlier, to estimate the structural parameters of interest in equation (3.5), a
multi-step estimation procedure has been proposed. In the first stage the parameters, Θ1,
of the system of reduced form equations, equation (3.4), is estimated. In the subsequent
stages additional correction terms or “control variables”, obtained from the first stage
reduced form estimates, correct for the bias due to endogeneity of the xt. We study the
identification and estimation of structural parameters for nonlinear response models and
show the construction of correction terms in subsection B and, in detail, in Appendix A.
But before we discuss identification of structural parameters, we first discuss the estimation
of the parameters of the reduced form equation.
A. Estimation of the First Stage Reduced Form Equations
In the first stage we estimate the system of reduced form equations (3.4). Since α˜i and
Zi are correlated in order to estimate δ , Σǫǫ, and κ consistently, we use Mundlak’s (1978)
correlated random effects formulation. We assume that
A4. E(α˜i|Zi) = Z¯
′
iδ¯ , (3.6)
3Though the i.i.d. assumption is not strictly necessary, and can be relaxed.
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where Z¯i, is the mean of time-varying variables in Zit. We also assume that
A5. α˜i|Zi ∼ N
[
E(α˜i|Zi), σ
2
α
]
, (3.7)
so that the tail, αi = α˜i−E(α˜i|Zi) = α˜i− Z¯
′
iδ¯, is distributed normally with mean zero and
variance σ2α, and is also assumed to be independent of Zi. Given the above, equation (3.4)
can now be written as
xit = Z
′
itδ + (Z¯
′
iδ¯ + αi)κ + ǫit. (3.4a)
To consistently estimate the reduced form parameters, Θ1 = {δ
′, δ¯
′
, vech(Σǫǫ)
′,κ′, σα}
′,
we employ the technique of step-wise maximum likelihood method in Biørn (2004). How-
ever, our model differs from Biørn. While Biørn estimates the covariance matrix Σα of
αi = {α1i, . . . , αmi}
′, where each of the αli, l ∈ {1, . . . , m}, is unrestricted, we place the
restriction αli = κlαi. This implies that
Σα = σ
2
αΣκ = σ
2
α


κ21
κ1κ2 κ
2
2
...
...
κ1κm κ2κm . . . κ
2
m


.
Moreover, as can be seen from the modified equation (3.4a), we also impose the restriction
that δ¯ remains the same across each of the m reduced form equations. In Appendix B we
provide a note on the estimation strategy employed to estimate the parameters of the
reduced form equations.
B. Identification and Estimation of the Structural Parameters
Given the above set of assumptions we have
Υt|X,Z, α˜ ∼ Υt|X− E(X|Z, α˜),Z, α˜
∼ Υt|ǫ,Z, α˜
∼ Υt|ǫ, α˜
∼ Υt|ǫ, (3.8)
17
where the second equality in distribution follows from the fact that Xi−E(Xi|Zi, α˜i) = ǫi,
the third follows from A1, and the fourth from assumption A2. According to the above,
the dependence of the structural error term Υt on X, Z, and α˜ is completely characterized
by the reduced form errors ǫ. The expectation of Υt given ǫ is given by
E(Υt|ǫ) = E(Υt|ǫt) = ΣΥǫΣ
−1
ǫǫ ǫt = Σ˜ΥǫΣǫΣ
−1
ǫǫ ǫt = Σ˜ΥǫΣ˜
−1
ǫǫ ǫt, (3.9)
where the first equality follows from the assumption that conditional on ǫit, Υit is indepen-
dent of ǫi
−t
. This assumption has also been made in Papke and Wooldridge (2008), and
Semykina and Wooldridge (2010). The (4×m) matrices Σ˜Υǫ in the fourth equality is
Σ˜Υǫ =


ρη1ǫ1ση1 . . . ρη1ǫmση1
ρη0ǫ1ση0 . . . ρη0ǫmση0
ρζǫ1σζ . . . ρζǫmσζ
ρυǫ1συ . . . ρυǫmσυ


and the (m×m) matrix Σǫ is diag(σǫ1, . . . , σǫm), so that Σ˜ΥǫΣǫ = ΣΥǫ. Finally, in the last
equality Σ˜−1ǫǫ = ΣǫΣ
−1
ǫǫ . We prefer to write the above conditional expectation as E(Υt|ǫt) =
Σ˜ΥǫΣ˜
−1
ǫǫ ǫt because the elements of Σ˜
−1
ǫǫ are obtained from the estimates of the first stage
reduced form estimation of our sequential estimation procedure, and the formulation in
(3.9) helps us distinguish the parameters that are estimated in the first stage from those
that are estimated in the subsequent stages. Also, as we will see, it is the elements of Σ˜Υǫ,
which are estimated in the subsequent stages that give us the test of exogeneity of xt with
respect to Υt .
Given assumptions A4 and A5 and equations (3.8) and (3.9), we can write the expecta-
tion of y∗t given X, Z, and α˜
E(y∗t |X,Z, α˜) = X
′
tB+ α˜k + Σ˜ΥǫΣ˜
−1
ǫǫ ǫt
= X′tB+ (Z¯
′δ¯ + α)k+ Σ˜ΥǫΣ˜
−1
ǫǫ ǫt = E(y
∗
t |X,Z, α) (3.10)
To estimate the system of equations in (3.10) the standard technique is to replace ǫt by
the residuals from the first stage reduced form regression, here equation (3.4a). However,
the residuals xt − E(xt|Z, α) = xt − Z
′
tδ − (Z¯
′δ¯ + α)κ, remain unidentified because the
α’s are unobserved even though the reduced form parameters, Θ1 = {δ
′, δ¯
′
,κ′, σα}
′, can be
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consistently estimated for the first stage estimation. From the results on identification of
structural parameters derived in Appendix A, it can be shown that
E(y∗t |X,Z) =
∫
E(y∗t |X,Z, α)f(α|X,Z)dα = X
′
tB+ (Z¯
′δ¯ + αˆ)k+ Σ˜ΥǫΣ˜
−1
ǫǫ ǫˆt,
(3.11)
where αˆi(Θ1,Xi,Zi) = E(αi|Xi,Zi), as discussed in Appendix A, is the Expected a Poste-
riori (EAP) value of αi and ǫˆit(Θ1,Xi,Zi) = xit−E(xit|Xi,Zi) = xit−Z
′
itδ −κ(Z¯
′
iδ¯ + αˆi).
ˆ˜αi = Z¯
′
iδ¯ + αˆi and ǫˆit are the “control functions” that correct for the bias which arises due
to the correlation of xt with α and Υt. The correlation of the exogenous variables Zt with
α˜, is accounted by Z¯ ′δ¯ + αˆ. In Appendix A we show how to construct αˆi. Given (3.11) we
can write the projection of y∗it given Xi, Zi in error form as
It =1{I
∗
t = X
I′
t γ + θ ˆ˜α + Σ˜υǫΣ˜
−1
ǫǫ ǫˆt + υ˜t > 0}, (3.12)
Ft =1{F
∗
t = X
F ′
t ϕ + λ ˆ˜α+ Σ˜ζǫΣ˜
−1
ǫǫ ǫˆt + ζ˜t > 0}, (3.13)
Rt =Ft(βfFt + X
R′
t β1 + µ1 ˆ˜α + Σ˜η1ǫΣ˜
−1
ǫǫ ǫˆt + η˜1t)
+ (1− Ft)(X
R′
t β 0 + µ0 ˆ˜α + Σ˜η0ǫΣ˜
−1
ǫǫ ǫˆt + η˜0t) if It = 1 (3.14)
where Υ˜t = {υ˜t, ζ˜t, η˜1t, η˜0t}
′, defined in Appendix A, is normally distributed with mean 0,
variance ΣΥ˜Υ˜, and is independent of X and Z. We would like to state here that in the
modified Innovation equation (3.12),
Σ˜υǫ = {ρυǫ1συ, . . . , ρυǫmσυ}
′,
where ρυǫ1συ, for example, gives a measure of correlation between x1 and υ, thus providing
us a test of exogeneity of x1 in the Innovation equation. Similarly, the estimates of Σ˜ζǫ and
Σ˜ηǫ give us a test of exogeneity of x in the Financial Constraint and the R&D equation
respectively.
Given Z¯ ′δ¯+αˆ and ǫˆt, it may be possible to consistently estimate the structural parameters
of interest by specifying a joint likelihood for It, Ft, and Rt. However, given the presence of
nonlinearities in the model, the likelihood function will be difficult to optimize. Given this
fact, we estimate the structural parameters of interest in equations (3.12) to (3.14) in two
steps after the first stage reduced form estimation. In the second stage, given the estimates
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of the control functions Z¯ ′δ¯ + αˆ and ǫˆt, we estimate jointly the structural parameters, Θ2,
of the Innovation equation (3.12) and the Financial Constraint equation (3.13). Then in
the third stage, given the control function and second stage estimates, we the estimate the
R&D equation (3.14).
Estimating the parameters of the second, Θ2, and third, Θ3, stage, given the first stage
consistent estimates Θˆ1, is asymptotically equivalent to estimating the subsequent stage
parameters had the true value of Θ1 been known. To obtain correct inference about the
structural parameters, Θ2 and Θ3, one has to account for the fact that instead of true
values of first stage reduced form parameters, we use their estimated value. In Appendix D
we provide analytical expression for the error adjusted covariance matrix for the estimates
of the structural parameters.
B.1. The Second Stage: Estimation of the Innovation and the Financial Constraint
Equations
Given the modified Innovation equation (3.12) and the modified Financial Constraint
equation (3.13), the conditional log likelihood function for firm i in period t given X, Z, if
the time period t corresponds to CIS3 and CIS3.54, is given by
Lt2(Θ2| ˆ˜α, ǫˆt) = ItFt ln(Pr(It = 1, Ft = 1)) + It(1− Ft) ln(Pr(It = 1, Ft = 0))
+ Ft(1− It) ln(Pr(It = 0, Ft = 1)) + (1− Ft)(1− It) ln(Pr(It = 0, Ft = 0)).
(3.15)
For CIS2.5, since we do not observe whether a firm is financially constrained or not for the
non-innovating firms, for time period t corresponding to CIS2.5, we have
Lt2(Θ2| ˆ˜α, ǫˆt) =
FtIt ln(Pr(It = 1, Ft = 1)) + (1− Ft)It ln(Pr(It = 1, Ft = 0)) + (1− It) ln(Pr(It = 0)).
(3.16)
4For our empirical analysis, as discussed in next Section on data, we use three waves of Dutch Community
Innovation Survey (CIS). For CIS3 and CIS3.5 we observe if the firm is financially constrained for both the
innovating and the non-innovating firms, but for CIS2.5 the information on financial constraint is given
for only the innovating firms.
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In the above two equations
Pr(It = 1, Ft = 1) = Φ2(ϕt, γt, ρζ˜υ˜), Pr(It = 1, Ft = 0) = Φ2(−ϕt, γt,−ρζ˜υ˜),
Pr(It = 0, Ft = 1) = Φ2(ϕt,−γt,−ρζ˜υ˜), Pr(It = 0, Ft = 0) = Φ2(−ϕt,−γt, ρζ˜υ˜),
and Pr(It = 0) = Φ(−γt),
where Φ2 is the cumulative distribution function of a standard bivariate normal, ρζ˜υ˜ is the
correlation of ζ˜t and υ˜t,
γt = (X
I′
t γ + θ ˆ˜α + Σ˜υǫΣ˜
−1
ǫǫ ǫˆt)
1
συ˜
ϕt = (X
F ′
t ϕ + λ ˆ˜α + Σ˜ζǫΣ˜
−1
ǫǫ ǫˆt)
1
σζ˜
, (3.17)
and Θ2 = {ϕ
′, λ, Σ˜ζǫ, γ
′, θ, Σ˜υǫ, ρζ˜υ˜}
′. The log likelihood of the second stage parameters is
given by
L2(Θ2) =
N∑
i=1
Ti∑
t=1
Lit2(Θ2| ˆ˜αi, ǫˆit). (3.18)
It should be noted that all the parameters of the structural equations (3.12) and (3.13)
can only be identified up to a scale, the scaling factor for the financial constraint equation
and selection equation being respectively σζ˜ and συ˜. In what follows, with a slight abuse
of notation, we will denote the scaled parameters of the second stage estimation by their
original notation. Computation of the standard errors of the structural parameters of this
second stage, Θ2, has been discussed in Appendix D.
Now, given the first stage estimates Θˆ1, we can obtain the estimates of the control func-
tions Z¯ ′iδ¯ + αˆi and ǫˆit, which can then be used in the above likelihood function to obtain
consistent estimates for the second stage parameters. The true measure, however, of the
effect of a certain variable, w, on the probability of engaging in innovation or the proba-
bility of being financially constrained is the Average Partial Effect (APE) of a variable. In
Appendix A we show that
∫
∂Pr(It = 1| ˆ˜α, ǫˆt)
∂w
dF ˆ˜α,ǫˆt and
∫
∂
∂w
(
Pr(It = 1, Ft = 1| ˆ˜α, ǫˆt)
Pr(Ft = 1| ˆ˜α, ǫˆt)
)
dF ˆ˜α,ǫˆt
are the true measure of the effect of w on the probability of being an innovator and the
probability of being an innovator conditional on being financially constrained. We discuss
tests for the estimates of APE in Appendix E.
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B.2. The Third Stage: Estimation of the R&D Switching Regression Model
The structural parameters of interest, Θ3, of the R&D switching regression equation in
(3.14) are estimated in the third stage, which is an extension of Heckman’s classical two
step estimation to multivariate selection problem. Here we are dealing with two kinds of
selection problems: (1) R&D investment conditional on being financially constrained or
not, and (2) R&D investment conditional on being an innovator, where being an innovator
determines if R&D expenditure needs to be declared or not. To consistently estimate the
parameters of equation (3.14), in Appendix D we derive the correction terms that correct
for the bias due to endogenous switching and the bias due to endogenous sample selection.
These correction terms are obtained for each firm-year observation. Adding these extra
correction terms, in addition to the estimates of ˆ˜α and ǫˆt, for each observation, we obtain
consistent estimates of Θ3.
To this effect, consider the following conditional mean:
E(Rt|F
∗
t , I
∗
t > 0, ˆ˜α, ǫˆt) = Ft
(
βf + X
R′
t β1 + µ1 ˆ˜α + Σ˜η1ǫΣ˜
−1
ǫǫ ǫˆt + E(η˜1t|F
∗
t > 0, I
∗
t > 0,X,Z)
)
+(1− Ft)
(
XR′t β0 + µ0 ˆ˜α + Σ˜η0ǫΣ˜
−1
ǫǫ ǫˆt + E(η˜0t|F
∗
t ≤ 0, I
∗
t > 0,X,Z)
)
.
(3.19)
Now, we know that
E(η˜1t|F
∗
t > 0, I
∗
t > 0, ˆ˜α, ǫˆt) = E[η˜1t|ζ˜t > −ϕt, υ˜t > −γt],
and
E(η˜0t|F
∗
t ≤ 0, I
∗
t > 0, ˆ˜α, ǫˆt) = E[η˜0t|ζ˜t ≤ −ϕt, υ˜t > −γt],
where ϕt and γt have been defined in (3.17). In Appendix C we show that
E[η˜1t|ζ˜t > −ϕt, υ˜t > −γt] = ση˜1ρη˜1ζ˜C11t + ση˜1ρη˜1υ˜C12t (3.20)
and
E[η˜0t|ζ˜t ≤ −ϕt, υ˜t > −γt] = ση˜0ρη˜0ζ˜C01t + ση˜0ρη˜0υ˜C02t, (3.21)
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where
C11t ≡ φ(ϕt)
Φ
(
(γt−ρζ˜υ˜ϕt)/
√
1−ρ2
ζ˜υ˜
)
Φ2(ϕt,γt,ρζ˜υ˜)
, C12t ≡ φ(γt)
Φ
(
(ϕt−ρζ˜υ˜γt)/
√
1−ρ2
ζ˜υ˜
)
Φ2(ϕt,γt,ρζ˜υ˜)
,
C01t ≡ −φ(ϕt)
Φ
(
(γt−ρζ˜υ˜ϕt)/
√
1−ρ2
ζ˜υ˜
)
Φ2(−ϕt,γt,−ρζ˜υ˜)
, and C02t ≡ φ(γt)
Φ
(
(−ϕt+ρζ˜υ˜γt)/
√
1−ρ2
ζ˜υ˜
)
Φ2(−ϕt,γt,−ρζ˜υ˜)
.
In the above φ is the standard normal density function, Φ the cumulative distribution
function of a standard normal, and Φ2 is the cumulative distribution function of a standard
bivariate normal.
Given estimates of ˆ˜α, ǫˆt, ϕt, γt, and ρζ˜υ˜, we can construct the above control functions,
which control for the bias that arises due to endogeneity of financial constraint faced and
the bias due to endogenous selection. With the above defined, we can now write the R&D
switching equations in (3.14), conditional on Ft, It = 1, X, Z as
Rt = Ft
(
βf + X
R′
t β1 + µ1 ˆ˜α + Σ˜η1ǫΣ˜
−1
ǫǫ ǫˆt + ση˜1ρη˜1ζ˜C11t + ση˜1ρη˜1υ˜C12t + η1t
)
+ (1− Ft)
(
X r′it β0 + µ0 ˆ˜α + Σ˜η0ǫΣ˜
−1
ǫǫ ǫˆt + ση˜0ρη˜0ζ˜C01t + ση˜0ρη˜0υ˜C02t + η0t
)
,
(3.22)
where η
1t
and η
0t
conditional on F ∗t , I
∗
t , X, Z is distributed with mean zero. With the
additional correction terms – C11, C12, C01, and C02 – constructed for every firm year
observation, the parameters of the R&D switching regression model can be consistently
estimated by running a simple pooled OLS for the sample of selected/innovating firms.
Analytical expression for the error adjusted covariance matrix for the estimates of the the
third state structural parameters, Θ3, has been derived in Appendix D.
To measure the magnitude by which R&D intensity is affected due to the presence of
financial constraint we have to compute the average partial effect (APE) of Ft. For a firm,
i, in time period, t, given Xt = X¯ , where Xt is the union of elements appearing in X
R
t , X
F
t ,
and X It , the APE of financial constraint on R&D intensity is computed as the difference in
the expected R&D expenditure between the two regimes, non-financially constrained and
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financially constrained, averaged over ˆ˜α and ǫˆ. The APE of financial constraint on R&D
expenditure, conditional on It = 1, is given by
∆FE(Rt|X¯ ) =
∫
E(R1t|X¯ , Ft = 1, It = 1, ˆ˜α, ǫˆ)dF ˆ˜α,ǫˆ
−
∫
E(R0t|X¯ , Ft = 0, It = 1, ˆ˜α, ǫˆ)dF ˆ˜α,ǫˆ. (3.23)
In Appendix E we discuss the estimation and the testing of the above measure.
4. DATA AND DEFINITION OF VARIABLES
For our empirical analysis we had to merge two data sets, one containing information
on R&D related variables and the other on the financial status of the firms. The data on
information related to R&D is obtained from the Dutch Community Innovation Surveys
(CIS), which are conducted every two years by the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS)
of The Netherlands. The Innovation Survey data are collected at the enterprise level.
Information on financial variables is available at the firm/company level, which could be
constituted of many enterprises consolidated within the firm. The financial data, known as
Statistiek Financie¨n (SF), is from the balance sheet of the individual firms.
A combination of a census and a stratified random sampling is used to collect the CIS
data. A census of large (250 or more employees) enterprises, and a stratified random sample
for small and medium sized enterprises from the frame population is used to construct the
data set for every survey. The stratum variables are the economic activity and the size
of an enterprise, where the economic activity is given by the Dutch standard industrial
classification. For our empirical analysis we use three waves of innovation survey data:
CIS2.5, CIS3, and CIS3.5 pertaining respectively to the years 1996-98, 1998-2000, and
2000-02.
However, since not all enterprises belonging to the firm have been surveyed in the CIS
data the problem when merging the SF data and the CIS data is to infer the size of the
relevant R&D variables for each firm. To do this we use the information on the sampling
design used by CBS.
For any given year, let N be the total population of R&D performing enterprises in the
Netherlands. From this population a stratified random sampling is done. These strata are
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again based on size and the activity class. Let S be the total number of strata, and each
stratum is indexed by s = 1, 2, · · · , S. Then,
∑S
s=1Ns = N , where Ns is the population
size of R&D performing enterprise belonging to stratum s. Let ns be the sample size of
each stratum and let Θs = {1, 2, · · · , i, · · · , is} be the set of enterprises for the s
th stratum,
that is |Θs| = ns.
Let x be the variable of interest and xi the value of x for the i
th enterprise. The average
value of x for an enterprise belonging to the sth stratum is x¯s = (
∑
i∈Θs
xi)/ns. Now
consider a firm f . Let Nfs be the total number of enterprises belonging to the firm f and
stratum s and nfs be the number of enterprises belonging to firm f and stratum s that
have been surveyed.
Then the estimated value of x for the firm f , xˆf is given by
xˆf =
S∑
s=1
(Nfs − nfs)x¯s +
S∑
s=1
nfs∑
k=1
xfsk, (4.1)
where xfsk is the value of x for the k
th enterprise belonging to stratum s and firm f that
has been surveyed, and Nfs− nfs is the number of enterprises of the f
th firm in stratum s
that have not been surveyed. It can be shown under appropriate conditions that xˆf is an
unbiased estimator of the expected value of x for firm f 5. Table I below gives, based on
size class and 2 digit Dutch Standard Industry Classification (SBI), the number of strata
between which the enterprises surveyed in the CIS surveys were divided.
For our analysis Nf =
∑S
s=1Nfs was obtained from the Frame Population constructed by
the CBS and nf =
∑S
s=1 nfs was obtained from the CIS surveys. The exact count of firms
for which Nf = nf and for which (Nf − nf) > 0 can be found in Table III. The sample of
firms used in the estimation is, however, much smaller than shown in Table III. The sample
5Proof:
The proof is based on the assumption that the expected value of x is the same for each enterprise in a
particular stratum. Let µxf be the population mean of x for the firm f and let µxs be the population
mean of x for an enterprise belonging to stratum s. Given our assumption, we know that x¯s is an unbiased
estimator of µxs, that µxf =
∑S
s=1Nfsµxs, and that the expected value of
∑S
s=1
∑nfs
k=1 xfsk, the second
term on the RHS of equation (4.1), is
∑S
s=1 nfsµxs. Taking expectations in (4.1) and substituting the
expected value of E(
∑S
s=1
∑nfs
k=1 xfsk) =
∑S
s=1 nfsµxs and noting that E(
∑S
s=1 nfsx¯s) =
∑S
s=1 nfsµxs,
we get E(xˆf ) = µxf =
∑S
s=1Nfsµxs.
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TABLE I
Number of Enterprises and Number of Strata
CIS2.5 CSI3 CIS3.5
Total no. of enterprises 13465 10750 10533
Total no. of strata 240 249 280
These figures are from the original/raw data set.
of firms used for the analysis are only those for which we had financial information, that is,
those in the SF data. For these firm we required that at least one of their potentially R&D
performing enterprises be present in the innovation surveys. Enterprises in the innovation
survey belonging to firms not present in the SF data had to be dropped. The percentage of
firms in the sample for which imputation, using equation (4.1), had to be done was 18.06%
in CIS2.5, 24.62% in CIS3 and 23.75% in CIS3.5. The majority of the firms happened to be
single enterprises: 78.97%, 74.01%, and 73.87% respectively for CIS2.5, CIS3, and CIS3.5.
The two variables of interest for which the aggregating exercise in equation (4.1) was
done are the R&D expenditure and the share of innovative sales in the total sales (SINS) of
the enterprise. Here we would like to mention that we do not have any information on these
two variables for those firms that have been categorized as non-innovators. An enterprise
is considered to be an innovator if either one of the following conditions is satisfied: (a) it
has introduced a new product to the market, (b) it has introduced a new process to the
market, (c) it has some unfinished R&D project, and (d) it has begun an R&D project,
and abandoned it during the time period that the survey covers. Given that the criteria,
classifying an enterprise as an innovator, are exhaustive, we, for the purpose of aggregation,
reasonably assumed that if an enterprise meets none of the above criteria, it has no R&D
expenditure and no new products.
We consider a firm to be financially constrained as soon as any one of its enterprises de-
clares to be financially constrained. When Nf > nf , a firm is characterized as an innovator
if one the constituent enterprises surveyed has innovated or if anyone of the enterprises that
have not been surveyed is found in a stratum that is classified as an innovating stratum6,
6An example could help illustrate. Suppose there is a firm that has three enterprises: E1, E2, and E3.
Assume that of the three enterprises only E3 has been surveyed, and has been found not to innovate. Now,
we know to which stratum E1 and E2 respectively belong to. Let E2 belong to the stratum s and E1 to
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where a stratum is defined to be innovative if x¯s > 0.
The total number of employees as a measure of the size of the firm was also constructed
using information from the CIS data and the General Business Register. As far as the
number of employees in a firm is concerned, if all the enterprises belonging to a firm are
surveyed, that is if Nf = nf , then we simply add up the number employees of each of the
constituent enterprises. However, when Nf > nf , for those enterprises that have not been
surveyed we take the mid point of the size class of those enterprises that have not been
surveyed. The size class to which an enterprise belongs to is available from the General
Business Register for every year.
In Table II below we tabulate the number of innovating and non-innovating firms for
each of the three waves, and the number of firms that declare to be financially constrained
in their innovation activities. As can be seen from the table, for CIS2.5 information on
financial constraint is available only for the innovators. It can be noticed that the number
of financially constrained firms is much lower than the number of unconstrained firms.
In our sample we find that the number of financially constrained firms is larger for the
innovating firms than for the non-innovating ones.
As mentioned earlier the CIS survey is conducted every two years. The question on being
innovative or being financially constrained pertains to all the years of the survey. However,
the variables, share of innovative sales in the total sales (SINS) and R&D expenditure are
reported only for the last year. The stock variables – long-term debt, liquidity reserve, assets
of the firms, and the number of employees, indexed t – are the values of the variables as
recorded at the beginning of period t. The flow variables are the observed values as recorded
during period t. R&D expenditure and SINS are reported only for the last year of the
periods that any CIS covers.
Below we provide the definition and the list of the variables that were used in the
empirical exercise.
1. Rt: R&D intensity defined as the ratio of R&D expenditure to total (tangible+ in-
tangible) capital assets
2. Ft: Binary variable equal to one if the firm is financially constrained
stratum s′. If we find that x¯s > 0 and that x¯s′ = 0, we will still regard the firm to be an innovator, with
R&D expenditure x¯s.
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TABLE II
Innovating/Non-Innovating and Financially Constrained/Unconstrained Firms
CIS2.5 (1996-98)
Financially Financially
Constrained Unconstrained Total
Innovators 525 2,422 2,947
Non-Innovators 2,416
Total 5,363
CIS3 (1998-00)
Financially Financially
Constrained Unconstrained Total
Innovators 336 1,508 1,844
Non-Innovators 75 1,504 1,579
Total 411 3,012 3,423
CIS3.5 (2000-02)
Financially Financially
Constrained Unconstrained Total
Innovators 154 1,826 1,980
Non-Innovators 32 2,234 2,266
Total 186 4,060 4,246
These figures are for the data set used in estimation.
In CIS 2.5, non-innovating firms do not report if they are financially constrained.
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3. It: Binary variable equal to one if the firm is an innovator
4. DEBTt: Long-term debt constituted of the book value of long-term liabilities owed to
group companies, members of cooperative society and other participating interests,
plus subordinated loans and debentures
5. LQt: Liquidity reserve including cash, bills of exchange, cheques, deposit accounts,
current accounts, and other short-term receivables
6. DIVt: Dividend payments to shareholders, group companies, and cooperative societies
7. SIZEt: Logarithm of the number of people employed
8. RAINTt: Ratio of intangible assets to total (tangible+ intangible) capital assets
9. SINSt: Share of sales in the total sales of the firm which is due to newly introduced
products
10. CFt: Cash flow defined as operating profit after tax, interest payment, and preference
dividend plus the provision for depreciation of assets
11. MKSHt: Market share defined as the ratio of firms sales to the total industry sales
12. DNFCt: Dummy variable that takes value one for negative realization of cash flow
13. DMULTIt: Dummy that takes value one if a firm has multiple enterprises
14. AGEt: Age of the firm
7.
15. Industry dummies
16. Year dummies
To minimize heteroscedasticity we scale long-term debt (DEBTt), cash flow (CFt), liq-
uidity reserve (LQt), and dividend payout DIVt by total capital assets. Henceforth when-
ever we refer to these variables, it would mean the scaled value of these variables.
[Table IV about here]
A. Endogenous Explanatory Variables
The set of endogenous regressors, xt, that appear in the structural equations, and for
which we construct control functions to account for their endogeneity are:
1. Long-term debt (DEBTt)
7We do not the age of the firms that existed prior to 1967 as the General Business Register, from which
we calculated the age of the firms, was initiated in 1967. For such cases we assume that the firm began in
1967.
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2. Liquidity reserve (LQt)
3. Dividend payout (DIVt)
4. Logarithm of the number of people employed (SIZEt)
5. Ratio of intangible assets to total assets (RAINTt)
6. Share of innovative sales in the total sales of the firm (SINSt)
While we know that financial variables, debt, liquidity reserve, and dividends, are en-
dogenously determined, we also test whether size of the firm is endogenously determined
along with financing and innovation decisions. Both AH and CH point out that under
endogenous borrowing constraint, debt and equity value of the firm are together endoge-
nously determined with size of the firm. We take ratio of intangible assets to total assets.
RAINTt as endogenous because it could be determined by the decision to innovate and
investment in R&D.
Share of innovative sales in the total sales of the firm, SINSt, will most likely be en-
dogenous because it could be determined by current investment decision. SINSt is only
observed for innovators. For the purpose of estimating the reduced form equation we assume
that SINSt is zero for the non-innovators. Given that the classification criteria, classifying
firms as innovators, is fairly exhaustive, we believe that this is not a strong assumption.
B. Exogenous Explanatory Variables
The vector of exogenous variables, zt, that appear in the structural and reduced form
equation are:
1. Cash flow of the firm (CFt)
2. Dummy for negative realization of cash flow (DNFCt)
3. Market share of the firm (MKSHt)
4. Age of the firm (AGEt)
5. Dummy that takes value 1 if the firm consists of multiple enterprises (DMULTIt)
6. Industry dummies
7. Year dummies
Cash flow is assumed to be exogenous because cash flow, which as Moyen (2004) points
out is highly correlated with the income shock, is largely driven by exogenous shocks.
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However, it should be pointed out it is exogenous conditional on unobserved heterogeneity,
α˜i. Hence, any component of cash flow that is endogenous to the system of equations
has been accounted for by allowing it to be correlated with the unobserved heterogeneity.
Similarly, while market share, MKSHt, and dummy for multiple enterprise, DMULTIt,
may not be strictly exogenous, they are likely to be given unobserved heterogeneity8.
C. Additional Instruments
Our additional set of instruments, z˜t, needed to identify the structural parameters
through the control functions constructed from the first stage reduced estimates are:
1. Cash flow in period t− 1 (CFt−1)
2. Dummy for negative cash flow (DNFCt−1)
3. Square of cash flow in period t− 1 (CF 2t−1)
4. Square of cash flow in period t (CF 2t )
5. Market share in period t− 1 (MKSHt−1)
6. Dummy that takes value 1 if the firm consists of multiple enterprises in period t− 1
(DMULTIt−1)
7. Dummy if the firm existed prior to 1967 (DAGEt)
We include past realization of cash flow in the set of instruments because, as argued
earlier, cash flow is strongly correlated with exogenous revenue shocks experienced by
the firm. To the extent that financing decisions of the firms are state contingent, current
and past realizations will influence all financing decision. For example, AH have shown
that better realization of past revenue shocks imply a higher leverage and long-term debt.
Reddick and Whited (2009) show that saving and cash flow are negatively correlated be-
cause firms optimally lower liquidity reserves to invest after receiving a positive cash flow
shocks. Hence, liquidity holdings of the firm and past level of income shocks are expected to
be correlated. Similarly, a higher dividend payout could be expected with better realization
of past revenue shocks.
8Most paper studying nonlinear panel data models assume all regressors to be exogenous conditional
on unobserved heterogeneity. In this paper we have relaxed this assumption to allow certain variables, xt,
to be correlated with the idiosyncratic component even after having accounted for their correlation with
unobserved heterogeneity.
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It has found that firms with monopoly and those that are multiple enterprise firm are
more likely to engage in innovative activity. Hence, firms that have had a higher degree
of monopoly in the past or have been a multiple enterprise firm in the past could be
expected to have a higher share of innovative sales, SINSt, today, and a higher ratio of
intangible assets to total capital assets, RAINTt. Finally, given that age and size of a firm
are correlated, DAGEt of the firm has been assumed to instrument size. We interact cash
flow and market share in period t− 1 with DMULTIt−1 and DAGEt.
We stress again that variables included in Zt = {z
′
t, z˜
′
t}
′ may or may not be strictly
exogenous, but, conditional on unobserved individual effects, these variables are unlikely to
be correlated with idiosyncratic component in the structural equations. To the extent that
we take into account the correlation betweeen Zt and α˜i, the presence of these variables in
the specification of the structural equations or as instruments will not lead to inconsistent
results.
5. RESULTS
A. Financing and Innovation Decision
As discussed earlier, in the second stage we jointly estimate the structural parameters
of the financial constraint and the innovation equation. The results of the second stage
estimation results are shown in Table V and Table VI. While Table V has the coefficient
estimates, in Table VI the Average Partial Effects (APE) of the covariates are reported.
In Specification 2 and Specification 3 shown in Table V and VI we do not have dummies
for multiple enterprises in the financial constraint equation, and while the specification for
the innovation equation in Specification 1 and 2 are same, in Specification 3 we remove the
control function/correction term for share of innovative sales.
We begin by discussing the results of the Innovation equation9. We find that firms with
9In the innovation equation, unlike Hajivassiliou and Savignac (2011), we do not include the financial
constraint variable Ft. This is because our aim in this paper is to study innovation and financing decision of
firms unlike Hajivassiliou and Savignac (2011), who look at how financial constraints affect the innovation
of potentially innovating firms. Given their objective, they exclude firms that have no wish to innovate.
Excluding such firms helps them identify the impact of Ft on It, which takes value 1 for firms that innovate
and 0 for those who want to innovate but cannot. In our data set, as discussed earlier, for CIS2.5 we can
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higher long-term debt,DEBT , in their capital structure are less likely to take up innovative
activity. This is consistent with the theoretical prediction, as discussed earlier, that bond
holders are unwilling to hold the higher risks associated with R&D activity, and also with
the findings of empirical papers, such as BFP and others, who find that equity rather than
debt may be more suitable to finance innovative activity.
[Table V about here]
[Table VI about here]
We also find that firms that take up innovative activity maintain higher amount of
liquidity reserve, LQ. Again, as pointed out earlier, because R&D intensive firms behave
as if they faced large adjustment cost, they choose to smooth their R&D spending. This
necessitates that innovative firms maintain a higher level of cash reserve to counter periods
of negative revenue shocks.
As far as dividend pay out is concerned, in Specification 3, where we remove the correc-
tion term for SINS in the innovation equation, we find a significant negative coefficient
for dividends, DIV . We remove the correction term for SINS in the selection because
SINS, which is observed only for the innovators, is not included in the specification for
the innovation equation10. This suggests that firms that pay out dividends are less likely
to innovate. Now, given the nature of R&D activity that makes borrowing costly, internal
funds may be more preferable. Therefore, innovative firms, ceteris paribus, are less likely
to distribute cash as dividends.
We find that large firms are more likely to be ones taking up innovative activity. While the
finding is consistent with the Schumpeterian view that large firms have a higher incentive to
not distinguish between those firms that want to innovate but due to constraints cannot innovate and
those who have no wish to innovate. That is, in CIS2.5 only innovators report if they are financially
constrained. Hence in our data set we cannot identify if innovation is hampered due to the presence of
financing constraints. Moreover, our aim is to study how financing and innovation choices are related and
how Pr(I = 1|F = 1) and Pr(I = 1|F = 0) changes with the financing policy of firms with different
characteristics.
10As stated earlier, since SINS is not observed for non-innovators, we assumed SINS to be zero for the
non-innovators when estimating the system of reduced form equation. Therefore, like SINS, the correction
term for SINS will be highly correlated with I, the decision to innovate. This could be the reason for the
very high significance of correction term/control function for SINS in Specification 1 and Specification 2.
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engage in innovative activities because they can amortize the large fixed costs of investing
by selling more units of output, we also know that large firms, as shown in AH and CH,
are less likely to face constraint in accessing external capital and therefore more likely to
engage in R&D activity.
We find that younger firms are more innovative. This corroborates with the findings of
other studies that find that young firms in their bid to survive and grow take up more in-
novative activity. Entry (see Audretsch, 1995; Huergo and Jaumandreu, 2004) is envisaged
as the way in which firms explore the value of new ideas in an uncertain context. Entry,
the likelihood of survival and subsequent growth are determined by barriers to survival,
which differ by industries according to technological opportunities. In this framework entry
is innovative and increases with uncertainty. Also, firms with large market share, MKSH ,
are found to be engaging more in innovative activity. This result confirms the fact that to
prevent entry of potential rivals a firm is more incited to innovate if it enjoys a monopoly
position, as has been argued in the Schumpeterian tradition.
The ratio of intangible assets to total capital assets, RAINT , has been found to be
significantly positive in the innovation equation. Since firms that engage in innovative
activity have more intangible assets in their asset base, this should be expected. Besides,
as Raymond et al. (2010) point out, there is persistence in innovation activity of a firm, or
in other words, innovation decision exhibits a certain degree of path dependency. To the
extent that RAINT is the outcome of past innovation activity, it captures the persistence
in the innovation decision of the firm. We also find that firms that have many enterprises
consolidated within them, DMULTI, are more likely to be innovative. Cassiman et al.
(2005) argue that entreprises merged or acquired may realize economies of scale in R&D,
and therefore have bigger incentive to perform R&D than before. Also, when merged entities
are technologically complementary they realize synergies and economies of scope in the
R&D process through their merger, and become more active R&D performers after being
merged or acquired.
We also find that factor loading, θ, which is the coefficients of Z¯ ′iδ¯+ αˆi in the Innovation
equation is significant. This and the fact that the control functions to correct for the bias
in the structural equations due to the presence of endogenous regressors are all significant
suggest a strong simultaneity in the decision to innovate and the financing choices made.
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B. Financial constraint and Innovation
In this subsection we discuss the specification and the results of the Financial Constraint
equation. Here we will also discuss how financing and innovation decisions under financial
constraints vary over the distribution of firm characteristics.
To begin with, as discussed earlier, given the financial state of a firm, higher expected
profitability from R&D investment could lead to a firm being financially constrained. There-
fore we need to control for the investment opportunity of the firm. To this end, we include
cash flow of the firm in specification for Financial Constraint equation. However, the re-
alized cash flow of the firm may not be only from the firm’s R&D activity. A measure
to control for the investment opportunity for R&D related activity should be based on a
measure such as Tobin’s “q” for R&D related activity or cash flows that result from R&D
output. However, in the absence of any such measure, we use the share of innovative sales
in the total sales of the firm, SINS, which can potentially signal demand for R&D related
activity. Besides, Moyen (2004) finds that Tobin’s “q” is a poor proxy for investment op-
portunities, cash flow is an excellent proxy, and that cash flow is an increasing function
of the income shock. We find that both CF and SINS have a significant positive sign
in the Financial Constraint equation11. This suggests that both cash flow and the share
of innovative sales are correlated with the R&D investment opportunity set and, ceteris
paribus, are indicative of the financing gap that firms face. We note here that while CF ,
which is largely driven by exogenous shocks and is exogenous conditional on α˜, SINS is
an outcome of current and past R&D efforts. Therefore we endogenise SINS. The coef-
ficient of the control function for SINS suggest that financial constraints and SINS are
determined endogenously.
In our specification we also have a dummy for negative cash flow, DNCF , which is found
to have a significantly positive coefficient. It seems that variations over time from negative
11While it may be desirable to include a measure of expected profitability from R&D investment in the
Innovation equation, we do not include cash flow, CF , and share of innovative sales in the total sales,
SINS, in the Innovation equation. We do not include SINS because it is observed only for innovators.
We do not include cash flow in the Innovation equation because, as explained in section 4, in our data
the decision to innovate precedes the realization of cash flow. Hence, cash flow can not identify a firm’s
decision to innovate.
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to positive cash flow are more indicative of positive “shifts” in the supply of internal equity
finance that relax financial constraint than variation in cash flow itself.
For all the specifications we obtain a significant positive sign on debt to assets ratio,
DEBT , indicating that highly leveraged firms are more likely to be financially constrained.
This is consistent with the prediction in AH and CH, who show that firms with higher long-
term debt in their capital structure are more likely to face tighter short-term borrowing
constraint. This could also reflect the debt overhang problem studied in Myers (1977). It
is also possible that, ceteris paribus, firms with higher leverage face a threat of default and
therefore a higher premium on additional borrowing due to bankruptcy costs. Also, as can
be evinced from the APE’s in Table VI, for an average firm, the likelihood of experiencing
higher financial constraint is quite high for a firm that has higher long-term debt in its
capital structure.
We find that firms that maintain higher liquidity reserve, LQ, are less likely to be
constrained. Gamba and Triantis (2008) point out that cash balances, which give financial
flexibility to firms, are held when external finance is costly and/or income uncertainty is
high. With higher liquidity reserve firms can counter bad shocks by draining it. Hence,
when a firm is not sure about a steady supply of positive cash flow it is likely to practice
precautionary savings to reduce its risks of being financially constrained during periods of
bad shocks. Besides, R&D intensive firms behave as if they face large adjustment costs,
and therefore chose to smooth their R&D spending. Hence, the need of financing flexibility
could be important for innovation firms.
Our results suggest that dividends DIV paying firms are less likely to be financially
constrained. HW also find low dividend paying firms face high costs of external funds.
Besides, AH and CH show that when a firm faces borrowing constraint, and all profits are
reinvested or paid to the lenders so that the burden of debt is reduced and the firm grows
to its optimal size, no dividends are paid. Since the APE of dividends, as shown in Table
V, is very high, our results lend credence to papers that employ dividend pay out as a
criterion for classifying firms as financially constrained or unconstrained.
We find that large and mature firms are less likely to be financially constrained. HW
also find large differences between the cost of external funds for small and large firms.
AH and CH show that over time as the firm pays off its debt, it reduces its debt burden
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and increases its equity value. This increase in the value of equity reduces the problem
of threat of default in AH and the problem of moral hazard in CH, with the result that
the extent of borrowing constraint decreases, the advancement of working capital from the
lender increases and the firm grows in size. Consequently larger and mature firms are less
likely to face financial constraint. On the other hand, old firms having survived through
time have built a reputation over the years and are therefore less likely to face adverse
information asymmetry problems as compared to young firms.
We include the ratio of intangible assets to total capital assets, RAINT , in the specifi-
cation for financial constraint. Since secondary markets for intangible asset is fraught with
more frictions and generally does not exist, firms with a higher percentage of intangible as-
sets have a lower amount of pledgable support to borrow, and are thus expected to be more
financially constrained. Almeida and Campello (2007) also find that firms with lower lev-
els of asset tangibility are more financially constrained, and that investments in intangible
assets do not generate additional debt capacity. Our results suggest that firms that have a
higher percentage of intangible assets are indeed more likely to be financially constrained.
Since a large part of the capital of an R&D intensive firm resides in the knowledge base
of the firm, which is intangible, innovating and R&D intensive firms, as can be evinced in
Table IV, have a higher intangible asset base. Given this fact, innovating firms are thus
more likely to face financial constraint.
We do not, however, find firms with a high market share, which serves as a proxy
for monopoly power, and firms with multiple enterprises to be significantly less or more
financially constrained.
In Table V we find λ, which are the coefficients of Z¯ ′iδ¯ + αˆi in the Financial Constraint
equation and all correction terms to be significant, suggesting that the share of innovative
sales, long-term debt, liquidity reserve, dividends, size, and the ratio of intangible assets
to total assets are endogenously determined.
In Figure 1 we plot the average partial effect of long-term debt on the propensity to
innovate conditional on being financially constrained
(∫ ∂Pr(I=1|F=1, ˆ˜α,ǫˆ)
∂DEBT
dF ˆ˜α,ǫˆ
)
and con-
ditional being financially unconstrained
(∫ ∂Pr(I=1|F=0, ˆ˜α,ǫˆ)
∂DEBT
dF ˆ˜α,ǫˆ
)
. We plot the APE of
DEBT against size, age and leverage. These plots of APE against age, size and leverage
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are based on Specification 2 of the second stage estimation. The APE plots based on other
specifications are almost exactly same.
[Figure 1 about here]
We find that conditional on not being financially constrained, the APE of DEBT on in-
novation to be negative and almost constant over the distribution of size, age and leverage.
In contrast, the APE of DEBT on innovation conditional on being financially constrained
varies widely over the distribution of age, size and leverage, and is less negative and some-
time positive when compared to the APE of DEBT on innovation conditional on not being
financially constrained. This indicates that under no financial constraint innovative firms,
regardless of size, maturity, and existing level of debt, would almost uniformly be less
inclined to innovate by financing themselves with debt. In other words, when borrowing
constraint do not bind and debt is accessible on easier terms, and if for some reason the
firm has to finance itself with debt, then it is very unlikely the debt financing will be used
for engaging in or starting an innovative activity. The following scenario can elucidate this:
suppose there is a profitable firm, that has a substantial amount of cash holdings, that it
can distribute to its shareholders. Being profitable, it is likely that it has a rather large
debt capacity and suppose its existing debt levels are such that it has not reached its debt
capacity. In such a situation, the firm can distribute cash and borrow more to finance its
investment. However, if it decides to innovate or spend more on R&D related activity, then
as our results suggests, it would be less inclined to distribute cash as dividends, be more
inclined to maintain a high cash reserves and not borrow more, in other words, finance
itself with cash flow or retained earnings. This is in congruity with the findings of BFP,
who show that in the absence of constraint, when internal and external equity are easily
available, the preferred means for financing innovation is not debt.
When financial constraints set in, innovating firms, though still averse to debt financing,
do innovate by borrowing as is reflected in the relatively higher change in propensity or
willingness to innovate by increasing DEBT as compared to when firms are unconstrained.
Now, under financial constraint, as Lambrecht and Myers (2008) explain, there can be two
possibilities: (a) postpone investment or (b) borrow more to invest. Given that most of the
firms that report being financially constrained are innovators, it is true that these firms
have not entirely abandoned innovative activity. Therefore, the fact that the change in
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propensity to innovate by increasing DEBT is relatively higher than under no financial
constraint, suggests that some projects might have been valuable enough to be pursued by
borrowing, even if that implied a higher cost.
However, under financial constraint, the change propensity to innovate by increasing
DEBT varies with size, age, and existing leverage. This is because under financial con-
straint, the relative cost of, or access to, external financing depends on firm’s age, size, and
the existing levels of debt.
Consider the plot of APE of DEBT on innovation conditional on financial constraint
against size of the firm. We see that under financial constraint large firms are more likely to
innovate by increasing their leverage as compared to small firms. This is because as firms
become large the extent of constraint weakens, and if some R&D projects are valuable
enough to be pursued, large firms have more leeway to finance their project by borrowing
than small firms. Both AH and CH show that a firm with a given need of external financing
to fund an initial investment and working capital, for a given level of growth opportunity
and profitability, over time, during which firms face borrowing constraint and dividend
payment is restricted, firms by paying off debt reduces its debt and increases its equity
value. As the firm increases its equity value, with the result that the problem of threat
of default in AH and the problem of moral hazard in CH decreases, the advancement of
working capital from the lender increases and the firm grows in size. Thus if a large firm
sees an investment opportunity in some R&D project it will be in a better position to
borrow than a small firm. Also, HW find that large firms face lower bankruptcy and equity
flotation costs as compared to small firms, which gives an advantage to large firms when
it comes to borrowing for R&D. While the above argument explains, through the role of
finance, why, for a given investment opportunity, large firms under financial constraint are
more likely to be willing to engage in innovation by borrowing more, it is also true that
large firms, by Schumpeterian argument, have a higher incentive to innovate, and, given
that large firms have a higher stock of knowledge, they are able to find more valuable R&D
investment projects.
Incentives to innovate also explain the plot of APE of DEBT on the conditional prob-
ability to innovate against age of the firms. We know that even though younger firms are
more likely to be financially constrained, it is the young firms that are more likely to take
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up innovative activity. This is because, as discussed earlier, survival and subsequent growth
of young firms, especially those that are in the high-tech sector, depend on their innova-
tion. Hence, under financial constraint young firms are more willing to finance themselves
by increasing their DEBT than matured firms. Consequently, we find the willingness to
innovate by increasing DEBT of young firms is higher compared to a matured firm. This
also makes the young firms more prone to default as discussed in CQ and more likely to
be financially constrained, which our results too suggests. However, the difference in APE
of DEBT on innovation conditional on being financially constrained for young and old is
not large as compared to the same for small and large firms. This could be due to the fact
that once conditioned on size, here at the mean value of all firm-year observations, APE
of DEBT on engaging in innovation does not vary much with age.
Lastly, under financial constraint, we find that change in propensity to innovate by
increasing DEBT declines with higher leverage, which only shows that, ceteris paribus,
for reasons stated earlier, the borrowing constraint get tighter with higher long-term debt in
the capital structure, and the firm becomes more reluctant to engage in innovative activity
by increasing long-term debt.
C. Financing Constraints and R&D Investment
In the third stage we estimate the R&D switching regression model, given in equation
(3.22), to assess the impact of financial constraint, as reported by the firms, on R&D
investment. The distinguishing feature of our R&D model is that it takes into consideration
the fact that R&D investment is determined endogenously along the decision to innovate
and other financial choices. To the extent that the latent variable, F ∗t , underlying Ft reflects
high premium on external finance and the high financing need of firms, the switching
regression model for R&D investment allows us test whether financing frictions affect R&D
activity adversely.
[Table VII about here]
The results of the third stage switching regression estimates are presented in Table VII.
The additional correction terms – C11, C12, C01, C02 – that correct for the bias that can
arise due to endogeneity of selection, It, and financial constraint, Ft, are constructed out
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of the estimates of the Specification 2 of the second stage estimates. Results of the third
stage that are based on the other specification of the second stage estimates are almost
exactly the same, the coefficients differing at the third or fourth decimal places. The results
in Table VI has two specifications; in Specification 2 the correction term for size, not being
significant in Specification 1, has been dropped.
In order to see the effect of financial constraint, Ft, on R&D investment, we have to fix
the firm’s investment opportunity. Since we do not have any information on the market
valuation of the firms, we can not construct average “q” for our firms or any such measure
related to the firm’s R&D investment. Hence, for reasons stated in Section 5.2, where we
discussed the results of the second stage estimation, we include cash flow, CF , and share
of innovative sales, SINS, which are indicative of demand signals and are thus correlated
with the R&D investment opportunity set.
The specification for the R&D equation does not include any financial state variables
such as long-term debt or cash reserves. This is because in the structural model for R&D
investment, R&D investment is determined only by the degree of financial constraint a firm
faces and the expected profitability from R&D investment. Therefore, it seems unlikely that
leverage and cash holdings will have an independent effect, other than through the financial
constraint affecting the firm. Now, we know that conditional on control functions, ˆ˜αi and
ǫˆit, the financial state variables become exogenous to Innovation, Financial Constraint, and
R&D investment. Hence, excluding the financial variables from the R&D equation helps
us to identify the parameters of the R&D equation when going from the second and the
third stage. This is similar to the exclusion restriction required in the Heckman two-step
sample selection model.
Now, even though cash flow turns out to be significantly positive and larger for the set of
financially constrained firms as compared to those that are not, a test for the existence of
financial frictions in our model is not predicated on sensitivity of R&D investment to cash
flow for constrained and unconstrained firms, but through the test of the effect of reported
financial constraint on R&D investment. While sensitivity of R&D investment to cash flow
can indicate the existence of financing frictions, as BFP claim, it could be possible that
cash flow are correlated with the R&D investment opportunity set and provide information
about future investment opportunities, hence, R&D investment-cash flow sensitivity may
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equally occur because firms respond to demand signals that cash flow contain. Besides,
SINS, which we include in the specification to control for future expected profitability, may
not perfectly control for the firm’s R&D investment opportunity, giving predictive power
to cash flow. Moyen (2004) too finds that cash flow is an excellent proxy for investment
opportunity, and that cash flow is an increasing function of the income shock. HW discuss
mechanisms, that are related to costs of issuing new equity, bankruptcy costs, and curvature
of profit functions, that drive investment-cash flow sensitivity. However, it is beyond the
scope of this paper to test for exact mechanism that drives the results on R&D investment-
cash flow sensitivity across constrained and unconstrained firms.
We find that firms whose share of innovative sales, SINS, is high are more likely to be
R&D intensive. This suggests that the share of innovative sales is also indicative of demand
signals for R&D activity. This finding is in line with stylized facts studied in KK that more
innovative firms have higher R&D intensity. However, the difference, though positive, in
the size of the coefficients of SINS across constrained and unconstrained firms is not high.
We also find that SINS is endogenous, as is reflected in the significance of correction term
for SINS.
Here, we want to test whether financing frictions, as summarized by Ft, adversely affects
a firm’s R&D investment. In Specification 2, where the correction term for SIZE has been
dropped, we find that the coefficient of Ft is significantly negative. Now, while the SIZE
of the firm turns out to be endogenous to the decision to innovate, as can be evinced from
the results of the second stage regression, it seems that SIZE, as reflected in Specification
1 of Table VI, conditional on unobserved heterogeneity α˜i, is exogenous to the amount
invested in R&D. This could be either because the additional correction terms – C11, C12,
C01, C02 – that take in account the endogeneity of the decision to innovate also accounts
for the endogeneity of SIZE. It could also reflect the fact that R&D investment, which is
a fraction of total investment, affects SIZE of the firm in a predetermined way. However,
what does not turn out significant is the APE of financial constraint on R&D intensity,
∆FE(Rit|X¯ ), defined in equation (3.23).
The other variables included in the specification are SIZE,MKSH , AGE, andDMULTI
that takes value 1 if the number of enterprises consolidated within a firm is more than one.
We find that even though large firms are more likely to engage in innovative activity,
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among the innovators smaller firms invest relatively more in R&D than larger firms. This
finding is contrary to KK who model firm dynamics with R&D and where R&D intensity
is independent of firm size. This is because KK in their model do not consider the financing
aspect of R&D. The finding that smaller firms are more R&D intensive could be because,
as has been argued in CQ and Gomes (2001), of the fact that smaller firms have a higher
Tobin’s “q” than large firms, which can even be true of R&D capital. Thus smaller firms
in their bid to grow exhibit risky behavior in terms of investment in R&D. Also, for larger
firms investing as much as or proportionately more in R&D than smaller firms would imply
subjecting themselves to higher risk. This is because large firms, as argued in CQ, oper-
ating on a larger scale are more subject to exogenous shocks, and tying up more capital,
or in proportionate to size, in a risky venture as R&D can potentially make large firms
more susceptible to default. This is specially true when the price process of R&D output is
correlated with the output of the existing operation of the firm. Thus, given the fact that
R&D capital is highly intangible, which lacks second hand market, and with decreasing
returns to R&D, investing in R&D proportionate to size or more would imply making itself
more prone to default. We also find that for a given SIZE, a constrained firm will invest
less in R&D.
Young firms are found to be more R&D intensive, and as we saw earlier, are also more
likely to engage in innovative activity as compared to mature firms. We also find that for
a given age, constrained firms invest less compared to unconstrained firms. In our sample
we find that constrained firms with a large market share, MKSH , invest more in R&D,
but market share does not have any explanatory power for unconstrained firms. In another
set of regression, where we had removed DMULTI from the specification we did find a
marginally significant positive sign for market share among the unconstrained firms, but
the comparison of the size and the significance of the coefficients across the two regimes
remained the same. Similar to the result on innovation we find that firms that have a
number of enterprises consolidated within them, DMULTI, are more R&D intensive.
In our analysis we find that the correction term for long-term debt and dividends are
significant for financially constrained firms but not for the unconstrained ones, suggesting
that financing with long-term debt and dividend payout are determined endogenously with
R&D investment for constrained firms but not for the unconstrained ones. This is consistent
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with the results of the some of the papers, cited above, that model endogenous borrowing
constraint, firm investment, and firm dynamics. We find that the control function for
liquidity reserve is significant for the unconstrained firms but not for the constrained ones.
In another set of regression, where we had removed DMULTI from the specification we
found a significant sign for the control function of liquidity reserve for the constrained
firms. This finding suggests that R&D investment and cash retention along with other
financial decision are endogenous. This is in line with the findings of Gamba and Triantis
(2008) where they analyze optimal liquidity policies and their resulting effects on firm
value. In their model the decision on investment, borrowing and cash retention/distribution
represent endogenous response to costs of external financing, the level of corporate and
personal tax rates that determine the effective cost of holding cash, the firm’s growth
potential and maturity, and the reversibility of capital.
While the significance of individual control functions correcting for endogeneity of finan-
cial state variables differ across constrained and unconstrained firms we find that Z¯ ′iδ¯ + αˆi
is significant across both the regimes, suggesting overall a strong simultaneity in R&D
investment and financial choices. Besides, we find that the additional correction terms –
C11, C12, C01, C02 – that take in account the endogeneity of the decision to innovate and
the financial constraint faced are also significant.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The main objective of this paper was to empirically study how incentives to innovate
interact with financing frictions, frictions that assume a special status given the risky and
idiosyncratic nature of R&D and innovative activity. We focused on (I) the firms’ decision
to innovate and the financial constraint faced given the endogenous financial choices made
by the firms. Then conditional on financial choices made, the decision to innovate, and the
constraint faced we tried to determine (II) how financial constraints affect R&D investment.
To the above mentioned end, we presented an empirical strategy to estimate a fully
specified model of endogenous R&D investment, endogenous financial constraint, endoge-
nous decision to innovate, and endogenous financial choices made. The strategy entailed
estimating in three steps (1) a system of structural equations pertaining to – (a) a model
for the decision to innovate, where we try to explain how incentives to innovate are shaped
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(b) a model for financial constraint, where we try to explain why certain firms report they
are financially constrained, and (c) a model for R&D investment, where we try to assess
the impact of financial constraint on R&D investment – and (2) a system of reduced form
equations of financing choice and other endogenous variables. The structural part (I) of
the analysis was carried out conditional on the first stage reduced form estimation, and
part (II) was done conditional on the first and second stage estimates.
Our methodology combined the method of “correlated random effect” and “control func-
tion” to account for unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity of regressors in the struc-
tural equations. We believe that the estimation technique is new to the literature and solves
the much discussed endogeneity problem in empirical corporate finance.
From the estimates of the second stage, where we estimated jointly the probability of
being an innovator and the probability of being financially constrained, conditional on
endogenous financial choices, we could garner that debt is not the preferred means of
external finance for firms engaging in R&D activity, and that a highly leveraged firm is
more likely to be financially constrained. We found that large and young firms, and those
enjoying a higher degree of monopoly are more likely to be innovators. Also, firms that
have many enterprises consolidated within them are more likely to be innovators. We found
that small and young firms and firms with lower collateralizable assets are more likely to
be financially constrained. Besides, the analysis also revealed that the decision to engage
in R&D activity, the various financial choices, and the financial constraint faced are all
endogenously determined.
Interestingly, we found that under no financial constraint, the marginal propensity to
innovate with respect to leverage is lower as compared to a situation in which firms find
themselves financially constrained. Also, though the marginal propensity to innovate under
no financial constraint, barely varies with firm characteristics such as maturity, size and
leverage, under financial constraint the propensity to innovate with respect to leverage
varies with the distribution of firm characteristics. The above implies that when a firm is
not financially constrained, regardless of its characteristic, it will be unwilling to engage
in innovative activity by raising debt. On the other hand under constraint, even though
on average debt it not a preferred means to finance innovative activity, firms do show a
propensity to engage in innovative activity by raising debt. However, this propensity is
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influenced both by the incentives to innovate and the capacity to raise debt; both of which
vary with firm characteristics. These findings draw our attention to the fact that innovation
and financing policy are not independent of firms dynamics of survival, exit, and growth.
The results of the third stage R&D switching regression imply that financial constraint
do adversely affect R&D investment. We found that small, young, and firms with multiple
enterprises are more R&D intensive. However, for a given size and age, the financially con-
strained ones invest less, which again shows how financing frictions condition firm dynamics
that are brought about through R&D investment. Besides, our analysis also showed that
R&D investment and financing decisions are determined simultaneously. Finally, among
others, one of the aims of this paper has been to gauge the magnitude of the impact
of financial constraint. However, since the measure of the magnitude is not statistically
significant we can not assert this finding.
These results underscore the fact that capital-market imperfections do affect the incen-
tives to innovate, and the interaction between financing frictions and innovation is not
uniform across firm characteristics. Our results therefore, taken together, point towards
the fact that financing frictions that affect innovation and R&D activity also affect firm
dynamics. While these findings are consistent with some of the empirical and theoretical re-
sults that seek to explain the implication of financing frictions and firm dynamics, none, to
our knowledge, has explored the implications of innovation and its interaction with financ-
ing frictions in determining firm dynamics. On the other hand while models in industrial
organization do study firm and industry dynamics where R&D and the stochastic nature
of innovation drive the dynamics, the financial aspect and its interaction with innovative
activity is found lacking. Our results suggest that future work in this area is needed.
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TABLE III
Total number of enterprises, Nf , and number of enterprises surveyed within a firm, nf
The table illustrates the number of firms, in each of the three CIS waves, for which the number of
number of enterprises surveyed is equal to the number of enterprises present in the firm, Nf = nf , and
the number of firms, for which the number of enterprises present in the firm exceeds the number of
enterprises surveyed. These figures pertain to the CIS data set prior to merging with the SF data set.
Since not all the CIS firms are in the SF data set, the CIS data used for estimation after cleaning is a bit
less than half the size of the original data set.
CIS2.5 CSI3 CIS3.5
No. of firms for which No. of firms for which No. of firms for which
Nf Nf = nf Nf > nf Nf Nf = nf Nf > nf Nf Nf = nf Nf > nf
1 9400 0 1 6155 0 1 7096 0
2 151 1255 2 67 823 2 137 978
3 20 608 3 4 424 3 24 553
4 3 316 4 3 237 4 2 290
5 3 247 5 2 108 5 222
6 149 6 115 6 122
7 107 7 48 7 105
8 60 8 77 8 50
9 2 93 9 58 9 77
10 83 10 39 10 82
11 106 11 63 11 50
12 49 12 39 12 58
13 43 13 15 13 49
14 59 14 50 14 46
15 46 15 17 15 25
16 31 16 28 16 51
17 62 17 15 17 15
18 36 18 26 18 55
19 37 19 13 19 8
20 29 20 21 20 28
21 13 21 2 21 43
22 23 22 27 22 36
23 15 24 5 23 18
25 34 25 9 24 25
26 46 26 8 25 11
27 4 27 21 27 17
29 14 28 13 28 19
30 14 29 8 29 11
31 18 30 8 30 15
32 15 31 3 31 7
33 11 32 16 32 16
34 18 34 22 33 25
37 15 40 10 37 21
38 15 45 14 38 13
43 15 48 18 39 20
44 17 50 19 40 9
45 14 57 16 41 10
48 20 60 16 46 15
49 22 50 16
51 28 53 47
56 19 55 16
66 33
85 41
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TABLE IV
Means of Variables for Innovators and Non-Innovators
CIS2.5 CSI3 CIS3.5
Innovator Non-Innovator Innovator Non-Innovator Innovator Non-Innovator
R&D* 0.506 0.338 0.192
Share of Innovative Sales
in Total Sales (%) 8.532 10.944 8.025
Long-term Debt* 0.789 0.834 0.739 0.8080 1.149 0.954
Cash flow* 0.869 0.841 0.638 1.167 0.589 0.352
Dummy for
Multiple Enterprises 0.369 0.019 0.478 0.008 0.539 0.019
Liquidity Reserve* 0.913 1.837 0.840 1.689 1.152 1.532
Dividends* 0.082 0.133 0.089 0.268 0.176 0.253
Market Share (%) 0.926 0.067 1.295 0.073 1.267 0.099
Size (Log of Employed) 5.038 4.007 4.808 3.304 4.980 3.759
Age 21.696 19.489 24.817 21.978 25.131 21.109
Ratio of Intangible
to Total Assets (%) 4.284 2.771 5.254 2.230 7.773 2.702
Dummy for Negative
Cash flow 0.069 0.110 0.079 0.109 0.119 0.135
No. of Observations 2,947 2,416 1,844 1,579 1,980 2,266
* Variables normalized by total capital assets
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TABLE V
Second Stage Coefficient Estimates: Financial Constraints and Innovation
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3
Variables of Financial Innovation Financial Innovation Financial Innovation
interest Constraints Constraints Constraints
Share of Innovative Sales 0.201∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.021) (0.021)
Long Term Debt 0.781∗∗∗ -0.366∗∗∗ 0.788∗∗∗ -0.366∗∗∗ 0.788∗∗∗ -2.292∗∗∗
(0.247) (0.108) (0.248) (0.108) (0.248) (0.133)
Cash flow 0.313∗∗∗ 0.317∗∗∗ 0.317∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
Dummy for Negative 0.99∗∗∗ 1.018∗∗∗ 1.018∗∗∗
Cash flow (0.116) (0.097) (0.097)
Liquidity Reserve -0.26∗∗∗ 0.515∗∗∗ -0.298∗∗∗ 0.515∗∗∗ -0.298∗∗∗ 1.524∗∗∗
(0.086) (0.095) (0.038) (0.095) (0.038) (0.121)
Dividends -3.624∗∗∗ 0.019 -3.677∗∗∗ 0.019 -3.677∗∗∗ -0.096∗∗∗
(0.454) (0.018) (0.452) (0.018) (0.452) (0.018)
Size -0.49∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ -0.486∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ -0.486 0.741∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.033) (0.067) (0.033) (0.067) (0.042)
Market Share 0.008 0.131∗∗∗ 0.004 0.131∗∗∗ 0.004 0.059∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.021) (0.004) (0.021) (0.004) (0.021)
Age -0.011∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Ratio of Intangible 0.041 -0.259∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ -0.259∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗
Assets to Total Assets (0.029) (0.03) (0.014) (0.03) (0.014) (0.024)
Dummy for Multiple 0.082 3.177∗∗∗ 3.177∗∗∗ 2.041∗∗∗
Enterprise Firms (0.162) (0.172) (0.172) (0.155)
Control Functions† for
Share of Innovative -1.328∗∗∗ 0.549∗∗∗ -1.378∗∗∗ 0.549∗∗∗ -1.378∗∗∗
Sales (0.184) (0.031) (0.154) (0.031) (0.154)
Long-term Debt -6.209∗∗∗ 2.633∗∗∗ -6.217∗∗∗ 2.633∗∗∗ -6.217∗∗∗ 18.626∗∗∗
(2.198) (0.892) (2.199) (0.892) (2.199) (1.06)
Dividends 17.387∗∗∗ -2.105∗∗∗ 17.787∗∗∗ -2.105∗∗∗ 17.787∗∗∗ -4.964∗∗∗
(2.058) (0.369) (1.98) (0.369) (1.98) (0.443)
Liquidity Reserve 7.637∗∗∗ -5.833∗∗∗ 8.164∗∗∗ -5.833∗∗∗ 8.164∗∗∗ -15.145∗∗∗
(1.089) (1.044) (0.404) (1.044) (0.404) (1.288)
Ratio of Intangible -1.209∗∗ 5.286∗∗∗ -1.517∗∗∗ 5.286∗∗∗ -1.517∗∗∗ -2.749∗∗∗
to Total Assets (0.59) (0.609) (0.257) (0.609) (0.257) (0.476)
Size -0.871∗∗∗ 0.775∗∗∗ -0.937∗∗∗ 0.775∗∗∗ -0.937∗∗∗ 2.044∗∗∗
(0.167) (0.164) (0.111) (0.164) (0.111) (0.189)
Individual Effects -0.729∗∗∗ -0.265∗∗∗ -0.688∗∗∗ -0.265∗∗∗ -0.688∗∗∗ 1.779∗∗∗
(Z¯iδ¯ + αˆi) (0.187) (0.084) (0.16) (0.084) (0.16) (0.102)
ρζ˜υ˜ 0.589
∗∗∗ 0.589∗∗∗ 0.589∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Total Number of Observations: 13032
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
†The estimated coefficients of the Control Function for Share of Innovative Sales, Long-term Debt,
Dividends, Liquidity Reserve, Ratio of Intangible to total Assets, and Size are the estimated terms in
Σ˜υǫ = {ρυǫ1συ, . . . , ρυǫmσυ} of equation (3.12) and Σ˜ζǫ = {ρζǫ1σζ , . . . , ρζǫmσζ} of equation (3.13).
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TABLE VI
Average Partial Effects of Second Stage Estimates
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3
Eq. (14) Eq. (15) Eq. (14) Eq. (15) Eq. (14) Eq. (15)
Financial Innovation Financial Innovation Financial Innovation
Constraints Constraints Constraints
Share of Innovative Sales 0.028∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Long Term debt 0.107∗∗∗ -0.091∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ -0.091∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ -0.3∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.025) (0.034) (0.027) (0.034) (0.01)
Cash flow 0.043∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Dummy for Negative 0.163∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗
Cash flow (0.02) (0.019) (0.019)
Liquidity Reserve -0.036∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.023) (0.005) (0.024) (0.005) (0.013)
Dividends -0.497∗∗∗ 0.005 -0.502∗∗∗ 0.005 -0.502∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.005) (0.062) (0.005) (0.062) (0.002)
Size -0.067∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ -0.066∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ -0.066∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.005)
Market Share 0.001 0.032∗∗∗ 0.001 0.032∗∗∗ 0.001 0.008∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.003)
Age -0.001∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗
(0.001) (0) (0.001) (0) (0.001) (0)
Ratio of Intangible Assets 0.006 -0.064∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
to Total Assets (0.004) (0.008) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.003)
Dummy for Multiple 0.011 0.555∗∗∗ 0.621∗∗∗ 0.866∗∗∗
Enterprise Firms (0.023) (0.097) (0.013) (0)
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
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Figure 1: Plot of APE of Long-term Debt on the Probability of Innovation conditional
on being Financially Constrained,
∫ ∂Pr(I=1|F=1, ˆ˜α,ǫˆ)
∂DEBT
dF ˆ˜α,ǫˆ, or not Financially Constrained,∫ ∂Pr(I=1|F=0, ˆ˜α,ǫˆ)
∂DEBT
dF ˆ˜α,ǫˆ, against Age, Size, and Leverage.
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TABLE VII
Third Stage Estimates: R&D Switching Regression Model
Variables Specification 1 Specification 2 Control Functions† Specification 1 Specification 2
of Interest No Control No Control
Function for Size Function for Size
f , Binary variable for -1.049 -0.84∗∗ For Financially
Financial Constraint (0.661) (0.408) Constrained Firms
f∗ Share of 0.217∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗ Share of Innovative -1.559∗∗∗ -1.597∗∗∗
Innovative Sales (0.018) (0.017) Sales (0.159) (0.141)
(1− f)∗Share of 0.201∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗ Long-trem Debt 0.525∗∗ 0.511∗∗
Innovative Sales (0.018) (0.015) (0.213) (0.215)
f∗ Cash flow 0.07∗ 0.071∗ Dividends -1.296∗∗∗ -1.232∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.041) (0.39) (0.363)
(1− f)∗ Cash flow 0.005 0.005 Liquidity Reserve -0.395 -0.352
(0.003) (0.003) (0.291) (0.27)
f∗Dummy for 0.799∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗∗ Ratio of Intangible -0.034 -0.036
Multiple Enterprise (0.245) (0.158) to Total Assets (0.046) (0.046)
(1− f)∗ Dummy for 0.514∗∗∗ 0.429∗∗∗ Size 0.067
Multiple Enterprise (0.189) (0.078) (0.106)
f∗Market Share 0.027∗ 0.019∗∗ Financial Constraint 0.967∗∗∗ 0.83∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.009) (C11(.)t) (0.319) (0.209)
(1− f)∗Market share 0.011 0.005 Selection 0.636∗ 0.589∗
(0.012) (0.004) (C12(.)t) (0.326) (0.306)
f∗Size -0.494∗∗∗ -0.431∗∗∗ Individual effects -0.413∗ -0.297∗∗
(0.118) (0.071) (Z¯iδ¯ + αˆi) (0.236) (0.142)
(1− f)∗Size -0.364∗∗∗ -0.318∗∗∗ For Financially
(0.102) (0.035) Unconstrained Firms
f∗Age -0.012∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ Share of Innovative -1.52∗∗∗ -1.57∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) Sales (0.164) (0.125)
(1− f)∗Age -0.002 -0.003∗∗ Long-trem Debt -0.029 -0.034
(0.002) (0.001) (0.084) (0.08)
Dividends 0.022 0.027
(0.053) (0.051)
Liquidity Reserve 0.18∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.058)
Ratio of Intangible -0.089∗∗∗ -0.092∗∗∗
to Total Assets (0.013) (0.012)
Size 0.034
(0.074)
Financial Constraint -0.277 -0.186∗∗
(C01(.)t) (0.198) (0.065)
Selection -0.883∗∗∗ -0.745∗∗∗
(C02(.)t) (0.324) (0.114)
Individual effects 0.346∗∗∗ 0.312∗∗∗
(Z¯iδ¯ + αˆi) (0.091) (0.064)
Average Partial Effect -0.241 -0.175
of Financial Constraint (0.7) (0.393)
Total Number of Observations: 6771
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
†The estimated coefficients of the Control Function for Share of Innovative Sales, Long-term Debt,
Dividends, Liquidity Reserve, Ratio of Intangible to total Assets, and Size are the terms in
Σ˜η1ǫ = {ρη1ǫ1ση1 , . . . , ρη1ǫmση1} for firms that are financially constrained and
Σ˜η0ǫ = {ρη0ǫ1ση0 , . . . , ρη0ǫmση0} for firms that are not financially constrained of the R&D equation (3.22).
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APPENDIX A: IDENTIFICATION OF STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS WITH EXPECTED A
POSTERIORI VALUES OF INDIVIDUAL EFFECTS
We began with a set of structural equations
y∗t = X
′
tB+ α˜k+Υt, (A-1)
and a set of reduced m form equations for the endogenous regressors in the above equation,
xt = Z
′
tδ + α˜κ + ǫt, (A-2)
The distributional assumptions that we made, which eventually will allow us to construct
the control functions that correct for the bias due to the endogeneity of xt and help us
identify the structural parameters of interest are:
A1. Υit|α˜i,Zi ∼ Υit|α˜i and ǫit|α˜i,Zi ∼ ǫit,
A2. Υit|α˜i, ǫi ∼ Υit|ǫi, where ǫi = {ǫ
′
i1 . . . ǫ
′
iTi
}′, and
A3. The error terms Υit and ǫit are i.i.d. and jointly distributed as

Υit
ǫit

 ∼ N



0
0



ΣΥΥ ΣΥǫ
ΣǫΥ Σǫǫ



 .
We also specified the conditional expectation and the distribution of the individual effects
α˜i.We assumed that
A4. E(α˜i|Zi) = Z¯
′
iδ¯ ,
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3Maastricht University and CESifo fellow, F.Palm@maastrichtuniversity.nl
4 Maastricht University, S.Loeff@maastrichtuniversity.nl
1
2where Z¯i, is the mean of time-varying variables in Zit. We also assumed that
A5. α˜i|Zi ∼ N
[
E(α˜i|Zi), σ
2
α
]
,
so that the tail, αi = α˜i−E(α˜i|Zi) = α˜i− Z¯
′
iδ¯, is distributed normally with mean zero and
variance σ2α, and was assumed to be independent of Zi
1.
These assumptions gave us equations (3.8), where
Υt|X,Z, α˜ ∼ Υt|X− E(X|Z, α˜),Z, α˜
∼ Υt|ǫ,Z, α˜
∼ Υt|ǫ, α˜
∼ Υt|ǫ, (A-3)
where the second equality in distribution follows from the fact that Xi−E(Xi|Zi, α˜i) = ǫi,
the third follows from A1, and the fourth from assumption A2. According to the above,
the dependence of the structural error term Υt on X, Z, and α˜ is completely characterized
by the reduced form errors ǫ. The expectation of Υt given ǫ in (3.9) was given by
E(Υt|ǫ) = E(Υt|ǫt) = ΣΥǫΣ
−1
ǫǫ ǫt = Σ˜ΥǫΣǫΣ
−1
ǫǫ ǫt = Σ˜ΥǫΣ˜
−1
ǫǫ ǫt, (A-4)
where the first equality followed from the assumption that conditional on ǫit, Υit is inde-
pendent of ǫi
−t
. This assumption has also been made in Papke and Wooldridge (2008), and
Semykina and Wooldridge (2010). The (4×m) matrices Σ˜Υǫ in the fourth equality is
Σ˜Υǫ =


ρη1ǫ1ση1 . . . ρη1ǫmση1
ρη0ǫ1ση0 . . . ρη0ǫmση0
ρζǫ1σζ . . . ρζǫmσζ
ρυǫ1συ . . . ρυǫmσυ


and the (m×m) matrix Σǫ is diag(σǫ1, . . . , σǫm), so that Σ˜ΥǫΣǫ = ΣΥǫ. Finally, in the last
equality Σ˜−1ǫǫ = ΣǫΣ
−1
ǫǫ . The assumption about the conditional distribution α˜ and equations
(A-3) and (A-4) led us the relationship in (3.10):
E(y∗t |X,Z, α) = X
′
tB+ (Z¯
′δ¯ + α)k+ Σ˜ΥǫΣ˜
−1
ǫǫ ǫt.
1In the rest of the appendix, except when needed, we will suppress the firm subscript i.
3Given the above, we can write the linear predictor of y∗t in error form as
y∗t = X
′
tB+ (Z¯
′δ¯ + α)k+ Σ˜ΥǫΣ˜
−1
ǫǫ ǫt + Υ˜t. (A-5)
We had argued that in order to estimate the system of equations in (A-3) the standard
technique of the control function approach is to replace ǫt by the residuals from the first
stage reduced form regression. However, the residuals xt −E(xt|Z, α) = xt−Z
′
tδ − (Z¯
′δ¯ +
α)κ, remain unidentified because the α’s are unobserved even though the reduced form
parameters, δ, δ¯ , and κ, can be consistently estimated from the first stage estimation of
the modified reduced form equation given in (3.4a).
However, it can still be possible to estimate the structural parameters if we can integrate
out the α’s. But given that α’s are correlated with the endogenous regressors we have
to integrate it out with respect to its conditional distribution. Let f(αi|Xi,Zi) be the
conditional distribution of time invariant individual effect αi conditional on Xi and Zi. For
any firm, i, taking expectation of the above with respect to the conditional distribution of
α, f(α|X,Z) we obtain
E(y∗t |X,Z) =
∫
E(y∗t |X,Z, α)f(α|X,Z)dα
= X′tB+ Z¯
′δ¯k+ Σ˜ΥǫΣ˜
−1
ǫǫ (xt − Z
′
tδ − Z¯
′δ¯κ) +
∫
(k− Σ˜ΥǫΣ˜
−1
ǫǫ κ)αf(α|X,Z)dα
= X′tB+ Z¯
′δ¯k+ Σ˜ΥǫΣ˜
−1
ǫǫ (xt − Z
′
tδ − Z¯
′δ¯κ) +
∫
(k− Σ˜ΥǫΣ˜
−1
ǫǫ κ)αf(α|X)dα
= X′tB+ Z¯
′δ¯k+ Σ˜ΥǫΣ˜
−1
ǫǫ (xt − Z
′
tδ − Z¯
′δ¯κ) + (k− Σ˜ΥǫΣ˜
−1
ǫǫ κ)αˆ
= X′tB+ (Z¯
′δ¯ + αˆ)k + Σ˜ΥǫΣ˜
−1
ǫǫ (xt − Z
′
tδ − (Z¯
′δ¯ + αˆ)κ)
= X′tB+ ˆ˜αk+ Σ˜ΥǫΣ˜
−1
ǫǫ ǫˆt, (A-6)
where the second equality follows from the fact that Z and α are independent. αˆi =
αˆi(Xi,Zi,Θ1) is the expected a posteriori (EAP) value of time invariant individual effects
αi, and Θ1 is the set of first stage reduced form parameters.
To obtain the EAP values, αˆi, in (A-6), we use Bayes rule we can write f(α|X,Z) as
f(α|X) =
f(X|α)g(α)
h(X)
=
f(X,Z|α)g(α)
h(X,Z)
, (A-7)
4where g and h are density functions. The above can be written as
f(α|X,Z) =
f(X|Z, α)p(Z|α)g(α)
h(X|Z)p(Z)
,
By our assumption the, αs are independent of the exogenous variables Z, hence p(Z|α) =
p(Z), that is,
f(α|X,Z) =
f(X|Z, α)g(α)
h(X|Z)
=
f(X|Z, α)g(α)∫
f(X|Z, α)g(α)dα
, (A-8)
Hence,
∫
αf(α|X,Z)d(α) =
∫
αf(X|Z, α)g(α)dα∫
f(X|Z, α)g(α)dα
=
∫
α
∏T
t=1 f(xt|Z, α)g(α)dα∫ ∏T
t=1 f(xt|Z, α)g(α)dα
= αˆ(X,Z,Θ1) (A-9)
where the second equality follow from the fact that conditional on Z and α, each of the xt,
xt ∈ {x1, . . . ,xT} are independently normally distributed with mean Z
′
tδ +(Z¯
′δ¯ +α)κ and
standard deviation Σǫǫ. g(α) by our assumption is normally distributed with mean zero
and variance σ2α and a =
α
σα
follows a standard normal distribution. The functional form
of αˆ(X,Z,Θ1) is given by:
αˆ(X,Z,Θ1) =∫
σαa
∏T
t=1 exp(−
1
2
(xt − Z
′
tδ − (Z¯
′δ¯ + σαa)κ)
TΣ−1ǫǫ (xt − Z
′
tδ − (Z¯
′δ¯ + σαa)κ))φ(a)da∫ ∏T
t=1 exp(−
1
2
(xt − Z
′
tδ − (Z¯
′δ¯ + σαa)κ)TΣ−1ǫǫ (xt − Z
′
tδ − (Z¯
′δ¯ + σαa)κ))φ(a)da
.
(A-10)
The right hand side of (A-10) is the expected a posteriori (EAP) value of α. ˆˆα(x,Z, Θˆ1)
is the estimated expected a posteriori value of α, which can be estimated by employing
numerical integration techniques, such as Gauss-Hermite quadratures, with respect to α
at the estimated Θ1 from the first stage. Also, it can be shown that
Lemma 1 ˆˆαi(Xi,Zi, Θˆ1) converges a.s. to αˆi(Xi,Zi,Θ1), where Θˆ1 is the consistent first
stage estimates.
5Proof of Lemma 1 Given in Section A.1.
Lemma 1 implies that
X
′
tB+ (Z¯
′δ¯ + ˆˆα)k+ Σ˜ζǫΣ˜
−1
ǫǫ
ˆˆǫt,
a.s
→ E(y∗t |X,Z) =
∫
E(y∗t |X,Z, α)f(α|X,Z)d(α),
where ˆˆǫt = xt − Z
′
tδ − (Z¯
′δ¯ + ˆˆα)κ. Therefore, if the reduced form population parameters,
Θ1, are known, the above implies that we could write the linear predictor of y
∗
it, given Xi
and Zi in error form as
y∗t = X
′
tB+ ˆ˜αk+ Σ˜ΥǫΣ˜
−1
ǫǫ ǫˆt + Υ˜t, (A-11)
where ˆ˜α = Z¯ ′δ¯+ αˆ and conditional of X and Z, Υ˜t is i.i.d. with mean 0. For linear models,
say if all the variables in y∗t were continuous and observed, with estimates of ˆ˜α, and the
estimates of Σ˜−1ǫǫ ǫˆt the parameters of interest, B, can be consistently estimated by running
a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) or a panel version of SUR to gain efficiency. We
note here that for any k, k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, n = 4 in our model, Σ˜ΥkǫΣ˜
−1
ǫǫ ǫˆt take the form
ρΥkǫ1σΥkf1(Σǫǫ, ǫˆ1t, . . . , ǫˆmt) + . . .+ ρΥkǫmσΥkfm(Σǫǫ, ǫˆ1t, . . . , ǫˆmt)
where each of the f ’s above are linear in ǫˆt. The estimates ρΥkǫlσΥk , l ∈ {1, . . . , m}, provides
us with a test of exogeneity of the regressor xl with respect to Υk.
However, when response outcomes are discrete and we have to deal with nonlinear models
additional assumptions than those made above are required. Let us consider F ∗t of y
∗
t where
F ∗t is the latent variable underlying Ft, the binary variable that takes value 1 when the
firm is financially constrained and 0 otherwise.
Ft = 1{F
∗
t > 0} = 1{X
F ′
t ϕ + λα˜ + ζt > 0} = H(X
F
t , α, ζt), (A-12)
For a firm i, what we are interested is the Average Structural Function (ASF),
E(Ft|X
F
t ) = G(X
F
t ) =
∫
H(X Ft , α˜, ζt)dFα˜,ζ, (A-13)
and the Average Partial Effect (APE) of changing a variable, say w, in time period t from
wt to wt +∆w,
∆E(Ft|X
F
t )
∆w
=
∆G(X Ft )
∆w
=
∫ (
H(X Ft
−w
, (wt +∆w), α˜, ζt)−H(X
F
t , α˜, ζt)
)
dFα˜,ζ
∆w
,
(A-14)
6where the average is taken over the marginal distribution of the error terms α˜ and ζ .
However, the above could only be possible if the endogeneity of X Ft were absent, that is, if
the regressors X Ft could be manipulated independently of the errors, α˜ and ζt. To obtain
the ASF, G(X Ft ), consider E(Ft|X
F
t ,X,Z) = E(Ft|X,Z). For a firm i, we have
E(Ft|X,Z) = E(H(X
F
t , α˜, ζt)|X,Z)
= E(E(H(X Ft , α˜, ζt)|X,Z, α˜)|X,Z)
= E(E(H(X Ft , α˜, ζt)|α˜, ǫ)|X,Z)
= E(E(H(X Ft , α˜, ζt)|ǫ)|X,Z)
= E(E(H(X Ft , α˜, ζt)|ǫt)|X,Z)
= E(H∗(X Ft , α˜, ǫt)|X,Z) =
∫
H∗(Xt, α˜, ǫt)dFα˜|X,Z
= H∗(X Ft , ˆ˜α, ǫˆt) = E(Ft|X,Z, ˆ˜α, ǫˆt) = E(Ft|X
F
t , ˆ˜α, ǫˆt). (A-15)
The second equality above is obtained by the Law of Iterated Expectation, the fourth
follows from the fact that ǫi = Xi − E(Xi|Zi, α˜i), where ǫi = {ǫ
′
i1, . . . , ǫ
′
iT}
′. The third
follows from equation (A-3), according to which the dependence of α˜i and ζit on the vector
of regressors Xi, Zi, and α˜i is completely characterized by the reduced form error vectors
ǫi and α˜i. The fourth equality follows from dFα˜,ζt|α˜,ǫ = dFζt|α˜,ǫ = dFζt|ǫ
2. The fifth equality
follows from the assumption that conditional on ǫit, ζit is independent of ǫi
−t
.
In the fifth equality the intermediate regression function, H∗(Xt, α˜, ǫt), is the conditional
CDF of ζt given ǫt evaluated at X
F ′
t ϕ + λα˜. That is
H∗(Xt, α˜, ǫt) = Fζt|ǫt(X
′
tϕ + λα˜|ǫt).
Had we observed α˜ and ǫt we could have made some suitable assumption about the con-
ditional distribution of ζt and obtained H
∗(Xt, α˜, ǫt), but we do not observe α˜ and ǫt. We,
however, have shown that
E(λα˜|X,Z) = λ ˆ˜α and E(ζt|X,Z) = E(E(ζt|α˜,X,Z)|X,Z) = Σ˜ζǫΣ˜
−1
ǫǫ ǫˆt.
To obtain the regression function, H∗(Xt, ˆ˜α, ǫˆt), the conditional CDF of ζt given X and
2The last equality here follows from assumption A2.
7Z, we, like Chamberlain (1984), assume that
ζt|X,Z ∼ N
[
E(ζt|X,Z), σ
2
ζ¯
]
and λα˜|X,Z ∼ N
[
E(λα˜|X,Z), σ2αλ
]
(A-16)
and that the tail, ζ¯t = ζt−E(ζt|X,Z) = ζt−Σ˜ζǫΣ˜
−1
ǫǫ ǫˆt, and the tail, αλ = λα˜−E(λα˜|X,Z) =
λα˜− λ ˆ˜α, are distributed normally with mean 0 and some variance.
Having assumed the conditional distribution of λα˜ and ζt, we can write the linear pro-
jection of F ∗t in error form as
F ∗t = X
F ′
t ϕ + λ ˆ˜α+ Σ˜ζǫΣ˜
−1
ǫǫ ǫˆt + αλ + ζ¯t, (A-17)
With the assumptions in (A-16) and the fact that in probit models the parameters are
identified only up to a scale3, the probability of Ft = 1, given X and Z, is given by
H∗(X Ft , ˆ˜α, ǫˆt) =
∫
Pr(Ft = 1|X
F
t , ˆ˜α, ǫˆt, αλ)dFαλ = Φ
(
{X F ′t ϕ + λ ˆ˜α + Σ˜ζǫΣ˜
−1
ǫǫ ǫˆt}σ˜
−1
ζ
)
,
where the σ˜ζ is the variance of ζ˜t = αλ + ζ¯t. Thus, we see that once we have the estimates
of ˆ˜αi and ǫˆit, we can simply pool the data and run a ordinary probit to get the structural
estimates of the Financial constraint equation.
Having obtain H∗(X Ft , ˆ˜α, ǫˆt), the measure ASF, G(X
F
t ), can be obtained by averaging
over ˆ˜α and ǫˆt.
G(X Ft ) = Pr(Ft = 1|X
F
t ) =
∫
H∗(X Ft , ˆ˜α, ǫˆt)dF ˆ˜α,ǫˆt =
∫
Φ(X F ′t ϕ + λ ˆ˜α + Σ˜ζǫΣ˜
−1
ǫǫ ǫˆt)dF ˆ˜α,ǫˆt
(A-18)
To see that the above indeed gives the ASF, consider the following:
∫ [ ∫
Pr(Ft = 1|X
F
t , ˆ˜α, ǫˆt, αλ)dFαλ
]
dF ˆ˜α,ǫˆt =
∫
H∗(X Ft , ˆ˜α, ǫˆt)dF ˆ˜α,ǫˆt
=
∫ [ ∫
H∗(X Ft , α˜, ǫt)dFα˜,ǫ| ˆ˜α,ǫˆt
]
dF ˆ˜α,ǫˆt =
∫
H∗(X Ft , α˜, ǫt)dFα˜,ǫt
=
∫ [ ∫
H(X Ft , α˜, ζt)dFα˜,ζt|α˜,ǫt
]
dFα˜,ǫt =
∫
H(X Ft , α˜, ζt)dFα˜,ζt = G(X
F
t ).
3In the rest of the appendix, with a slight abuse of notations, we will denote the scaled parameters by
their original notation.
8The sample analog of ASF, G(X Fit ), for any fixed X
F
it = X¯
F can be computed as
Gˆ(X¯ F ) =
1∑N
i=1 Ti
N∑
i=1
Ti∑
t=1
Φ(X¯ F ′ϕˆ + λˆ ˆ˜ˆαi +
ˆ˜Σζǫ
ˆ˜Σ−1ǫǫ
ˆˆǫit), (A-19)
where
ˆˆ
α˜i and ˆˆǫit are the estimated values of ˆ˜αi and ǫˆit.
The APE,
∆G(XFt )
∆w
in (A-14), of changing a variable, say wt, from wt to wt +∆w can be
obtained by taking the difference of ASF at wt and wt + ∆w and dividing the difference
by ∆w. In our case, since the integrand is a smooth function of its arguments, in the limit
when ∆w tends to zero we can change the order of differentiation and integration in (A-14)
to get
∂G(X Ft )
∂w
=
∂ Pr(Ft = 1|X
F
t )
∂w
=
∫
ϕwφ(X¯
F ′ϕ + λ ˆ˜α + Σ˜ζǫΣ˜
−1
ǫǫ ǫˆt)dFǫˆt, ˆ˜α, (A-20)
where φ is the density function of a standard normal and ϕw is the coefficient of w. If w is
dummy variable taking values 0 and 1, then the APE of change of wit from 0 to 1 on the
probability of yit = 1, given other covariates, is given by∫ [
Φ(X¯ F ′−wϕ−w + ϕw + λ ˆ˜α + Σ˜ζǫΣ˜
−1
ǫǫ ǫˆt)− Φ(X¯
F ′
−wϕ−w + λαˆ + Σ˜ζǫΣ˜
−1
ǫǫ ǫˆt)
]
dFǫˆt,αˆ.
(A-21)
The sample analog of the APE’s in equation (A-20) and (A-21) can be computed in exactly
the same way as was done for the ASF in (A-19).
A similar equation as (A-17) also holds for the Innovation and R&D equations. That is
Υ˜t in equations (3.12) to (3.14) in the main text is Υ˜t = {υ˜t, ζ˜t, η˜1t, η˜0t}
′ = {αθ + υ¯t, αλ +
ζ¯t, αµ1 + η¯1t, αµ0 + η¯0t}
′, where αθ+ υ¯t, αµ1 + η¯1t, and αµ0 + η¯0t are defined in the same way
as αλ + ζ¯t is defined in (A-17).
A.1. Proof of Lemma 1
Proof: Let Θ∗1 be true value of first stage reduced form parameters. Now, for a firm i
αˆ(X,Z,Θ1) =
∫
α exp(−1
2
r(Θ1, α))φ(α)dα∫
exp(−1
2
r(Θ1, α))φ(α)dα
,
where r(Θ1, α) =
∑T
t=1(xt − Z
′
tδ − (Z¯
′
tδ¯ + α)κ)
′Σ−1ǫǫ (xt − Z
′
tδ − (Z¯
′
tδ¯ + α)κ).
9First consider the expression in the numerator
∫
α exp(−1
2
r(Θ1, α))φ(α)dα. Now, |α|, |.|
being the absolute value of its argument, is continuous in α and |α| ≥ α exp(−1
2
r(Θ1, α))
∀Θ1 ∈ Θ1 . We also know that Θˆ1
a.s.
−→ Θ∗1, and since α exp(−
1
2
r(Θ1, α)), is continuous in Θ1
and α, α exp(−1
2
r(Θˆ1, α))
a.s.
−→ α exp(−1
2
r(Θ∗1, α)) for any given α. Thus by an application
of Lebesque Dominated Convergence Theorem we can conclude that
∫
α exp(−
1
2
r(Θˆ1, α))φ(α)dα
a.s.
−→
∫
α exp(−
1
2
r(Θ∗1, α))φ(α)dα.
Also, since 1 ≥ exp(−1
2
r(Θ1, α)), again by an application of Lebesque Dominated Conver-
gence Theorem we can conclude that
∫
exp(−
1
2
r(Θˆ1, α))φ(α)dα
a.s.
−→
∫
exp(−
1
2
r(Θ∗1, α))φ(α)dα.
Given that both the numerator and the denominator in (A-9) defined at Θˆ1 converge almost
surly to the same defined at Θ∗1, it can now be easily shown that
ˆˆα(X,Z, Θˆ1)
a.s.
−→ αˆ(X,Z,Θ∗1).
APPENDIX B: MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATION OF THE REDUCED FORM
EQUATIONS
Let N be the total number of firms. The firms are observed in at least one and at most
P periods. Let Np denote the number of firms observed in p periods, that is N =
∑P
p=1Np.
Let N be the total number of observations, i.e., N =
∑P
p=1Npp. Assume that the firms
are ordered in P groups such that the N1 firms observed once come first, the N2 firms
observed twice come second, etc. Let Mp =
∑p
k=1Nk be the cumulated number of firms
observed up to p times, so that the index sets of the firms observed p times can be written
as I(p) = (Mp−1 + 1, . . . ,Mp)(p = 1, . . . , P ;M0 = 0). We may, formally, consider I1 as a
cross section and Ip(p = 2, . . . , P ) as a balanced panel with p observations of each firm.
The system of m reduced form equations in equation (3.4a) is given by
xit = Z
′
itδ + Z¯
′
iδ¯κ + αiκ + ǫit = Z
′
itδ + Z¯
′
iδ¯κ + uit, (B-1)
where xit = (x1it, . . . , xmit)
′ and Zit = diag(z1it, . . . , zmit) is the matrix of exogenous
variables appearing in each of the m reduced form equation in (B-1). δ = (δ ′1, . . . , δ
′
m)
′,
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κ = (κ1, . . . , κm)
′, and ǫit = (ǫ1it, . . . , ǫmit)
′. σ2α is the variance of αi, which is normally
distributed with mean 0.We employ a step-wise maximum likelihood method developed
by Biørn (2004) to obtain consistent estimates of parameters, δ,Σǫǫ,κ, and σ
2
α. Given the
distribution of αi, καi is normally distributed with mean zero and variance Σα, given by:
Σα = σ
2
αΣκ = σ
2
α


κ21
κ1κ2 κ
2
2
...
...
κ1κm κ2κm . . . κ
2
m


.
ǫit is normally distributed with mean zero and variance Σǫǫ. We assume that αi and ǫit are
mutually uncorrelated and given that Z′it is exogenous, αi and ǫit are uncorrelated with
Z′it. Let xi(p) = {x
′
i1, . . .x
′
ip}
′, Z i(p) = {Z
′
i1, . . .Z
′
ip}
′ and ǫi(p) = {ǫ
′
i1, . . . ǫ
′
ip}
′ and write the
model as
xi(p) = Z
′
i(p)δ + (ep ⊗ Z¯
′
iδ¯κ) + (ep ⊗ αiκ) + ǫi(p) = Z
′
i(p)δ + (ep ⊗ Z¯
′
iδ¯κ) + ui(p),
(B-2)
E(ui(p)u
′
i(p)) = Ip ⊗ Σǫǫ + Ep ⊗ Σα = Kp ⊗ Σǫǫ + Jp ⊗ Σ(p) = Ωu(p) (B-3)
where
Σ(p) = Σǫǫ + pΣα, p = 1, . . . , P (B-4)
and Ip is the p dimensional identity matrix, ep is the (p × 1) vector of ones, Ep = epe
′
p,
Jp = (1/p)Ep, and Kp = Ip − Jp. The latter two matrices are symmetric and idempotent
and have orthogonal columns, which facilitates inversion of Ωu(p).
B.1. GMM estimation
Before addressing the maximum likelihood problem, we consider the GMM problem for
δ˜ = {δ ′, δ¯
′
}′ when κ, σα (hence Σα), and Σǫǫ are known. Define Qi(p) = u
′
i(p)Ω
−1
u(p)ui(p), then
11
GMM estimation is the problem of minimizing Q =
∑P
p=1
∑
i∈I(p)
Qi(p) with respect to δ˜.
Since Ω−1u(p) = Kp ⊗ Σ
−1
ǫǫ + Jp ⊗ (Σǫǫ + pΣα)
−1, we can rewrite Q as
Q =
P∑
p=1
∑
i∈I(p)
Qi(p)(δ,Σǫǫ,κ, σ
2
α) =
P∑
p=1
∑
i∈I(p)
u′i(p)[Kp ⊗ Σ
−1
ǫǫ + Jp ⊗ (Σǫǫ + pΣα)
−1]ui(p),
(B-5)
with ui(p) = xi(p) − Z
′
i(p)δ − (ep ⊗ Z¯
′
iδ¯κ). Had we not imposed the restriction that δ¯ be
the same for each of the m equations we could have estimated δ and δ¯ by employing GLS
estimation as in Biørn.
B.2. Maximum Likelihood Estimation
We now consider ML estimation of Θ1 = {δ˜,Σǫǫ,κ, σ
2
α}. Assuming normality of αi and
the disturbances ǫit, i.e., αiκ ∼ IIN(0, σ
2
αΣκ) and ǫit ∼ IIN(0,Σǫǫ), then ui(p) = (ep ⊗
αiκ)+ǫi(p) ∼ IIN(0mp,1,Ωu(p)). The log-likelihood function of all x’s conditional on all Z’s
for a firm in group p and for all firms then become, respectively,
Li(p)1(Θ1) =
−mp
2
ln(2π)−
1
2
ln |Ωu(p)| −
1
2
Qi(p)(δ˜ ,Σǫǫ,κ, σ
2
α) (B-6)
L1(Θ1) =
P∑
p=1
∑
i∈I(p)
Li(p)1 =
−mN
2
ln(2π)−
1
2
P∑
p=1
Np ln |Ωu(p)| −
1
2
P∑
p=1
∑
i∈I(p)
Qi(p)(δ˜ ,Σǫǫ,κ, σ
2
α),
(B-7)
where |Ωu(p)| = |Σ(p)||Σǫǫ|
p−1.
We split the problem into: (A) Maximization of L with respect to δ˜ for given (Σǫǫ,κ, σ
2
α)
and (B) Maximization of L1(Θ1) with respect to (Σǫǫ,κ, σ
2
α) for given δ˜ . Subproblem (A)
is identical with the GMM problem, since maximization of L1(Θ1) with respect to δ˜ for
given (Σǫǫ,κ, σ
2
α) is equivalent to minimization of
∑P
p=1
∑
i∈I(p)
Qi(p)(δ˜ ,Σǫǫ,κ, σ
2
α).
The first order conditions with respect to Σǫǫ, κ, and σ
2
α, which we derive in Appendix E
does not have a closed form solution. To obtain estimates of Σǫǫ, κ, and σ
2
α, we numerically
maximize L1(Θ1) with respect to Σǫǫ, κ, and σ
2
α for a given δ˜ and use the first order
conditions as vector of gradients in the maximization routine.
12
The complete stepwise algorithm for solving jointly subproblems (A) and (B) then con-
sists in switching between minimizing (B-5) with respect to δ˜ and (B-7) with respect to
Σǫǫ, κ, and σ
2
α and iterating until convergence. Biørn and the reference there in have mono-
tonicity properties of such a sequential procedure which ensure that its solution converges
to the ML estimator even if the likelihood function is not globally concave.
APPENDIX C: DERIVATION OF THE CORRECTION TERMS FOR THE THIRD STAGE
SWITCHING REGRESSION MODEL
To avoid complicating the notations, we denote the idiosyncratic error components – υ˜,
ζ˜, η˜1, and η˜0 – in equations (3.12) to (3.14), that were defined in appendix A, respectively
as υ, ζ , η1, and η0. We know that the conditional expectation of η, where η is either η1 or
η0, given ζ and υ, E[η|ζ, υ], is given by
E[η|ζ, υ] = µη +
ση(ρηζ − ρηυρζυ)(ζ − µζ)
σζ(1− ρ2ζυ)
+
ση(ρηυ − ρηζρζυ)(υ − µυ)
συ(1− ρ2ζυ)
.
Since, µη = µζ = µυ = 0 we have,
E[η|ζ, υ] =
ση(ρηζ − ρηυρζυ)(ζ)
σζ(1− ρ2ζυ)
+
ση(ρηυ − ρηζρζυ)(υ)
συ(1− ρ2ζυ)
.
Define, ζ¯ = ζ
σζ
and υ¯ = υ
συ
, then
E[η|ζ, υ] =
ση(ρηζ − ρηυρζυ)ζ¯
(1− ρ2ζυ)
+
ση(ρηυ − ρηζρζυ)υ¯
(1− ρ2ζυ)
,
which can be written as
E[η|ζ, υ] =
σηρηζ
(1− ρ2ζυ)
(ζ¯ − ρζυυ¯) +
σηρηυ
(1− ρ2ζυ)
(υ¯ − ρζυζ¯). (C-1)
Hence,
E[η|ζ > −a, υ > −b] = E[η|ζ¯ >
−a
σζ
, υ¯ >
−b
συ
] =
∫∞
−b
συ
∫∞
−a
σζ
E[η|ζ¯ , υ¯]φ2(ζ¯ , υ¯, ρζυ)dζ¯dυ¯
Φ2
(
a
σζ
, b
συ
, ρζυ
)
=
1
Φ2
(
a
σζ
, b
συ
, ρζυ
) σηρηζ
(1− ρ2ζυ)
∫ ∞
−b
συ
∫ ∞
−a
σζ
(ζ¯ − ρζυυ¯)φ2(ζ¯ , υ¯, ρζυ)dζ¯dυ¯
+
1
Φ2
(
a
σζ
, b
συ
, ρζυ
) σηρηυ
(1− ρ2ζυ)
∫ ∞
−b
συ
∫ ∞
−a
σζ
(υ¯ − ρζυζ¯)φ2(ζ¯ , υ¯, ρζυ)dζ¯dυ¯, (C-2)
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where, φ2 and Φ2 denote respectively the density and cumulative density function function
of a standard bivariate normal. Now, consider the expression
∫∞
−b
συ
∫∞
−a
σζ
(ζ¯−ρζυυ¯)φ2(ζ¯ , υ¯, ρζυ)dζ¯dυ¯,
of the RHS in (C-2). Given that φ2(ζ¯ , υ¯, ρζυ) = φ(ζ¯)
1√
(1−ρ2
ζυ
)
φ
(
υ¯−ρζυ ζ¯√
(1−ρ2
ζυ
)
)
, the concerned
expression can be written as
∫ ∞
−b
συ
∫ ∞
−a
σζ
(ζ¯ − ρζυυ¯)φ(ζ¯)
1√
(1− ρ2ζυ)
φ
(
υ¯ − ρζυ ζ¯√
(1− ρ2ζυ)
)
dζ¯dυ¯ =
∫ ∞
−a
σζ
ζ¯φ(ζ¯)
(
1− Φ
( −b
συ
− ρζυ ζ¯√
(1− ρ2ζυ)
))
dζ¯ − ρζυ
∫ ∞
−b
συ
∫ ∞
−a
σζ
υ¯φ(ζ¯)
1√
(1− ρ2ζυ)
φ
(
υ¯ − ρζυ ζ¯√
(1− ρ2ζυ)
)
dζ¯dυ¯.
(C-3)
Now, let y =
υ¯−ρζυ ζ¯√
(1−ρ2
ζυ
)
, then dy = dυ¯√
(1−ρ2
ζυ
)
. Having defined y, the right hand side of (C-3)
can now be written as∫ ∞
−a
σζ
ζ¯φ(ζ¯)
(
1− Φ
( −b
συ
− ρζυ ζ¯√
(1− ρ2ζυ)
))
dζ¯ − ρζυ
∫ ∞
−b
συ
−ρζυζ¯√
(1−ρ2
ζυ
)
∫ ∞
−a
σζ
(y
√
(1− ρ2ζυ) + ρζυζ¯)φ(ζ¯)φ(y)dζ¯dy
=
∫ ∞
−a
σζ
ζ¯φ(ζ¯)
(
1− Φ
( −b
συ
− ρζυ ζ¯√
(1− ρ2ζυ)
))
dζ¯
−ρζυ
∫ ∞
−b
συ
−ρζυζ¯√
(1−ρ2
ζυ
)
∫ ∞
−a
σζ
y
√
(1− ρ2ζυ)φ(ζ¯)φ(y)dζ¯dy − ρ
2
ζυ
∫ ∞
−b
συ
−ρζυζ¯√
(1−ρ2
ζυ
)
∫ ∞
−a
σζ
ζ¯φ(ζ¯)φ(y)dζ¯dy
(C-4)
= (1− ρ2ζυ)
∫ ∞
−a
σζ
ζ¯φ(ζ¯)
(
1− Φ
( −b
συ
− ρζυζ¯√
(1− ρ2ζυ)
))
dζ¯
−ρζυ
√
(1− ρ2ζυ)
∫ ∞
−b
συ
−ρζυζ¯√
(1−ρ2
ζυ
)
∫ ∞
−a
σζ
yφ(ζ¯)φ(y)dζ¯dy
= (1− ρ2ζυ)
∫ ∞
−a
σζ
ζ¯φ(ζ¯)Φ
( b
συ
+ ρζυ ζ¯√
(1− ρ2ζυ)
)
dζ¯ − ρζυ
√
(1− ρ2ζυ)
∫ ∞
−b
συ
−ρζυζ¯√
(1−ρ2
ζυ
)
∫ ∞
−a
σζ
yφ(ζ¯)φ(y)dζ¯dy.
(C-5)
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Now, note that ζ¯φ(ζ¯)dζ¯ = −dφ(ζ¯) and φ(ζ¯) = φ(−ζ¯), hence using integration by parts,
the first part of the last equation of (C-5) can now be written as
(1− ρ2ζυ)
∫ ∞
−a
σζ
ζ¯φ(ζ¯)Φ
( b
συ
+ ρζυ ζ¯√
(1− ρ2ζυ)
)
dζ¯ = (1− ρ2ζυ)
∫ ∞
−a
σζ
−dφ(ζ¯)Φ
( b
συ
+ ρζυ ζ¯√
(1− ρ2ζυ)
)
= −(1 − ρ2ζυ)φ(ζ¯)Φ
( b
συ
+ ρζυζ¯√
(1− ρ2ζυ)
)∣∣∣∣
∞
−a
σζ
+ ρζυ
√
(1− ρ2ζυ)
∫ ∞
−a
σζ
φ(ζ¯)φ
( b
συ
+ ρζυ ζ¯√
(1− ρ2ζυ)
)
dζ¯
= (1− ρ2ζυ)φ(
a
σζ
)Φ
( b
συ
− ρζυ
a
σζ√
(1− ρ2ζυ)
)
+ ρζυ
√
(1− ρ2ζυ)
∫ ∞
−a
σζ
φ(ζ¯)φ
( b
συ
+ ρζυ ζ¯√
(1− ρ2ζυ)
)
dζ¯.
(C-6)
The second expression of the last line in equation (C-5) can be written as
−ρζυ
√
(1− ρ2ζυ)
∫ ∞
−b
συ
−ρζυζ¯√
(1−ρ2
ζυ
)
∫ ∞
−a
σζ
yφ(ζ¯)φ(y)dζ¯dy = ρζυ
√
(1− ρ2ζυ)
∫ ∞
−a
σζ
∫ ∞
−b
συ
−ρζυζ¯√
(1−ρ2
ζυ
)
dφ(y)φ(ζ¯)dζ¯
= ρζυ
√
(1− ρ2ζυ)
∫ ∞
−a
σζ
φ(y)
∣∣∣∣
∞
−b
συ
−ρζυζ¯√
(1−ρ2
ζυ
)
φ(ζ¯)dζ¯ = −ρζυ
√
(1− ρ2ζυ)
∫ ∞
−a
σζ
φ
( b
συ
+ ρζυ ζ¯√
(1− ρ2ζυ)
)
φ(ζ¯)dζ¯.
(C-7)
Plugging the results obtained in (C-6) and (C-7) into (C-4), we obtain
∫ ∞
−b
συ
∫ ∞
−a
σζ
(ζ¯ − ρζυυ¯)φ2(ζ¯ , υ¯, ρζυ)dζ¯dυ¯ = (1− ρ
2
ζυ)φ(
a
σζ
)Φ
( b
συ
− ρζυ
a
σζ√
(1− ρ2ζυ)
)
.
Similarly, it can be shown that
∫ ∞
−b
συ
∫ ∞
−a
σζ
(υ¯ − ρζυ ζ¯)φ2(ζ¯ , υ¯, ρζυ)dζ¯dυ¯ = (1− ρ
2
ζυ)φ(
b
συ
)Φ
( a
σζ
− ρζυ
b
συ√
(1− ρ2ζυ)
)
.
Hence,
E[η|ζ¯ >
−a
σζ
, υ¯ >
−b
συ
] =
σηρηζφ(
a
σζ
)
Φ2
(
a
σζ
, b
συ
, ρζυ
)Φ
( b
συ
− ρζυ
a
σζ√
(1− ρ2ζυ)
)
+
σηρηυφ(
b
συ
)
Φ2
(
a
σζ
, b
συ
, ρζυ
)Φ
( a
σζ
− ρζυ
b
συ√
(1− ρ2ζυ)
)
.
(C-8)
15
Now, consider
E[η|ζ ≤ −a, υ > −b] = E[η|ζ¯ ≤
−a
σζ
, υ¯ >
−b
συ
] =
∫∞
−b
συ
∫ −aσζ
−∞ E[η|ζ¯ , υ¯]φ2(ζ¯ , υ¯, ρζυ)dζ¯dυ¯
Φ2
(
−a
σζ
, b
συ
,−ρζυ
)
=
1
Φ2
(
−a
σζ
, b
συ
,−ρζυ
) σηρηζ
(1− ρ2ζυ)
∫ ∞
−b
συ
∫ −a
σζ
−∞
(ζ¯ − ρζυυ¯)φ2(ζ¯ , υ¯, ρζυ)dζ¯dυ¯
+
1
Φ2
(
−a
σζ
, b
συ
,−ρζυ
) σηρηυ
(1− ρ2ζυ)
∫ ∞
−b
συ
∫ −a
σζ
−∞
(υ¯ − ρζυζ¯)φ2(ζ¯ , υ¯, ρζυ)dζ¯dυ¯. (C-9)
By a method analogous to that used in deriving (C-8), it can be shown that
E[η|ζ¯ ≤
−a
σζ
, υ¯ >
−b
συ
] =
−σηρηζφ(
a
σζ
)
Φ2
(
−a
σζ
, b
συ
,−ρζυ
)Φ
( b
συ
− ρζυ
a
σζ√
(1− ρ2ζυ)
)
+
σηρηυφ(
b
συ
)
Φ2
(
−a
σζ
, b
συ
,−ρζυ
)Φ
( −a
σζ
+ ρζυ
b
συ√
(1− ρ2ζυ)
)
. (C-10)
APPENDIX D: ASYMPTOTIC COVARIANCE MATRIX OF THE SECOND AND THIRD STAGE
ESTIMATES
In this section we give the asymptotic covariance matrix of the coefficients of the second
stage and third stage R&D switching regression model. Newey (1984) has shown that
sequential estimators can be interpreted as members of a class of Method of Moments
(MM) estimators and that this interpretation facilitates derivation of asymptotic covariance
matrices for multi-step estimators. Let Θ = {Θ′1,Θ
′
2,Θ
′
3}
′, where Θ1, Θ2, and Θ3 are
respectively the parameters to be estimated in the first, second and third step estimation
of the sequential estimator. Following Newey (1984) we write the first, second, and third
step estimation as an MM estimation based on the following population moment conditions:
E(Li(p)1Θ1) = E
∂ lnLi(p)1(Θ1)
∂Θ1
= 0 (D-1)
E(Li(p)2Θ2) = E
∂ lnLi(p)2(Θ1,Θ2)
∂Θ2
= 0 (D-2)
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and
E(Li(p)3Θ3) = E[
p∑
t=1
IitX
R
it(Rit − X
R′
it Θ3)] = 0 (D-3)
where Li(p)1(Θ1) is the likelihood function for firm i belonging to the group p, p ∈ {1, . . . , P},
for the first step system of reduced form equations. The notation p was introduced in Ap-
pendix B. p is the number of time period a firm is observed in an unbalanced panel; the
minimum being 1 and maximum P . Hence
∑N
i=1
∑Ti
t=1 =
∑P
p=1
∑
i∈I(p)
∑p
t=1, where I(p)
has been defined in Appendix B. Li(p)2(Θ1,Θ2) is the likelihood function for the second
step estimation in which the joint probability of a firm being an innovator and the firm
being financially constrained is estimated. Equation (D-3) is the first order condition for
minimizing the sum of squared error for the pooled OLS regression of XRit on Rit for those
firms, that have been selected, Iit = 1, where
Rit = FitRit
X
R
it = Fit{Fit,X
R′
it , ˆ˜αi(Θ1), (Σ
−1
ǫǫ ǫˆit(Θ1))
′, C11it(Θ1,Θ2), C12it(Θ1,Θ2)}
′
if Fit = 1, else
Rit = (1− Fit)Rit
X
R
it = (1− Fit){Fit,X
R′
it , αˆi(Θ1), (Σ
−1
ǫǫ ǫˆit(Θ1))
′, C01it(Θ1,Θ2), C02it(Θ1,Θ2)}
′
if Fit = 0.
The estimates for Θ1, Θ2, and Θ3 are obtained by solving the sample analog of the above
population moment conditions. The sample analog of moment conditions for the first step
estimation is given by
1
N
L1Θ1(Θˆ1) =
1
N
P∑
p=1
∑
i∈I(p)
∂ lnLi(p)1(Θˆ1)
∂Θ1
(D-4)
where Li(p)1 = lnLi(p)1(Θ1) is given by equation (B-6) in Appendix B. Θ1 = {δ
′, δ¯
′
vech(Σǫǫ)
′,κ′, σ2α}
′ and N is the total number of firms. The first order moment conditions
for solving Θˆ1 are derived in Subsection D.1.
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Since in the second stage we pool all data to estimate the parameters of the financial
constraint and innovation equation, the sample analog of population moment condition for
the second step estimation is given by
1
N
L2Θ2(Θˆ1, Θˆ2) =
1
N
P∑
p=1
∑
i∈I(p)
∂Li(p)2(Θˆ1, Θˆ2)
∂Θ2
=
1
N
P∑
p=1
∑
i∈I(p)
p∑
t=1
∂Lit2(Θˆ1, Θˆ2)
∂Θ2
(D-5)
where Lit2(Θ1,Θ2) is given by equations (3.15) and (3.17) in the main text and Θ2 =
{ϕ′, γ ′, ρζ˜υ˜}
′ was defined in Appendix D. Finally, the sample analog of the population for
the third step estimation is given by
1
N
L3Θ3(Θˆ1, Θˆ2, Θˆ3) =
1
N
P∑
p=1
∑
i∈I(p)
p∑
t=1
IitX
R
it(Rit − X
R′
it Θˆ3) (D-6)
In Appendix A, we had shown that with ˆ˜αi(Xi,Zi,Θ1) substituted for α˜i still leads to
the identification of Θ2 and Θ3. Let Θ
∗
1, Θ
∗
2, and Θ
∗
3 respectively be the true values of Θ1,
Θ2 and Θ3. Under the assumptions we make, maximizing Li(p)2(Θˆ1,Θ2) is asymptotically
equivalent to maximizing Li(p)2(Θ
∗
1,Θ2), where Θˆ1 is a consistent first step estimate of Θ1.
Hence Θˆ2 obtained by solving
1
N
L2Θ2(Θˆ1, Θˆ2) = 0 is a consistent estimate of Θ2. By the
same logic Θˆ3 obtained by solving
1
N
L3Θ3(Θˆ1, Θˆ2, Θˆ3) = 0 in the third step gives consistent
estimate of the third stage parameters. Newey gives a general formulation of the asymptotic
distribution of the subsequent step estimates for a sequential step sequential estimator.
To derive the asymptotic distribution of the second and third step estimates Θˆ2 and Θˆ3
respectively, consider the stacked up sample moment conditions
1
N


L1Θ1(Θˆ1)
L2Θ2(Θˆ1, Θˆ2)
L3Θ3(Θˆ1, Θˆ2, Θˆ3)

 = 0. (D-7)
A series of Taylor’s expansion of L1Θ1(Θˆ1), L2Θ2(Θˆ1, Θˆ2) and LΘ3(Θˆ1, Θˆ2, Θˆ3) around Θ
∗
gives
1
N


L1Θ1Θ1 0 0
L2Θ2Θ1 L2Θ2Θ2 0
L3Θ3Θ1 L3Θ3Θ2 L3Θ3Θ3




√
N(Θˆ1 −Θ
∗
1)
√
N(Θˆ2 −Θ
∗
2)
√
N(Θˆ3 −Θ
∗
3)

 = − 1√N


L1Θ1
L2Θ2
L3Θ3


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In matrix notation the above can be written as
BΘΘN
√
N(Θˆ−Θ) = −
1
√
N
ΛΘN , (D-8)
where ΛΘN is evaluated at Θ
∗ and BΘΘN is evaluated at points somewhere between Θˆ
and Θ∗. Under the standard regularity conditions for Generalized Method of Moments
(GMM), (see Newey, 1984), BΘΘN converges in probability to the lower block triangular
matrix B∗ = limEBΘΘN . B∗ is given by
B∗ =


L1Θ1Θ1 0 0
L2Θ2Θ1 L2Θ2Θ2 0
L3Θ3Θ1 L3Θ3Θ2 L3Θ3Θ3

 ,
where a typical element, say, L2Θ2Θ1 = E(Li(p)2Θ2Θ1).
1√
N
ΛN in (D-8) converges in distribu-
tion to an asymptotically normal random variable with mean zero and a covariance matrix
A∗ = limE
1
N
ΛNΛ
′
N , where A∗ is given by
A∗ =


VL1L1 VL1L2 VL1L3
VL2L1 VL2L2 VL2L3
VL3L1 VL3L2 VL3L3

 ,
where a typical element ofA∗, say VL1L2 is given by VL1L2 = E[Li(p)1Θ1(Θ1)Li(p)2Θ2(Θ1,Θ2)
′].
Under the regularity conditions
√
N(Θˆ−Θ∗) is asymptotically normal with zero mean and
covariance matrix4 given by B−1∗ A∗B
−1′
∗ .
√
N(Θˆ−Θ∗)
a
∼ N[(0), (B−1∗ A∗B
−1′
∗ )] (D-9)
The moment conditions for every firm, at the estimates of Θ1, Θ2, and Θ3, of the three
stages can be employed to obtain the sample analog of every element in A∗. For example, to
get an estimate of VL1L2 we have to estimate
1
N
∑P
p=1
∑
i∈I(p)
[Li(p)1Θ1(Θˆ1)Li(p)2Θ2(Θˆ1, Θˆ2)
′].
Consider now the elements of B∗. Since in the first and the second stage we employ
4The covariance matrices V ∗2F in equation (E-5), V
∗
2 in equation (E-7), and V
∗
s in equation (E-12) can
obtained by selecting the appropriate submatrix of 1
N
B−1
∗
A∗B
−1′
∗
.
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MLE, at Θ∗1 and Θ
∗
2 to which Θˆ1 and Θˆ2 converge, we have
L1Θ1Θ1 = E
[
∂Li(p)1(Θ1)
∂Θ1Θ
′
1
]
= −E
[
∂Li(p)1(Θ1)
∂Θ1
∂Li(p)1(Θ1)
∂Θ′1
]
= −VL1L1 and
L2Θ2Θ2 = E
[
∂Li(p)2(Θ2)
∂Θ2Θ′2
]
= −E
[
∂Li(p)2(Θ2)
∂Θ2
∂Li(p)2(Θ2)
∂Θ′1
]
= −VL2L2.
We can employ the derivative Li(p)1(Θ1) of with respect to Θ1 and of Li(p)2(Θ1,Θ2) with
respect to Θ2 to compute Li(p)1Θ1Θ1 and Li(p)2Θ2Θ2 for all firms, which can then be used
to compute the sample analog of L1Θ1Θ1 and L2Θ2Θ2. This leaves us with the problem of
constructing sample analogs of L2Θ2Θ1, L3Θ3Θ1 , L3Θ3Θ2, and L3Θ3Θ3 . While it is straight-
forward to compute sample analog of L3Θ3Θ3 , computation of sample analogs of L2Θ2Θ1 ,
L3Θ3Θ1 , and L3Θ3Θ2 can be challenging. In the next subsections we derive the deriva-
tive of Li(p)2Θ2(Θ1,Θ2) and Li(p)3Θ3(Θ1,Θ2,Θ2) with respect to Θ1 and the derivative of
Li(p)3Θ3(Θ1,Θ2,Θ2) with respect to Θ2. But first we begin by deriving the first order con-
ditions of the log likelihood function of the first stage.
D.1. Derivation of the First Order Conditions for First Stage Reduced Form Likelihood
Function
To derive the first order conditions it is convenient to arrange the disturbances, uit,
given in (B-1), for a firm i, i ∈ Ip, in the (m × p) matrix E˜i(p) = [ui1, . . . ,uip], write
ui(p) = vec(Ei(p)), where ‘vec()’ is the vectorization operator, and define
Wui(p) = E˜i(p)KpE˜
′
i(p) and Bui(p) = E˜i(p)JpE˜
′
i(p), (D-10)
where Jp and Kp defined earlier in Appendix B are Jp = (1/p)Ep, and Kp = Ip−Jp, where
Ip is the p dimensional identity matrix, ep is the (p× 1) vector of ones, Ep = epe
′
p.
Below we show that
∂Li(p)
∂δ
= 2Z i(p)Ω
−1
u(p)ui(p),
∂Li(p)
∂δ¯
= −2Z¯iκ
′
[
Σ−1(p)E˜i(p)Jp + Σ
−1
ǫǫ E˜i(p)Kp
]
ep,
∂Li(p)
∂vech(Σǫǫ)
= −
1
2
vech
(
Σ−1(p) + (p− 1)Σ
−1
ǫǫ − Σ
−1
(p)Bui(p)Σ
−1
(p) − Σ
−1
ǫǫ Wui(p)Σ
−1
ǫǫ
)
,
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∂Li(p)
∂κ
= −pσ2α[Σ
−1
(p) − Σ
−1
(p)Bui(p)Σ
−1
(p)]κ + Z¯
′
iδ¯
[
Σ−1(p)E˜i(p)Jp + Σ
−1
ǫǫ E˜i(p)Kp
]
ep,
and
∂Li(p)
∂σ2α
= −
1
2
p[vec(Σ−1(p))
′ − vec(Σ−1(p)Bui(p)Σ
−1
(p))
′]vec(Σκ), (D-11)
where ‘vech()’ operator is column-wise vectorization of the lower triangle of the symmetric
matrix Σǫǫ
5.
To derive the above we utilize the following matrix results:
1. |Jp ⊗ C +Kp ⊗D| = |C||D|
p−1, since Jp and Kp have ranks 1 and p− 1,
2. ∂ ln |A|
∂A
= (A′)−1,
3. tr(ABCD) = tr(CDAB) = vec(A′)′(D′ ⊗B)vec(C) = vec(C ′)′(B′ ⊗D)vec(A),
4. ∂tr(CB
−1)
∂B
= −(B−1CB−1)′,
5. ∂xx
′
∂x
= x⊗ In+ In⊗ x, where x is a (n× 1) matrix and In is a n dimensional identity
matrix
and
6. vec(ABC) = (C ′ ⊗ A)vec(B).
The log-likelihood for a firm i belonging to group p is given by
Li(p) =
−mp
2
ln(2π)−
1
2
ln |Ωu(p)| −
1
2
Qi(p)(δ, δ¯,Σǫǫ,κ, σ
2
α).
Then
∂Li(p)
∂Σǫǫ
= −
1
2
∂ ln |Ωu(p)|
∂Σǫǫ
−
1
2
∂Qi(p)(δ, δ¯ ,Σǫǫ,κ, σ
2
α)
∂Σǫǫ
.
Now from (a) we have |Ωu(p)| = |Kp⊗Σǫǫ+Jp⊗Σ(p)| = |Σǫǫ|
p−1|Σ(p)| and from (b) we have
∂ ln |Ωu(p)|
∂Σǫǫ
=
∂ ln |Σ(p)|
∂Σǫǫ
+ (p− 1)
∂ ln |Σǫǫ|
∂Σǫǫ
= Σ−1(p) + (p− 1)Σ
−1
ǫǫ (D-12)
For any given δ and δ¯ we have
Qi(p)() = u
′
i(p)[Kp ⊗ Σ
−1
ǫǫ ]ui(p) + u
′
i(p)[Jp ⊗ Σ
−1
(p)]ui(p)
= vec(Ei(p))
′[Kp ⊗ Σ
−1
ǫǫ ]vec(Ei(p)) + vec(Ei(p))
′[Jp ⊗ Σ
−1
(p)]vec(Ei(p))
5Because Σǫǫ is symmetric we only need to optimize with respect to
m(m+1)
2 elements of the lower
triangle of the Σǫǫ.
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From (c) we get
Qi(p)() = tr[Ei(p)Σ
−1
(p)E
′
i(p)Jp] + tr[Ei(p)Σ
−1
ǫǫ E
′
i(p)Kp] = tr[Ei(p)JpE
′
i(p)Σ
−1
(p)] + tr[Ei(p)KpE
′
i(p)Σ
−1
ǫǫ ].
Using (D-10) we obtain
Qi(p)() = tr[Bui(p)Σ
−1
(p)] + tr[Wui(p)Σ
−1
ǫǫ ],
and from (d) we get
∂Qi(p)()
∂Σǫǫ
= −[Σ−1(p)Bui(p)Σ
−1
(p) + Σ
−1
ǫǫ Wui(p)Σ
−1
ǫǫ ]. (D-13)
Combining (D-12) and (D-13) we obtain
∂Li(p)
∂vech(Σǫǫ)
= −
1
2
vech
(
Σ−1(p) + (p− 1)Σ
−1
ǫǫ − Σ
−1
(p)Bui(p)Σ
−1
(p) − Σ
−1
ǫǫ Wui(p)Σ
−1
ǫǫ
)
.
(D-14)
To find expressions for the first order condition with respect to κ and σ2α, consider the
total differential d(ln |Ωu(p)|) and d(Qi(p)()) for given Σǫǫ, δ, and δ¯ .
d(ln |Ωu(p)|) = d(ln(|Σǫǫ|
p−1|Σ(p)|)) = d(ln(|Σ(p)|)) = vec[Σ
−1
(p)]
′vec[d(Σ(p))]
= vec[Σ−1(p)]
′vec[pd(σ2α)Σκ + pσ
2
αd(Σκ)]
= vec[Σ−1(p)]
′vec[pd(σ2α)Σκ + pσ
2
α(κ ⊗ Im + Im ⊗ κ)d(κ)], (D-15)
where the third equality follows from employing (b). Since Σǫǫ is given, dΣ(p) = d(Σǫǫ +
pσ2αΣκ) = pd(σ
2
αΣκ) = pd(σ
2
α)Σκ + pσ
2
αd(Σκ), hence the fourth equality. Also, since Σκ =
κκ′, the last equality follows using (e).
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The total differential, d(Qi(p)()), is given by
d(Qi(p)()) =d(tr[Bui(p)Σ
−1
(p)] + tr[Wui(p)Σ
−1
ǫǫ ])
=− vec(Σ−1(p)Bui(p)Σ
−1
(p))
′vec(pd(σ2α)Σκ + pσ
2
αd(Σκ))
+ vec(Σ−1(p))
′vec(d(Bui(p))) + vec(Σ
−1
ǫǫ )
′vec(d(Wui(p)))
=− vec(Σ−1(p)Bui(p)Σ
−1
(p))
′vec
(
pd(σ2α)Σκ + pσ
2
α(κ ⊗ Im + Im ⊗ κ)dκ
)
+ vec(Σ−1(p))
′
[
(Im ⊗ E˜i(p)Jp)vec(d(E˜
′
i(p))) + (E˜i(p)J
′
p ⊗ Im)vec(d(E˜i(p)))
]
+ vec(Σ−1ǫǫ )
′
[
(Im ⊗ E˜i(p)Kp)vec(d(E˜
′
i(p))) + (E˜i(p)K
′
p ⊗ Im)vec(d(E˜i(p)))
]
=− vec(Σ−1(p)Bui(p)Σ
−1
(p))
′vec
(
pd(σ2α)Σκ + pσ
2
α(κ ⊗ Im + Im ⊗ κ)dκ
)
− vec(Σ−1(p))
′
[
(Im ⊗ E˜i(p)Jp)(Z¯
′
iδ¯dκ ⊗ ep) + (E˜i(p)J
′
p ⊗ Im)(ep ⊗ Z¯
′
iδ¯dκ)
]
− vec(Σ−1ǫǫ )
′
[
(Im ⊗ E˜i(p)Kp)(Z¯
′
iδ¯dκ ⊗ ep) + (E˜i(p)K
′
p ⊗ Im)(ep ⊗ Z¯
′
iδ¯dκ)
]
=− pvec(Σ−1(p)Bui(p)Σ
−1
(p))
′vec(Σκ)d(σ
2
α)− pσ
2
αvec(Σ
−1
(p)Bui(p)Σ
−1
(p))
′(κ ⊗ Im + Im ⊗ κ)dκ
−
[
vec(J ′pE˜
′
i(p)Σ
−1
(p))
′(Z¯ ′iδ¯dκ ⊗ ep) + vec(Σ
−1
(p)E˜i(p)J
′
p)
′(ep ⊗ Z¯
′
iδ¯dκ)
]
−
[
vec(K ′pE˜
′
i(p)Σ
−1
ǫǫ )
′(Z¯ ′iδ¯dκ ⊗ ep) + vec(Σ
−1
ǫǫ E˜i(p)K
′
p)
′(ep ⊗ Z¯
′
iδ¯dκ)
]
=− pvec(Σ−1(p)Bui(p)Σ
−1
(p))
′vec(Σκ)d(σ
2
α)− 2pσ
2
αvec([Σ
−1
(p)Bui(p)Σ
−1
(p)]κ)
′dκ
− 2e′p
[
J ′pE˜
′
i(p)Σ
−1
(p) +K
′
pE˜
′
i(p)Σ
−1
ǫǫ
]
Z¯ ′iδ¯dκ, (D-16)
where the second equality follows from employing (d), and the fact that Σǫǫ being given,
dΣ(p) = d(Σǫǫ + pσ
2
αΣκ) = pd(σ
2
αΣκ). Since Σκ = κκ
′, the third equality follows using (e)
and taking the differential of Bui(p) and Wui(p). The fourth equality follows from taking
the differential of E˜i(p), and finally in the fifth and sixth we have used matrix algebra to
rearrange terms. Given (D-16) we can conclude that
∂Qi(p)()
∂κ
= −2pσ2α[Σ
−1
(p)Bui(p)Σ
−1
(p)]κ − 2Z¯
′
iδ¯
[
Σ−1(p)E˜i(p)Jp + Σ
−1
ǫǫ E˜i(p)Kp
]
ep. (D-17)
Similarly, from (D-15) we obtain
∂ ln |Ωu(p)|
∂κ
= 2pσ2α[Σ
−1
(p)]κ. (D-18)
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Combining (D-17) and (D-18) we get the expression in (D-11) for
∂Li(p)
∂κ
.
Again, from (D-15) and (D-16) respectively we obtain
∂ ln |Ωu(p)|
∂σ2α
= pvec[Σ−1(p)]
′vec(Σκ) and
∂Qi(p)()
∂σ2α
= −pvec[Σ−1(p)Bui(p)Σ
−1
(p)]
′vec(Σκ), which when combined yields the expression for
∂Li(p)
∂σ2α
in (D-11). By a similar derivation as in (D-16), we can conclude that
∂Li(p)
∂δ¯
= −2Z¯iκ
′
[
Σ−1(p)E˜i(p)Jp + Σ
−1
ǫǫ E˜i(p)Kp
]
ep. (D-19)
D.2. Derivative of Li(p)2Θ2 with respect to Θ1
Let us begin by deriving the derivative of score functions, Li(p)2Θ2 , of second stage like-
lihood with respect to Θ1. Since the second step is essentially a combination of probit and
bivariate probit, we have to take the derivative of the score functions of the probit and
bivariate probit with respect to Θ1. Now, we know that Θ1 enters the second stage of the
sequential estimator through z¯′iδ¯+ αˆi(Θ1) and Σ˜
−1
ǫǫ ǫˆit(Θ1), and that Li(p)2Θ2 =
∑p
t=1 Lit2Θ2 .
Hence in order to compute the derivative of Li(p)2Θ2 with respect to Θ1 we have to com-
pute
∂Lit2Θ2(Θ1,Θ2)
∂Θ′1
. To do so let us first separate the coefficients of the second stage into
coefficients of the Financial Constraint equation, Θ2F , coefficients of the Innovation equa-
tion Θ2I and ρζ˜υ˜, the correlation between the idiosyncratic components of the Financial
Constraint and the Innovation equation. In matrix form we can write
Li(p)2Θ2Θ1 =
∂Li(p)2Θ2
∂Θ′1
=
p∑
t=1
∂Lit2Θ2
∂Θ′1
=
p∑
t=1


∂Lit2Θ2F
∂Θ′1
∂Lit2Θ2I
∂Θ′1
∂Lit2ρ
ζ˜υ˜
∂Θ′1

 ,
where the score functions, Lit2Θ2F , Lit2Θ2I , and Lit2Θ2ρ
ζ˜υ˜
, above are the score functions of
the log likelihood function for bivariate probit when it belongs to CIS3 and CIS3.5, and
are given by
Lit2Θ2F (Θ1,Θ2) =
qitF gitF
Φ2
X
F
it , Lit2Θ2I (Θ1,Θ2) =
qitIgitI
Φ2
X
I
it, and Lit2ρζ˜υ˜(Θ1,Θ2) =
qitIqitIφ2
Φ2
(D-20)
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where XFit = {X
F ′
it , Z¯
′
iδ¯ + αˆi, (Σ˜
−1
ǫǫ ǫˆit)
′}′, XIit = {X
I′
it , Z¯
′
iδ¯ + αˆi, (Σ˜
−1
ǫǫ ǫˆit)
′}′, qitF = 2Fit − 1,
qitI = 2Iit − 1. gitF and gitI in (D-20) are defined as
gitF = φ(ϕit)Φ(
γit − ρ
∗
ζ˜υ˜
ϕit
√
(1− ρ∗2
ζ˜υ˜
)
), and gitI = φ(γit)Φ(
ϕit − ρ
∗
ζ˜υ˜
γit
√
(1− ρ∗2
ζ˜υ˜
)
),
where ρ∗
ζ˜υ˜
= qitF qitIρζ˜υ˜, ϕit = X
F ′
it Θ2F , and γit = X
I′
itΘ2I . However, for CIS2.5 we do not
observe Fit when Iit = 0. So, while the score functions remain the same as in (D-20) when
Iit = 1, the functions are
Lit2Θ2F (Θ1,Θ2) = 0Θ2F , Lit2Θ2I (Θ1,Θ2) = −
φ(−XI′itΘ2I)
Φ(−XI′itΘ2I)
X
I
it, and Lit2ρζ˜υ˜(Θ1,Θ2) = 0
(D-21)
when Iit = 0, where 0Θ2F is a vector of zeros.
To ease notations we now suppress firm and time subscript except when necessary. Given
the above, we have
∂L2Θ2j (Θ1,Θ2)
∂Θ′1
= qj
{
∂
∂Θ′1
(
gj
Φ2
)
X
j +
gj
Φ2
∂Xj
∂Θ′1
}
= qj
{(
∂(gj/Φ2)
∂ϕit
∂ϕit
∂Θ′1
+
∂(gj/Φ2)
∂γit
∂γit
∂Θ′1
)
X
j +
gj
Φ2
∂Xj
∂Θ′1
}
= qj
{(
∂(gj/Φ2)
∂ϕit
∂XF ′it
∂Θ′1
Θ2F +
∂(gj/Φ2)
∂γit
∂XI′it
∂Θ′1
Θ2I
)
X
j +
gj
Φ2
∂Xj
∂Θ′1
}
.
(D-22)
where j ∈ {F, I} and
∂L2ρ
ζ˜υ˜
(Θ1,Θ2)
∂Θ′1
= qF qI
{
∂
∂Θ′1
(
φ2
Φ2
)}
= qF qI
{
∂(φ2/Φ2)
∂ϕit
∂XF ′it
∂Θ′1
Θ2F +
∂(φ2/Φ2)
∂γit
∂XI′it
∂Θ′1
Θ2I
}
(D-23)
when the firm year observation, it, is such that it belongs to CIS3 and CIS3.5, and CIS2.5
when Iit = 1. When Iit = 0, for CIS2.5 we have
∂L2Θ2F (Θ1,Θ2)
∂Θ′1
= 0Θ2F ,
∂L2ρ
ζ˜υ˜
(Θ1,Θ2)
∂Θ′1
= 0, and
∂L2Θ2I (Θ1,Θ2)
∂Θ′1
= −
{
∂
∂Θ′1
(
φ(−γit)
Φ(−γit)
)
X
I
it +
φ(−γit)
Φ(−γit)
∂XIit
∂Θ′1
}
= −
{
∂
∂γit
(
φ(−γit)
Φ(−γit)
)
∂XI′it
∂Θ′1
Θ2IX
I
it +
φ(−γit)
Φ(−γit)
∂XIit
∂Θ′1
}
(D-24)
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To obtain expressions for (D-22), (D-23), and (D-24) we need the derivative of
gj
Φ2
,
j ∈ {F, I}, with respect to ϕit and γit, the derivative of
φ2
Φ2
with respect to ϕit and γit, and
the derivative of φ(−γit)
Φ(−γit)
with respect to γit. While these can be easily obtained and can be
found in Greene (2002), what is challenging to obtain is the derivative of XFit and X
I
it with
respect to Θ1.
∂Xjit
∂Θ′1
=


∂X jit
∂δ ′
∂X jit
∂δ¯
′
∂X jit
∂κ′
∂X jit
∂vech(Σǫǫ)′
∂X jit
∂σ2α
∂(Z¯ ′iδ¯+αˆi)
∂δ ′
∂(Z¯ ′iδ¯+αˆi)
∂δ¯
′
∂(Z¯ ′iδ¯+αˆi)
∂κ′
∂(Z¯ ′iδ¯+αˆi)
∂vech(Σǫǫ)′
∂(Z¯ ′iδ¯+αˆi)
∂σ2α
∂Σ˜−1ǫǫ ǫˆit
∂δ ′
∂Σ˜−1ǫǫ ǫˆit
∂δ¯
′
∂Σ˜−1ǫǫ ǫˆit
∂κ′
∂Σ˜−1ǫǫ ǫˆit
∂vech(Σǫǫ)′
∂Σ˜−1ǫǫ ǫˆit
∂σ2α

 ,
where j ∈ {F, I}. While
∂X jit
∂Θ′1
= 0, below we show that
∂(Z¯ ′iδ¯ + αˆi)
∂δ ′
= −
1
U2dr
p∑
t=1
[
U2nr − UdrFdr
]
κ′Σ−1ǫǫ Z
′
it
∂(Z¯ ′iδ¯ + αˆi)
∂δ¯
′ = Z¯
′
i −
p
U2dr
[
U2nr − UdrFdr
]
κ′Σ−1ǫǫ κZ¯
′
i
∂(Z¯ ′iδ¯ + αˆi)
∂κ′
= −
1
U2dr
p∑
t=1
{[
U2nr − UdrFdr
]
(Z¯ ′iδ¯κ
′ − r′it)Σ
−1
ǫǫ +
[
UnrFdr − UdrFnr
]
κ′Σ−1ǫǫ
}
∂(Z¯ ′iδ¯ + αˆi)
∂vech(Σǫǫ)′
=
1
2U2dr
p∑
t=1
[
(U2nr − UdrFdr)vec(κr
′
it + ritκ
′)′
+ (UdrFnr − UnrFdr)vec(Σκ)
′
]
(Σ−1ǫǫ ⊗ Σ
−1
ǫǫ )
′L′m
∂(Z¯ ′iδ¯ + αˆi)
∂σ2α
=
1
2σ4αU
2
dr
(UdrFnr − UnrFdr) (D-25)
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∂Σ˜−1ǫǫ ǫˆit
∂δ ′
= −Σ˜−1ǫǫ Z
′
it +
Σ˜−1ǫǫ κ
U2dr
p∑
t=1
[
U2nr − UdrFdr
]
κ′Σ−1ǫǫ Z
′
it
∂Σ˜−1ǫǫ ǫˆit
∂δ¯
′ = −Σ˜
−1
ǫǫ κZ¯
′
i +
pΣ˜−1ǫǫ κ
U2dr
[
U2nr − UdrFdr
]
κ′Σ−1ǫǫ κZ¯
′
i
∂Σ˜−1ǫǫ ǫˆit
∂κ′
= −Σ˜−1ǫǫ Z¯
′
iδ¯ − Σ˜
−1
ǫǫ αˆi +
Σ˜−1ǫǫ κ
U2dr
p∑
t=1
{[
U2nr − UdrFdr
]
(Z¯ ′iδ¯κ
′ − r′it)Σ
−1
ǫǫ
+
[
UnrFdr − UdrFnr
]
κ′Σ−1ǫǫ
}
∂Σ˜−1ǫǫ ǫˆit
∂vech(Σǫǫ)′
=
[
(ǫ′itΣ
−1
ǫǫ ⊗ Im)vec((dg(Σǫǫ))
−1/2)′ − (ǫit ⊗ Σ
′
ǫ)
′(Σ−1ǫǫ ⊗ Σ
−1
ǫǫ )
′
]
L′m
−
Σ˜−1ǫǫ κ
2(Udr)2
p∑
t=1
[
(U2nr − UdrFdr)vec(κr
′
it + ritκ
′)′
+ (UdrFnr − UnrFdr)vec(Σκ)
′
]
(Σ−1ǫǫ ⊗ Σ
−1
ǫǫ )
′L′m
∂Σ˜−1ǫǫ ǫˆit
∂σ2α
= −
Σ˜−1ǫǫ κ
2σ4αU
2
dr
(UdrFnr − UnrFdr), (D-26)
where
Unr =
∫
α exp(−
1
2
p∑
t=1
ǫ′itΣ
−1
ǫǫ ǫit)φ(α)dα, Fnr =
∫
α3 exp(−
1
2
p∑
t=1
ǫ′itΣ
−1
ǫǫ ǫit)φ(α)dα,
Udr =
∫
exp(−
1
2
p∑
t=1
ǫ′itΣ
−1
ǫǫ ǫit)φ(α)dα, Fdr =
∫
α2 exp(−
1
2
p∑
t=1
ǫ′itΣ
−1
ǫǫ ǫit)φ(α)dα,
and Lm in the set of equations in (D-25) and (D-26) is the elimination matrix and rit =
xit − Zitδ − κZ¯iδ¯ . Unr, Udr, Fnr, and Fdr needed to estimate the covariance matrix of the
structural parameters are obtained using Gauss Hermit quadrature rules.
D.2.1. Derivation of the derivative of Z¯ ′iδ¯ + αˆi and Σ˜
−1
ǫǫ ǫˆit and with respect to Θ1
Let us first consider the derivative of Z¯ ′iδ¯ +αi and Σ˜
−1
ǫǫ ǫˆit with respect to δ
′. We have
∂(Z¯ ′iδ¯ + αˆi)
∂δ ′
=
∂Z¯ ′iδ¯
∂δ ′
+
∂αˆi
∂δ ′
= 0 +
∂
∂δ ′
[∫
α exp(−1
2
∑p
t=1 ǫ
′
itΣ
−1
ǫǫ ǫit)φ(α)dα∫
exp(−1
2
∑p
t=1 ǫ
′
itΣ
−1
ǫǫ ǫit)φ(α)dα
]
= 0−
1
(
∫
exp(.)φ(α)dα)2
p∑
t=1
[ ∫
α exp(.)ǫ′itΣ
−1
ǫǫ Z
′
itφ(α)dα
∫
exp(.)φ(α)dα
−
∫
α exp(.)φ(α)dα
∫
exp(.)ǫ′itΣ
−1
ǫǫ Z
′
itφ(α)dα
]
, (D-27)
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To derive the above result in (D-27) we used the fact that
∂(ǫ′itΣ
−1
ǫǫ ǫit)
∂δ ′
= 2ǫ′itΣ
−1
ǫǫ
∂(ǫit)
∂δ ′
= −2ǫ′itΣ
−1
ǫǫ Z
′
it.
Taking into account the fact that ǫit = xit−Z
′
itδ − (Z¯
′
iδ¯ +αi)κ, after some rearrangements
it can be shown that
∂αˆi
∂δ ′
= −
1
U2dr
T∑
t=1
[
U2nr − UdrFdr
]
κ′Σ−1ǫǫ Z
′
it,
where
Unr =
∫
α exp(−
1
2
p∑
t=1
ǫ′itΣ
−1
ǫǫ ǫit)φ(α)dα, Fnr =
∫
α3 exp(−
1
2
p∑
t=1
ǫ′itΣ
−1
ǫǫ ǫit)φ(α)dα
Udr =
∫
exp(−
1
2
p∑
t=1
ǫ′itΣ
−1
ǫǫ ǫit)φ(α)dα, Fdr =
∫
α2 exp(−
1
2
p∑
t=1
ǫ′itΣ
−1
ǫǫ ǫit)φ(α)dα.
(D-28)
Hence we have
∂(Z¯ ′iδ¯ + αˆi)
∂δ ′
= −
1
U2dr
p∑
t=1
[
U2nr − UdrFdr
]
κ′Σ−1ǫǫ Z
′
it, (D-29)
and
∂Σ˜−1ǫǫ ǫˆit
∂δ ′
=
∂Σ˜−1ǫǫ (xit − Z
′
itδ − Z¯
′
iδ¯κ)
∂δ ′
−
∂Σ˜−1ǫǫ αˆiκ
∂δ ′
= −Σ˜−1ǫǫ Z
′
it +
Σ˜−1ǫǫ κ
U2dr
p∑
t=1
[
U2nr − UdrFdr
]
κ′Σ−1ǫǫ Z
′
it. (D-30)
From (D-29) and (D-30) we can see that while ∂(Z¯
′δ¯+αˆi)
∂δ ′
for a firm i remains the same for
all time periods, ∂Σ˜
−1
ǫǫ ǫˆit
∂δ ′
varies with time. Similarly it can be shown that
∂(Z¯ ′iδ¯ + αˆi)
∂δ¯
′ = Z¯
′
i −
1
U2dr
p∑
t=1
[
U2nr − UdrFdr
]
κ′Σ−1ǫǫ κZ¯
′
i = Z¯
′
i −
p
U2dr
[
U2nr − UdrFdr
]
κ′Σ−1ǫǫ κZ¯
′
i,
(D-31)
and
∂Σ˜−1ǫǫ ǫˆit
∂δ ′
=
∂Σ˜−1ǫǫ (xit − Z
′
itδ − Z¯
′
iδ¯κ)
∂δ ′
−
∂Σ˜−1ǫǫ αˆiκ
∂δ ′
= −Σ˜−1ǫǫ κZ¯
′
i +
pΣ˜−1ǫǫ κ
U2dr
[
U2nr − UdrFdr
]
κ′Σ−1ǫǫ κZ¯
′
i. (D-32)
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Let us now consider the derivative of Z¯ ′iδ¯ + αˆi with respect to κ. We have
∂(Z¯ ′iδ¯ + αˆi)
∂κ′
=
∂
∂κ′
[∫
α exp(−1
2
∑p
t=1 ǫ
′
itΣ
−1
ǫǫ ǫit)φ(α)dα∫
exp(−1
2
∑p
t=1 ǫ
′
itΣ
−1
ǫǫ ǫit)φ(α)dα
]
= −
1
(
∫
exp(.)φ(α)dα)2
p∑
t=1
[ ∫
α exp(.)ǫ′itΣ
−1
ǫǫ (Z¯
′
iδ + αi)φ(α)dα
∫
exp(.)φ(α)dα
−
∫
α exp(.)φ(α)dα
∫
exp(.)ǫ′itΣ
−1
ǫǫ (Z¯
′
iδ + αi)
′φ(α)dα
]
, (D-33)
which after simplification can be written as
∂(Z¯ ′iδ¯ + αˆi)
∂κ′
= −
1
U2dr
p∑
t=1
{[
U2nr − UdrFdr
]
(Z¯ ′iδ¯κ
′ − r′it)Σ
−1
ǫǫ +
[
UnrFdr − UdrFnr
]
κ′Σ−1ǫǫ
}
,
(D-34)
where rit = xit − Z
′
itδ − Z¯
′
iδ¯κ and Unr, Udr, Fnr, and Fdr are given in (D-28). Also, it can
be shown that
∂Σ˜−1ǫǫ ǫˆit
∂κ′
=
∂Σ˜−1ǫǫ (xit − Z
′
itδ − Z¯
′
iδ¯κ)
∂κ′
−
∂Σ˜−1ǫǫ αˆiκ
∂κ′
= −Σ˜−1ǫǫ Z¯
′
iδ¯ − Σ˜
−1
ǫǫ αˆi +
Σ˜−1ǫǫ κ
U2dr
p∑
t=1
{[
U2nr − UdrFdr
]
(Z¯ ′iδ¯κ
′ − r′it)Σ
−1
ǫǫ
+
[
UnrFdr − UdrFnr
]
κ′Σ−1ǫǫ
}
. (D-35)
Now consider the derivative of Z¯ ′iδ¯ + αˆi with respect to vech(Σǫǫ). We have
∂(Z¯ ′iδ¯ + αˆi)
∂vech(Σǫǫ)′
=
∂αˆi
∂vech(Σǫǫ)′
=
∂
∂vech(Σǫǫ)′
[∫
α exp(−1
2
∑p
t=1 ǫ
′
itΣ
−1
ǫǫ ǫit)φ(α)dα∫
exp(−1
2
∑p
t=1 ǫ
′
itΣ
−1
ǫǫ ǫit)φ(α)dα
]
= −
1
2
[∫
αψ(α)
∂
∑p
t=1 ǫ
′
itΣ
−1
ǫǫ ǫit
∂vech(Σǫǫ)′
dα
∫
ψ(α)dα−
∫
αψ(α)dα
∫
ψ(α)
∂
∑p
t=1 ǫ
′
itΣ
−1
ǫǫ ǫit
∂vech(Σǫǫ)′
dα
(
∫
ψ(α)dα)2
]
,
where ψ(α) = exp(−1
2
∑p
t=1 ǫ
′
itΣ
−1
ǫǫ ǫit)φ(α). With
∂
∑p
t=1 ǫ
′
itΣ
−1
ǫǫ ǫit
∂vech(Σǫǫ)′
=
∑p
t=1 vec(−(Σ
−1
ǫǫ )
′ǫitǫ
′
it(Σ
−1
ǫǫ )
′)′L′m
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the above can be written as
∂αˆi
∂vech(Σǫǫ)′
=
1
2(
∫
ψ(α)dα)2
p∑
t=1
[ ∫
αψ(α)vec((Σ−1ǫǫ )
′ǫitǫ
′
it(Σ
−1
ǫǫ )
′)′L′mdα
∫
ψ(α)dα
−
∫
ψ(α)vec((Σ−1ǫǫ )
′ǫitǫ
′
it(Σ
−1
ǫǫ )
′)′L′mdα
∫
αψ(α)dα
]
=
1
2U2dr
T∑
t=1
[ ∫
αψ(α)vec(ǫitǫ
′
it)
′(Σ−1ǫǫ ⊗ Σ
−1
ǫǫ )
′L′mdαUdr
− Unr
∫
ψ(α)vec(ǫitǫ
′
it)
′(Σ−1ǫǫ ⊗ Σ
−1
ǫǫ )
′L′mdα
]
=
1
2U2dr
p∑
t=1
[ ∫
(Udrαvec(ǫitǫ
′
it)
′ − Unrvec(ǫitǫ
′
it)
′)ψ(α)dα
]
(Σ−1ǫǫ ⊗ Σ
−1
ǫǫ )
′L′m,
(D-36)
where Lm is an elimination matrix. To simply further, write ǫit as ǫit = xit−Zitδ −κZ¯iδ¯ −
κα = rit − κα, where rit = xit − Zitδ − κZ¯iδ¯ . Then ǫitǫ
′
it = ritr
′
it − κr
′
itα− ritκ
′α + κκ′α2,
then (D-36) after some simplification can be written as
∂αˆi
∂vech(Σǫǫ)′
=
1
2U2dr
p∑
t=1
[
(U2nr − UdrFdr)vec(κr
′
it + ritκ
′)′
+ (UdrFnr − UnrFdr)vec(Σκ)
′
]
(Σ−1ǫǫ ⊗ Σ
−1
ǫǫ )
′L′m. (D-37)
where Unr, Udr, Fnr, and Fdr have been defined in (D-28) and Σκ = κκ
′. Let us now consider
the derivative ∂Σ˜
−1
ǫǫ ǫˆit
∂vech(Σǫǫ)′
= ∂(ΣǫΣ
−1
ǫǫ ǫˆit)
∂vech(Σǫǫ)′
= ∂(ΣǫΣ
−1
ǫǫ rit)
∂vech(Σǫǫ)′
− ∂(ΣǫΣ
−1
ǫǫ καˆi)
∂vech(Σǫǫ)′
. The total differential of
ΣǫΣ
−1
ǫǫ καˆi is given by:
d(ΣǫΣ
−1
ǫǫ καˆi) = d(Σǫ)Σ
−1
ǫǫ καˆi + Σǫd(Σ
−1
ǫǫ )καˆi + ΣǫΣ
−1
ǫǫ κd(αˆi). (D-38)
Now, as defined earlier, Σǫ = (dg(Σǫǫ))
1/2, hence
∂(Σǫ)Σ
−1
ǫǫ καˆi
∂vech(Σǫǫ)′
=
1
2
(κ′αˆiΣ
−1
ǫǫ ⊗ Im)vec((dg(Σǫǫ))
−1/2)
∂vec(Σǫǫ)
∂vech(Σǫǫ)′
=
1
2
(κ′αˆiΣ
−1
ǫǫ ⊗ Im)vec((dg(Σǫǫ))
−1/2)′L′m. (D-39)
Now, consider the second term of the differential given in (D-38). It can be shown that
Σǫ∂(Σ
−1
ǫǫ )καˆi
∂vech(Σǫǫ)′
= −(καˆi ⊗ Σ
′
ǫ)
′(Σ−1ǫǫ ⊗ Σ
−1
ǫǫ )
∂vec(Σǫǫ)
∂vech(Σǫǫ)′
= −(καˆi ⊗ Σ
′
ǫ)
′(Σ−1ǫǫ ⊗ Σ
−1
ǫǫ )L
′
m.
(D-40)
30
Now consider the third term in the total differential in (D-38). From (D-37) we can conclude
that
ΣǫΣ
−1
ǫǫ κ∂(αˆi)
∂vech(Σǫǫ)′
=
ΣǫΣ
−1
ǫǫ κ
2U2dr
p∑
t=1
[
(U2nr − UdrFdr)vec(κr
′
it + ritκ
′)′
+ (UdrFnr − UnrFdr)vec(Σκ)
′
]
(Σ−1ǫǫ ⊗ Σ
−1
ǫǫ )
′L′m.
(D-41)
Combining (D-39), (D-40), and (D-41) we obtain
∂Σ˜−1ǫǫ ǫˆit
∂vech(Σǫǫ)′
=
[
(ǫ′itΣ
−1
ǫǫ ⊗ Im)vec((dg(Σǫǫ))
−1/2)′ − (ǫit ⊗ Σ
′
ǫ)
′(Σ−1ǫǫ ⊗ Σ
−1
ǫǫ )
′
]
L′m
−
Σ˜−1ǫǫ κ
2(Udr)2
p∑
t=1
[
(U2nr − UdrFdr)vec(κr
′
it + ritκ
′)′ + (UdrFnr − UnrFdr)vec(Σκ)
′
]
(Σ−1ǫǫ ⊗ Σ
−1
ǫǫ )
′L′m.
(D-42)
Finally, let consider the derivative of Z¯ ′iδ¯ + αˆi with respect to σ
2
α. We have
∂(Z¯ ′iδ¯ + αˆi)
∂σ2α
=
∂αˆi
∂σ2α
=
∂
∂σ2α
[∫
α exp(.)φ(α)dα∫
exp(.)φ(α)dα
]
=
=
[
∫
α exp(.)∂φ(α)
∂σ2α
dα][
∫
exp(.)φ(α)dα]− [
∫
α exp(.)φ(α)dα][
∫
exp(.)∂φ(α)
∂σ2α
dα]
[
∫
exp(.)φ(α)dα]2
.
Given that ∂φ(α)
∂σ2α
= − 1
2σ2α
φ(α) + α
2
2σ4α
φ(α), the above after simplification reduces to
∂(Z¯ ′iδ¯ + αˆi)
∂σ2α
=
1
2σ4αU
2
dr
(UdrFnr − UnrFdr), (D-43)
and we can write ∂Σ˜
−1
ǫǫ ǫit
σ2α
as
∂Σ˜−1ǫǫ ǫˆit
∂vech(Σǫǫ)′
= −
Σ˜−1ǫǫ κ∂(αˆi)
∂σ2α
= −
Σ˜−1ǫǫ κ
2σ4αU
2
dr
(UdrFnr − UnrFdr). (D-44)
D.3. Derivative of Li(p)3Θ3 with respect to Θ1 and Θ2
As stated earlier in order to construct error corrected standard errors of the structural
parameters we also need sample analogs of L3Θ3Θ1 , L3Θ3Θ2 , and L3Θ3Θ3 to construct B∗
in (D-9). While it is straightforward to compute sample analog of L3Θ3Θ3 , computation of
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sample analogs of L3Θ3Θ1 and L3Θ3Θ2 needs some work. Here we derive the derivative of
Li(p)3Θ3(Θ1,Θ2,Θ2) with respect to Θ1 and Θ2. Now, we know that
∂Li(p)3Θ3
∂Θ′j
=
p∑
t=1
∂Lit3Θ3
∂Θ′j
=
p∑
t=1
∂
∂Θ′j
Iit[X
R
it(Θ1, Θˆ2)(Rit − X
R
it(.)
′Θ3)]
=
p∑
t=1
Iit
[
X
R
it(.)
∂Θ′j
(Rit − X
R
it(.)
′Θˆ3) + X
R
it(Θˆ1, Θˆ2)
X
R
it(.)
′
∂Θ′j
Θˆ3
]
j ∈ {1, 2},
(D-45)
where
X
R
it(Θˆ1, Θˆ2) =


XRit
Fit(Z¯
′
iδ¯ + αˆi)
(1− Fit)(Z¯
′
iδ¯ + αˆi)
FitΣ
−1
ǫǫ ǫˆit
(1− Fit)Σ
−1
ǫǫ ǫˆit
FitC11(Θ1,Θ2)it
(1− Fit)C01(Θ1,Θ2)it
FitC12(Θ1,Θ2)it
(1− Fit)C02(Θ1,Θ2)it


.
And XRit = {X
R′
1it,X
R′
0it}
′ where XR1it and X
R
0it have been defined in equation (3.5) in the main
text.
We know that
XRit
Θ′1
=
XRit
Θ′2
= 0, that
Z¯′iδ¯+αˆi
Θ′2
= Σ
−1
ǫǫ ǫˆit
Θ′2
= 0 and
Z¯′iδ¯+αˆi
Θ′1
and Σ
−1
ǫǫ ǫˆit
Θ′1
have been
derived above. Here we derive the derivatives of the remaining correction terms, C11, C12,
C01, and C02 with respect to Θ1 and Θ2. We have
∂Cjk(Θ1,Θ2)it
∂Θ′1
=
∂Cjk(Θ1,Θ2)it
∂ϕit
∂XF ′it Θ2F
∂Θ′1
+
∂Cjk(Θ1,Θ2)it
∂γit
∂XI′itΘ2I
∂Θ′1
, j ∈ {0, 1}, k ∈ {1, 2}.
(D-46)
Given the functional form of Cjk(Θ1,Θ2) in equations (3.20) and (3.21), its derivative
with respect to ϕit and γit can be easily obtained. The partial derivatives
∂XF ′it
∂Θ′1
and
∂XI′it
∂Θ′1
have been worked out above. Now consider the derivative of Cjk(Θ1,Θ2) with respect to
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Θ2 = {Θ
′
2F ,Θ
′
2I , ρζ˜υ˜}
′.
∂Cjk(Θ1,Θ2)it
∂Θ′2
=


∂Cjk(Θ1,Θ2)it
∂ϕit
∂XF ′it Θ2F
∂Θ2F
∂Cjk(Θ1,Θ2)it
∂γit
∂XI′itΘ2I
∂Θ2I
∂Cjk(Θ1,Θ2)it
∂ρζ˜υ˜


′
=


∂Cjk(Θ1,Θ2)it
∂ϕit
X
F
it
∂Cjk(Θ1,Θ2)it
∂γit
X
I
it
∂Cjk(Θ1,Θ2)it
∂ρζ˜υ˜


′
(D-47)
Again, given the functional form of Cjk(Θ1,Θ2),
∂Cjk(Θ1,Θ2)it
∂ϕit
and
∂Cjk(Θ1,Θ2)it
∂γit
can be easily
computed. We note that, depending on the particular combination of j and k, the deriva-
tives stated above involve taking derivatives of Pr(Fit = 1, Iit = 1) and Pr(Fit = 0, Iit = 1)
with respect to ϕit, γit and ρζ˜υ˜, and these are stated in Greene (2002).
APPENDIX E: ESTIMATION OF AVERAGE PARTIAL EFFECTS
In this section we discuss estimation of Average Partial Effects (APE) and testing hy-
pothesis about the APEs for the structural equations.
E.1. Average Partial Effects for the Second Stage
E.1.1. Estimation
In the second stage, as discussed earlier, we jointly estimate the parameters of Innovation
and Financial Constraint equations,
It = 1{I
∗
t > 0} = 1{X
I′
t γ + θ ˆ˜α + Σ˜υǫΣ˜
−1
ǫǫ ǫˆt + υ˜t > 0}
Ft = 1{F
∗
t > 0} = 1{X
F ′
t ϕ + λ ˆ˜α + Σ˜ζǫΣ˜
−1
ǫǫ ǫˆt + ζ˜t > 0},
given in equations (3.12) and (3.13) in the main text above. In our discussion of the
identification of structural parameters of interest and the APE for nonlinear model in
Appendix A, we had shown how to estimate the APE of covariates for the unconditional
probability of being financially constrained or being an innovator.
We may also be interested in the APE of a variable on the conditional probability of an
event, or compare the APE of a variable on the probability of an event conditional on two
mutually exclusive events. For example, we may be interested in the marginal effect of w,
say long-term debt to asset ratio, on the probability of a firm being an innovator, It = 1,
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conditional on it being financially constrained, Ft = 1, as compared to the APE of w, on
the probability of It = 1, conditional on Ft = 0. We know that for a firm i in time period t
Pr(It = 1|Ft = 1, ˆ˜α, ǫˆt) =
Pr(It = 1, Ft = 1| ˆ˜α, ǫˆt)
Pr(Ft = 1| ˆ˜α, ǫˆt)
=
Φ2(ϕt( ˆ˜α, ǫˆt), γt( ˆ˜α, ǫˆt), ρζ˜υ˜)
Φ(ϕt( ˆ˜α, ǫˆt))
,
Pr(It = 1|Ft = 0, ˆ˜α, ǫˆt) =
Pr(It = 1, Ft = 0| ˆ˜α, ǫˆt)
Pr(Ft = 0| ˆ˜α, ǫˆt)
=
Φ2(ϕt( ˆ˜α, ǫˆt),−γt( ˆ˜α, ǫˆt),−ρζ˜υ˜)
1− Φ(ϕt( ˆ˜α, ǫˆt))
,
where Φ2 is the cumulative distribution function of a standard bivariate normal and
ϕt( ˆ˜α, ǫˆt) = X
F ′
t ϕ + λ ˆ˜α + Σ˜ζǫΣ˜
−1
ǫǫ ǫˆt, and γt( ˆ˜α, ǫˆt) = X
I′
t γ + θ ˆ˜α + Σ˜υǫΣ˜
−1
ǫǫ ǫˆt.
Hence, for a firm i we have
∂ Pr(It = 1|Ft = 1)
∂w
=
∫
∂
∂w
(
Φ2(ϕt, γt, ρζ˜υ˜)
Φ(ϕt)
)
dF ˆ˜α,ǫˆ. (E-1)
If w belongs to both the specifications, ϕt and γt, then the above involves taking derivative
of CDF of a standard bivariate normal with respect to ϕt and γt. It can be shown that
∂
∂w
(
Φ2(ϕt, γt, ρζ˜υ˜)
Φ(ϕt)
)
=
1
Φ(ϕt)
[
gIγw+
(
gF − Φ2(ϕt, γt, ρζ˜υ˜)
φ(ϕt)
Φ(ϕt)
)
ϕw
]
, (E-2)
where
gF = φ(ϕt)Φ
(
γt − ρζ˜υ˜ϕt√
1− ρ2
ζ˜υ˜
)
and gI = φ(γt)Φ
(
ϕt − ρζ˜υ˜γt√
1− ρ2
ζ˜υ˜
)
. (E-3)
The derivatives of the other conditional probabilities with respect to ϕt and γt can be found
in Greene (2002). Once the integrand in (E-1) is estimated at X Ft = X¯
F and X It = X¯
I ,
given the estimates
ˆˆ
α˜i and ˆˆǫit, the APE of w on the conditional probabilities are estimated
by taking an average over all firm-year observations.
E.1.2. Hypothesis Testing
To test various hypothesis in order to draw inferences about the APE’s we need to
compute the standard errors of their estimates. From (A-20) in Appendix A we know that
estimated APE of w on the unconditional probability of being, say, financially constrained
for firm i in time period t is given by
∂P̂r(Ft = 1)
∂w
=
1∑N
i=1 Ti
N∑
i=1
Ti∑
t=1
ϕˆwφ(X¯
F ′
it ϕˆ),
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where X¯Fit = {X¯
F ′,
ˆˆ
α˜i, (Σ˜
−1
ǫǫ
ˆˆǫit)
′}′ and ϕˆ = {ϕˆ′, λˆ, ˆ˜Σ′ζǫ}
′. Since each of the ϕˆwφ(X¯
F ′
it ϕˆ) is a
function of ϕˆ the variance of ∂P̂r(Ft=1)
∂w
will be a function of the variance of the estimate of ϕ.
Now, we know that by the linear approximation approach (delta method), the asymptotic
covariance matrix of ∂P̂r(Ft=1)
∂w
is given by
Asy. Var[
∂P̂r(Ft = 1)
∂w
] =
[
1∑N
i=1 Ti
N∑
i=1
Ti∑
t=1
∂ϕˆwφ(X¯
F ′
it ϕˆ)
∂ϕˆ′
]
V ∗2F
[
1∑N
i=1 Ti
N∑
i=1
Ti∑
t=1
∂ϕˆwφ(X¯
F ′
it ϕˆ)
∂ϕˆ′
]′
,
(E-4)
where V ∗2F is the second stage error adjusted covariance matrix, shown in appendix D, of
ϕˆ. In the RHS of (E-4)
∂ϕˆwφ(X¯
F ′
it ϕˆ)
∂ϕˆ′
= φ(X¯F ′it ϕˆ)[ew − (ϕˆ
′
X¯
F
it)ϕˆwX¯
F ′
it ], (E-5)
where and ew is a row vector having the dimension of ϕ
′ and with 1 at the position of ϕw
in ϕ and zeros elsewhere.
If w is a dummy variable then from (A-21) we know that the estimated APE of w on
the probability of being financially constrained in time period t, given X Ft = X¯
F is given
by
∆w Pr(Ft = 1) =
1∑N
i=1 Ti
N∑
i=1
Ti∑
t=1
Φ(X¯ F−w, w = 1,
ˆˆ
α˜i, ˆˆǫit)− Φ(X¯
F
−w, w = 0,
ˆˆ
α˜i, ˆˆǫit)
=
1∑N
i=1 Ti
N∑
i=1
Ti∑
t=1
∆wΦit(.).
To obtain the variance of the above, again by the delta method we have
Asy. Var∆w Pr(Ft = 1) =
[
1∑N
i=1 Ti
N∑
i=1
Ti∑
t=1
∂∆Φit(.)
∂ϕˆ
]′
V ∗2f
[
1∑N
i=1 Ti
N∑
i=1
Ti∑
t=1
∂∆Φit(.)
∂ϕˆ
]
,
(E-6)
where
∂∆Φit(.)
∂ϕˆ
=
∂Φˆit(., w = 1)
∂ϕˆ
−
∂Φit(., w = 0)
∂ϕˆ
= φit(., w = 1)

X¯Fit−w
1

− φit(., w = 0)

X¯Fit−w
0

 .
Substituting the above in (E-6) gives the asymptotic variance of the APE of the dummy
variable w.
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Delta method can also be applied for to obtain the asymptotic variance of the APE’s of
the continuous or dummy variable on the conditional probability of say being an innovator
given the firm is financially constrained or not financially constrained. Let X¯2it = {X¯
F ′
it , X¯
I′
it}
′
and Θ2 = {ϕ
′, γ ′, ρζ˜υ˜}
′, where X¯I′it = {X¯
I′, ˆ˜ˆαi, (Σ˜
−1
ǫǫ
ˆˆǫit)
′}′ and γ = {γ ′, θ, Σ˜′υǫ}
′, and denote
the right hand side of (E-2) as Λ(I=1|F=1),w(X¯2it,Θ2). Then the APE of w on the conditional
probability of being an innovator given that the firm is financially constrained is given by
∂P̂r(It = 1|Ft = 1)
∂w
=
1∑N
i=1 Ti
N∑
i=1
Ti∑
t=1
Λ(I=1|F=1),w(X¯2it, Θˆ2)
By the delta method we know that the asymptotic variance of ∂P̂r(It=1|Ft=1)
∂w
is given by
[
1∑N
i=1 Ti
N∑
i=1
Ti∑
t=1
∂Λ(I=1|F=1),w(X¯2it, Θˆ2)
∂Θ′2
]
V ∗2
[
1∑N
i=1 Ti
N∑
i=1
Ti∑
t=1
∂Λ(I=1|F=1),w(X¯2it, Θˆ2)
∂Θ′2
]′
,
(E-7)
where V ∗2 is second stage error corrected covariance matrix of Θˆ2. The derivative of Λ(s=1|f=1),w(X¯2it, Θˆ2)
with respect to the second stage parameters, Θ2, can easily obtained, even though the al-
gebra is a bit messy.
E.2. Average Partial Effects for the Third Stage
One of the purposes of this exercise is to measure the effect of financial constraints,
Ft = 1, on R&D expenditure. For a firm i in time period t, given Xt = X¯ , where Xt is the
union of elements appearing in XRt , X
F
t , and X
I
t , the APE of financial constraint on R&D
intensity is computed as the difference in the expected R&D expenditure between the two
regimes, financially constrained and non-financially constrained, averaged over ˆ˜α and ǫˆ.
The conditional, conditional on being an innovator (sit = 1), APE of financial constraint
on R&D expenditure is given by
∆FE(Rt|X¯ ) =
∫
E(R1t|X¯ , Ft = 1, It = 1, ˆ˜α, ǫˆ)dF ˆ˜α,ǫˆ
−
∫
E(R0t|X¯ , Ft = 0, It = 1, ˆ˜α, ǫˆ)dF ˆ˜α,ǫˆ. (E-8)
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From the discussion of the third stage estimation we know that for a firm i
E(R1t|X¯ , Ft = 1, It = 1, ˆ˜α, ǫˆt) =
βf + X¯
R′β1 + µ1 ˆ˜α + Σ˜η1ǫΣ˜
−1
ǫǫ ǫˆt + ση˜1ρη˜1ζ˜C11(
ˆ˜α, ǫˆt) + ση˜1ρη˜1υ˜C12( ˆ˜α, ǫˆt) (E-9)
if F ∗t > 0, and
E(R0t|X¯ , Ft = 0, It = 1, ˆ˜α, ǫˆt) =
X¯R′t β0 + µ0 ˆ˜α+ Ση0ǫΣ
−1
ǫǫ ǫˆt + ση˜0ρη˜0ζ˜C01(
ˆ˜α, ǫˆt) + ση˜0ρη˜0υ˜C02( ˆ˜α, ǫˆt) (E-10)
if F ∗t ≤ 0, and where the correction terms – C11(X¯
I , X¯ F , ˆ˜α, ǫˆt), C12(X¯
F , X¯ F , ˆ˜α, ǫˆt), C01(X¯
I , X¯ F , ˆ˜α, ǫˆt),
and C02(X¯
I , X¯ F , ˆ˜α, ǫˆt) – are defined at the given X
I
t = X¯
I and X Ft = X¯
F . Given the above,
an estimate of the APE of financial constraint on R&D intensity, can be obtained by taking
the average of the difference in (E-9) and (E-10) over all firm-year observations for which
It = 1.
The unconditional APE’s of all other variables in the specification are simply the coef-
ficient estimates of the two regimes of the switching regression model.
E.2.1. Hypothesis Testing
Since the APE of being financially constrained in the third stage switching regression
model is a function of the correction terms constructed from the estimates of the seconds
stage, the variance of the APE will be a function of the variances of the correction terms.
Since the correction terms are in turn functions of the estimated coefficients in the second
stage, the variance of the estimated APE be a function of the variance of the estimated
second stage coefficients.
To see this, consider the the conditional APE of the financial constraint on the R&D
expenditure, which is given by
∆F Eˆ(Rt|X¯ ) =
1∑N
i=1 Ti
N∑
i=1
Ti∑
t=1
[
It
(
βˆf + X¯
R′(βˆ1 − βˆ0) + (µˆ1 − µˆ0)
ˆ˜ˆα + (ˆ˜Ση1ǫk −
ˆ˜Ση0ǫk)
ˆ˜Σ−1ǫǫ
ˆˆǫt
+ σ̂η˜1ρη˜1ζ˜C11(
ˆ˜ˆα, ˆˆǫt) + σ̂η˜1ρη˜1υ˜C12(
ˆ˜ˆα, ˆˆǫt)− σ̂η˜0ρη˜0ζ˜C01(
ˆ˜ˆα, ˆˆǫt)− σ̂η˜0ρη˜0υ˜C02(
ˆ˜ˆα, ˆˆǫt)
)]
(E-11)
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Let us denote the structural coefficients of our model as Θs = {Θ
′
2,Θ
′
3}
′ where Θ′2 and Θ
′
3
are the vector of structural coefficients estimated in the third stage respectively. Again, by
the application of the delta method we know that
Asy. Var[∆F Eˆ(Rt|X¯ )] =
[
∂∆F Eˆ(Rt|X¯ )
∂Θs
]′
V ∗s
[
∂∆F Eˆ(Rt|X¯ )
∂Θs
]
, (E-12)
where V ∗s , the error corrected asymptotic covariance matrix of Θˆs, has been derived in
appendix D. Since only the correction terms are functions of the second stage parameters
Θ2, the above involves taking the derivative of the correction terms with respect to the
second stage parameters Θ2.
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